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Africa, Mashreq, European Union: the Trilateral of the 21st century

In memory of my parents and my grandmother
To my children Michael, Sarah and Adam

From the same author

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Introduction

The statements of Donald Trump, president of the United States, on "the shitty countries", speaking of Haiti and Africa, are to be compared with its protectionist and non-cooperative ambitions at the international level. This should encourage the Mashreq countries, Africa and Europe to consider building a new model of North-South and South-South cooperation based on finding the most advantageous common denominators.
The Mashreq is often defined in relation to the Maghreb (the West). But Egypt is an African land, in terms of geography and its membership of the African Union. From this point of view, the Mashreq (East or East), encompasses the entire Arab world except North Africa.
This scheme is not a simple positioning compared to the world's leading power, but a new direction that aims to go beyond traditional commercial relations and direct investments, through co-production, setting in motion multilateral production and distribution processes, and transcontinental.
This proposal is the result of scientific research, but also the result of an experience of advising international trade in support of 350 East-Parisian companies in 66 countries, for 30 years.
The matrix of this combination of means and potential is articulated around European technology and know-how, financing by surplus-saving countries, particularly those in the Gulf, and large African markets. From this point of view, Africa ceases to be the receptacle of consumer goods imported from Asia and the reservoir of raw materials and primary agricultural products. Hence the idea of an industrialization of the continent by the transformation of its raw resources and its participation in what is called a chain of values and that I will call a division of labor inter-blocks following the more dynamic use and evolutionary factors of production and exchange. The international division of postcolonial work has frozen relations between the North and the South in a logic of subjection and submission, forgetting that, in the long term, the principle of enriching one's partner by selling him more and associating with hisprojects to generate permanent and mutually beneficial profits. A prosperous Africa, with a productive apparatus and an educated and trained population, provides opportunities for European businesses while creating jobs and economic development in African countries. It's win-win. Funding countries, like members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), would benefit from this trilateral configuration in a number of ways. First of all by no longer content to place their money in US and European bonds or actions of large groups. They will become actors in the co-production and co-marketing processes.
It is noteworthy how the Arab countries had the desire to build economic integration and a free trade area and that each step was followed by failure.
Our great challenge is to build the schemas of a progressive economic union in stages, leading to Maghreb integration (CEM), then to privileged and fusional links with the Mashreq (Egypt, GCC ...).

The purpose of this book is to make recommendations that will ensure prosperity and economic development for the people of the Gulf, in connection with their brothers in the rest of the Arab world and all of Africa.
The deepening of the GCC integration process and the success of the industrializing partnership projects must be carried out in concert with the industrialization of the other Arab countries organized in subregional communities. These are win-win cooperation and preparing the future of all Arab economies.

In the preliminary chapter, he will highlight Afro-Arab relations embracing all aspects: economic, cultural, human, geostrategic, political and religious. It will shed light on the state of Arab economies moving in an area without borders.
Freedom of thought and openness to other cultures have supported the development of science, technology and thereby economic and social development.
It is Ibn Khaldoun who analyzed the formation and dislocation of the Arabo-Muslim empires on the sociological, religious and political levels, which gives us information on the rivalries between Arab countries today.
We also have information on trade between Arabic speakers and Africans, thanks to the spirit of entrepreneurship, creativity and innovation.
The articulation between the three blocks in a complex process of multidimensional partnerships requires, in a first part, to make an inventory of the economic, human and financial potentialities of the Arabic-speaking countries of North Africa. In this regard, it will be imagined an economic community of North Africa with its strengths and weaknesses.
Starting from the socio-economic indicators, it will be possible to identify the solutions of the exit of crisis and the way of mobilizing the whole region, in order to create a dynamics of cooperation with sub-Saharan Africa.
In the same logic, a radioscopy of the Mashreq states will shed light on their economic models based on hydrocarbon exports with a nuance as far as the Emirate of Dubai is concerned. With oil prices easing, Saudi Arabia wants to embark on pharaonic projects like Neom, while others are wondering how to diversify their economies.

The Trilateral 21st Century project could allow the Gulf countries to embark on a long-term cooperation approach with the Africa bloc and the European Union. This articulation between the three entities is better explained in the second part, which will focus on Africa and its potentialities, existing regional integrations and building (first subpart).
A second sub-section will take stock of the relations between Africa and the Arabic-speaking countries, all in nuances with regard to the diversity of African and Arabic-speaking states. But there will be institutional meetings between African and Arab leaders. With the exception of Morocco, Arab countries are cautiously advancing in sub-Saharan Africa. It is necessary to suggest ways to better build a successful partnership.
In order to complete the panorama of the Trilateral, the third subpart will highlight the different facets of this special relationship between the European Union and Africa. The successive decolonizations gave rise to a politico-economic model comprador with the installation of management teams in the majority of the African countries, accepting the plunder of their resources by means of royalties. The continent has remained in the position of supplier of raw materials and agricultural products, and consumer of all capital goods, end-products and consumer goods.
The economic partnership between the European Union and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries is not 100% win-win. Some criticize these agreements by invoking the very unequal economic weight between the two entities.
The EU is the largest importer and exporter of agricultural products, industrial goods and services. Of course, this is aggregated data that implies contrasting situations according to the countries of Southern Europe and its North.
We will then arrive at the point of our demonstration, that is to say, the architecture of the Trilateral and its perspectives (fourth subpart).

The implementation of cooperative relations within three blocks (Africa / Mashreq / European Union) will favor integration through production by combining productive, human and material factors. This aims to promote collaborative production in several countries (Airbus case), in order to co-produce and co-distribute on the domestic market and / or export. This approach can take many forms such as the joint venture, holding company or multinational. The entanglement of productive apparatus may be based on a division of labor among Trilateral member countries or a specialization, based on comparative advantages.

The construction of an interregional space for free trade and capital mobility is needed from the outset. There is a need for a triangular Mashreq / Africa / European Union cooperation where hydrocarbon exporting countries with foreign exchange surpluses will have an interest in investing in the other countries of this group in productive and profitable sectors. These are not aid programs but viable co-development projects.
Several objectives will be explored: the realization of economies of scale thanks to the widening of the commercial space, the specialization of each country and of each economic zone according to the comparative advantages, the development of the research and the innovation thus promotion of education and scientific and technical training.

The Trilateral is imagined as a three-level rocket. The first level is composed of three supranational institutions : the Arab Economic Community, the African Union and the European Union. These three sets must create the political, regulatory, commercial, legal and financial environment, and implement a framework to ensure the exchange of goods and services, as well as cross-border investments.
The first bloc is embodied by Africa, represented by the African Union. It must transform itself by acquiring political, geostrategic, economic and social prerogatives, by also creating an economic commission that will bring together the different regional economic communities.
The second bloc is constituted by the Arab Economic Community, as it is the grouping of the Maghreb Economic Community, the North African Economic Union, the Gulf Cooperation Council and other non-affiliated countries, or formation of an economic zone.
Finally, the third bloc is represented by the European Union, which is the most operational group, the best organized and which has the most appropriate tools to intervene outside the borders of the Union.
The Trilateral will not be required to play the role of a programming body for future cooperation between the three blocs, nor to organize the productive activities of this new interregional integration. Emphasis will be placed on creating optimal conditions that would facilitate trade in goods and services as well as direct business investment.
Measures to promote investment opportunities between the three blocks and their protection need to be informed. The liberalization of investments and the circulation of capital within the Trilateral countries must not result in the flight of ill-gotten funds from the South to the North. The question of European and Arab funding should be linked to economic projects of common interest.

The second level that will be examined corresponds to the way in which each bloc coordinates and organizes itself, in order to deploy all its efforts in the direction of the success of its partition in the Trilateral.
Should the European Union not change its neighborhood policy and its relations with the South and the East by considering its destiny as intimately linked to the other two blocs? Its reindustrialization should go hand in hand with the industrialization of Africa and the Mashreq.
As for the Arabic-speaking countries, it is necessary to distinguish the surplus oil states in foreign exchange reserves and the countries of North Africa, a link between the Mashreq and the rest of Africa. The Gulf countries should position themselves as investors through their

SWFs in productive value systems in agriculture, industry and services, in Africa but also in the continuity of the upstream production chain or in downstream in all Arabic-speaking countries.
Pragmatism would require all Gulf countries to leave their political conflicts aside and reinforce each other economically. The proposals that will be developed in this book are intended to prepare for the post-oil era and to envisage new interregional cooperation. Economies that adhere to a process of production and wealth creation, in good understanding with their partners, would ensure the good of their people in peace and stability.

Thirdly, imagine the African Union bringing regional economic zones together around the goals of the Trilateral. African regional economic zones are not economically integrated by production, but only by trade and for both CFA franc zones by the currency. Should the African regional economic communities not be united in a federation under the auspices of the African Union, whose economic and monetary prerogatives would be deepened? This involves free trade agreements, tax, customs, economic, infrastructure and energy, investment protection and intellectual property.

The third level of this building is the Trilateral focuses on private operators, NGOs, banks and insurance companies, chambers of commerce and industry, employers associations of the three blocks.

The synergies between the three blocs and the entanglement of their productive processes should be accompanied by a change of models in African and Mashreq countries.
Should the modes of development based on the preponderance of the State, either by the management and distribution of the rent of raw materials, or by the concentration of wealth in the hands of a few families, give way to a perfectly competitive economy? ? In other words, entrepreneurship should be developed in universities and colleges.
Private initiative should be at work in creating productive activities and jobs in a stimulating and stimulating national and international environment.
Organizations supporting public, semi-public or private enterprise development should register their actions in consultation with their counterparts in the other blocks (creation of databases of business opportunities, co-organization of economic missions, symposiums and interregional conferences ...).
Other success factors are not limited to physical capital but also include human resources through education, training and knowledge exchange.
If the private sector drives this new dynamic, large projects must benefit from state intervention through economic diplomacy.
Nevertheless, States must not interfere in the unfolding of market mechanisms and take measures that could disrupt the rules of competition.
In order to boost co-production operations and value-creation processes, it is necessary to look for financial resources that can come from sovereign wealth funds, private equity funds, but also from new targeted taxes, the amounts of which will be small, affecting only the middle, upper and upper classes.

The objectives of the Trilateral should not only concern economic areas, but also include social, environmental and educational issues.
Interregional integration through production and not just trade in goods and services should implement the development of new, clean, non-polluting, renewable energy industries. Could the Trilateral succeed in the absence of Arab regional integration? If the European Union is at

an advanced stage in its economic unity and the completion of a single market, Africa should move forward in consolidating and coordinating the regional economic communities. North of the African continent, AMU is moribund. This is why a Maghreb Economic Community is needed. Further east, the Mashreq countries are mired in geostrategic rivalries paralyzing the Gulf Cooperation Council.
Rising unemployment among young people, a rapidly growing population and the scarcity of mineral resources and their long-term exhaustion pose inextricable threats to the stability, integrity and sustainability of these countries.

Should Arabic-speaking states not be aware of the dangers they face by refraining from viewing their neighbors as eternal enemies but rather as lasting partners? Their regrouping in economic communities should allow them to join forces and weigh against the great powers. A North African Economic Community aggregating the Maghreb and Egypt will be proposed as a necessary step for a coordination liaison with the GCC. These subsets, including Arab countries not affiliated with an economic zone, could form the Arab Economic Community.

The triangular relationship is presented as a three-stage rocket. The first level is inhabited by the three supranational institutions: the European Union, the Arab Economic Community and the African Union. It should create the optimal conditions that would facilitate trade in goods and services, the direct investment of enterprises, the realization of public and private public facilities, the rehabilitation of road, maritime and rail infrastructures, not forgetting the digital and renewable energies. This interregional body should facilitate investments within of the Trilateral, to direct European and Arab funding towards mixed projects, to harmonize tax legislation in an incentive way in favor of productive investments and to create the legislative texts guaranteeing the successful completion of economic operations.The three entities have a legislative, regulatory role , stimulator, promoter of synergies and accompanying companies regardless. On the second floor, the blocks are each organized on their side to strengthen the tools of intervention with their companies and economic operators, so that they are better prepared for the project the Trilateral.

The European Union should change its neighborhood policy and its relations with the South and the Arab East, considering its destiny as intimately linked to the other two blocs. Its reindustrialization will go hand in hand with the industrialization of Africa and the Mashreq.
The Arabic-speaking countries are made up of surplus oil states in terms of their foreign exchange reserves and North African countries, a link between the Mashreq and the rest of Africa. This block is expected to fulfill the function of investor through its sovereign funds in value-producing systems such as land, factories, renewable energies and digital in Africa, but also in the continuity of the production chain upstream or downstream in all Arabic-speaking countries.

Thirdly, the African Union must bring African regional economic zones together and integrate the other States in a perspective of integration into the processes of production and distribution of wealth.
But the perimeter of the African regional economic communities must be enlarged by their regrouping into a kind of federation of the latter, under the aegis of the African Union, more focused on economic and monetary issues. This involves free trade agreements, tax, customs, economic, infrastructure and energy, investment protection and intellectual property.

The third floor is occupied by private operators, NGOs, banks and insurance companies, chambers of commerce and industry, employers associations of the three blocks.

The Trilateral project should mobilize public and private operators around investment opportunities. The latter would be supported by all professional organizations and consular chambers, whose mission is to serve businesses.

In our Trilateral project, there is no question of dictating or planning production and distribution processes for SMEs / SMIs and multinational firms. Institutional intervention is required to create a legal, political, financial and social environment, as well as the conditions for valuing investments, not to mention the infrastructure markup and the availability of trained and well-qualified human resources.

It is the private entrepreneurs who will spearhead this new dynamic. However, major projects must benefit from state sponsorship through the deployment of economic diplomacy.

States must not intervene in the conduct of private sector competition mechanisms, or take measures that could disrupt them. SOEs and monopolies should not foreclose markets for goods and services from partner countries.

Taxation should be the lever to promote productive activities and penalize economic actions parasitic and rentier. Customs duties on imports of certain products that can destroy jobs in countries belonging to the three blocks must be revised upwards, except for inputs and capital goods.

The Trilateral must not only favor trade agreements and partnership, but embrace social, political and environmental issues as well.

Preliminary chapter. Brief reminder of the economic, political and social history of the Arab-Muslim space

While going through the history of Arab-Muslim thought, several lessons emerge:
- economic and social development took place in a context of freedom of thought and openness to other cultures (Greek and Roman),
- the decline of this civilization has been concomitant with the retreat into retrograde ideas and their constant rehash,
- the exchange between Arab thinkers of the three monotheistic religions has been beneficial to all,
- the support of the Sovereign was precious and created an environment conducive to intellectual creativity.

The Arab-Muslim dynasties that have succeeded each other in the post-caliphal Arab-speaking world have evolved in the same way as all the empires of their respective epochs, favoring the conquest of the throne and its transmission to their descendants.

In order to legitimize his caliphate, Muawiya Ibn Abi Sufiane (661-680) will give him the name of his ancestor Omayya Ibn Abd Shams, grand-uncle of the Prophet Muhammad, a native of the Quraychite tribe.

The Umayyads will rule the Muslim world from 661 to 750 with a state with broad borders, stretching from Damascus, their capital, to the Iberian Peninsula. Beaten by Charles Martel at Poitiers in 732, they fought the Byzantine Empire and the Khazar Empire, and removed the Visigoth Kingdom.

Unlike the Daesh charlatans, the Umayyads will integrate non-Muslims (Christians, Jews, Zoroastrians, etc.), granting them freedom of worship and broad judicial autonomy. The only obligation imposed upon them was a tax, the ǧlan, in return for their non-enrollment in the army.

This empire functioned without religious fanaticism, now most Byzantine officials at their respective posts. This religious tolerance was skilful and out of step with any religious dogmatism. It aimed at stabilizing a predominantly Christian Syria and securing a territorial base. Many scholars gave Omayya Ibn Abd Shams's descent a lack of sincerity in his conversion to Islam.

Contrary to the precepts of the Muslim religion advocating the equality of all Muslims, regardless of their ethnicity, social classes were formed in the provinces far from the empire and were the cause of unrest. Social inequalities marked the relations between Arab Muslims and conquered peoples, but also between rival Arab tribes. Those who claim to be the Prophet Mohammed will bring down others with the same legitimacy. But the objective was constantly the conquest of power and the enjoyment of its material benefits. Thus, a heteroclite movement led by the Abbasids will bring down the Umayyads, whose ruling family was assassinated after the defeat at the Grand Zab in 750. The founder of this dynasty is Abu al-Abbas, nicknamed As-Saffah and descendant of Al-Abbas Ibn Abd al-Muttalib, Mohammed's uncle. One of the Umayyad survivors will found a state in Cordoba, Andalusia, five years later.

After having reached its peak under Harun ar-Rachid, the Abbasid Empire declined to be confined to a religious role under the tutelage of Bouyides in the 10th century, then Seljuk in the 11th century. The coup de grace will come from the Mongols who will bring down Baghdad in 1258. Repelled to Cairo, a branch of the dynasty settled there maintaining the title of caliph, but under the domination of the Mamluk sultans. In 1492, Spain is completely

reconquered (taken from Granada) by Christians. Jews and Muslims are deported to North Africa.
In the Maghreb, the Muslim conquest was initiated by the Kharijites in the eighth century. They were able to convince the Berbers who were resistant to Arab domination and attached to their system of egalitarian community with the involvement of women in social and economic life. They will accompany the inclinations of the indigenous populations to share the spoils equitably and to stop disemboweling the ewes to obtain the fur of the fetuses.
The rebellions multiplied with an insurrection that will lead Maysara, a Berber leader, to seize the city of Tangier in 739 after the assassination of his governor. The Berber revolts were not aimed at challenging Islam but protecting their pastoral economy and exploiting their wealth. After the fall of the Umayyads of Syria, the West of the empire completely escaped the central power of Damascus.
The Berbers, when they could take and exercise power, did not hesitate to do so. Thus, the Almoravids (Al-Mourabitoun meaning "ribat fighters", the ribat being a small fortress) are from the Berber tribes Sanhajas Lamtounas and Guzzalas nomadic in the Sahara desert between Adrar and Tafilalet. These warrior tribes, led by Abdullah Ibn Yassin, established Sunni Islam of Maliki rite in Andalusia, North Africa and parts of West Africa. This rite is described as tolerant and less rigorous than Salafism and Wahabism.

This is the proof, if it was necessary, that they were largely in the majority, and for good reason: the Arabs, who invaded countries going from Spain to Asia (Iran, India, Indonesia, China and Far East) through Central and Eastern Europe, were not enough to settle there permanently. The debate, which is still throbbing in the Maghreb and which can lead to a rise in violence, is between Muslim Arabs and Muslim Berbers.
Defeated, the Berbers were nevertheless majority in North Africa. For various reasons, they accepted the yoke of their invaders, either to avoid paying the tax on unbelievers, or to combine the good services of the new masters of the place, or by conviction. After their release from the authority of the caliphs settled in Damascus or Baghdad, they accepted at certain moments of their history to entrust the keys of the power to a dissident coming from Mecca and pretending to belong to the family of the prophet Mohammed (soulala charifa, holy filiation).
This was the case with the Idrissids, whose dynasty was founded by Idris I, great-grandson of Al-Hassan Ibn Ali. Fleeing the threat of the Abbassids, Idris will settle in Walilah (Volubilis), under the protection of the Berber tribe of Awarbas, and with the support of other local tribes. It is instructive to notice the combination of a defector from Mecca who brought the religious guaranty of a family close to the Prophet and tribes who were looking for a guide (imam) from outside, referee and providential man. The Idrissids are the builders of a state, an administration (the Makhzen, which means "public treasury"), several cities (Fez, named capital, Salé, Wazzequr, Tamdoult and Basra) and a university Al-Quaraouiyine who will participate in the Islamic Golden Age of Science, Arts and Letters alongside major civilizational centers like Cordoba, Cairo and Baghdad.
Their reign, which began in 789, was marked by religious pragmatism. They abandoned the Shiite rite to embrace Sunnism in order to stay in touch with their Umayyad neighbors living in Spain. The latter, in an objective alliance with the Zirids, vassals of the Fatimids, and Zenetes will be right of this dynasty in 985.
The conquests and rivalries between Muslim factions were mainly dictated by the search for agricultural and mining resources. Muslim expansionism was less violent than that of invaders from Christian civilizations, like the Vikings from Scandinavia who coveted the potential resources offered by the southern Mediterranean. The multiplication of the kingdoms and vassals of the two great dynasties is based on socio-economic considerations against a

backdrop of divergent interpretations of the Koran and hadiths. Thus the kingdom of Berghouata (744-1058), an aggregation of tribes from the Masmoudas who, after participating in the Kharijite revolt of Maysara, will establish an independent emirate in the region of Tamesna, between Safi and Sale (Atlantic coast of the current Morocco), under the direction of Tarif al-Matghari. This state will have the presumption to invent a new cult inspired by Islam and Judaism as well as local ancient beliefs and adopted a holy book inspired by the Koran. Despite ideological differences, they established diplomatic and commercial relations with the Umayyads of Cordoba. They were anxious, above all, to weaken the Fatimids and their allies Zenetes.
Another example of the primacy of the realpolitik on the religious: the dynasty of the Midrarids, founded by Samgou Idn Wassoul al-Miknassi and based in Sijilmassa (758-1055). After officially adopting the sufrite rite kharijism, the new rulers will recognize from 883 the religious supremacy of the Sunni caliphate of the Abbasids of Baghdad, while maintaining excellent relations with other Kharijite states, such as the kingdom of the Rostemides of Tahert led by a dynasty of Persian origin. Sijilmassa, like all the kingdoms and caliphates, will develop a business flow with the kingdom of Ghana, at the time center of gravity of gold deposits of West Africa.
This juicy trade of precious metals will attract the covetousness of the Umayyads of Córdoba, the Fatimids as well as the Almoravids who will have the last word by crushing the Midrarid kingdom in 1055.

The religious cement (a schism of Islam) has always played a role of mobilization of certain tribes to conquer the power and then exercise it. Soon, the religious base gives way to an exercise of power as in any state claiming any religion. Thus the Almohades (Al-Muwahhidun) launched their operation of conquest of power against the Almoravids on the basis of a puritanical moral reform advocated by Mohammed Ibn Toumert in 1120 and supported mainly by the tribes of the Masmoudas of the High Atlas (Al-Maghrib al-Aqsa, current Morocco). His successor, Abd al-Mumin, was quick to establish a hereditary regime in 1130 and the Berber tribes who supported him overthrew the Almoravids in 1147 and were in turn eliminated by the Merinids in 1269.
The Bani Marin, a Berber tribe with no specific doctrine, had to rely on their service in wars and battles, such as that of Alarcos (1195), won by the Almohad camp, and that of Las Navas de Tolosa (1212) that the Merinid troops won against the Almohad soldiers by joining forces with Christian troops.
The Maghreb population is in the image of the origins of its Berber population: genetically modified following successive invasions of Phoenicians, Romans, Vandals, Arabs, Spaniards, Turks and French. In addition, Islamized Jews and Spaniards arrived in North Africa after 1492 from Andalusia. The arrival of the Hilalian tribes (Arab Bedouin tribes) expelled from Egypt accelerated at all levels the Arabization of several Berber tribes.

It is Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406), the true founder of Arabic-speaking sociology, who makes the most objective analysis of the process of taking power through the esprit de corps (asabiyya) followed by a period of prosperity and ending with decline. The exercise of responsibilities in all peace, with loss of solidarity and divergence of interests, even disappointment of the left-behind, explains the fall of the rulers facing the rise to power of one or more tribes who will know the the same way and will fall in their turn.
Reading the biography and works of Ibn Khaldun is extremely important in understanding the past and present of Mashreq and North African societies. Ibn Khaldun is undoubtedly a historian who has used sociology in the modern sense to explain individual and collective behavior, such as nomads and city dwellers, Arabs and Berbers. We will learn that the

Maghreb is dominated by Berbers and Arabized Berbers. This last category is fundamental to get out of clichés. The mixing of populations forbids talking about races or ethnic groups. That is why I propose the qualifier of country or Arabic-speaking peoples that aggregates populations with different origins but who have agreed to speak a language: Arabic, the only structured and in this case that of the Koran, a book whose immanence has imposed itself by force or by force.

The Moslem religion, or rather a version of Islam, is not at the origin of the outbreak of a founding violence of a new order, but indeed of the desire, in the sense of René Girard, of s' to monopolize the possessions that the other tribes possess. It is no coincidence that the Berber populations of the Maghreb have adopted the Kharijite schism which is a dissidence compared to the established order in Damascus or Baghdad, against the backdrop of tribal rivalries sometimes arbitrated by an imam from Mashreq (the Idrissids) or directly as indigenous inhabitants such as Almohads, Berghouata or Almoravids.

Ibn Khaldun explained the causes of the historical evolutions of the Maghreb tribes by social, cultural and climatic factors. It is the movement of an asabiyya (esprit de corps) that leads to power (mulk). Ibn Khaldun, therefore, does not claim to find in the history of some plan of God and notes that the religious feeling is denatured and dissolves at the same time as the links of solidarity of the asabiyya are distended. This doctrine runs counter to the rigorous Malikite idealism that reigned then in the Maghreb of the fourteenth century.
Voltaire, in his Preface to his Essay on Universal History (1754), praises this toleration of Islam in these terms:
"In our centuries of barbarism and ignorance, which followed the decay and tearing of the Roman Empire, we received almost all Arabs: astronomy, chemistry, medicine, and especially remedies sweeter and healthier than those who had been known to the Greeks and Romans. Algebra is the invention of these Arabs; our arithmetic itself was brought to us by them.

I quote again Voltaire in his Dictionnaire philosophique (1764):
"These same Moors cultivated science successfully, and taught Spain and Italy for more than five centuries. Things are changed. The land of St. Augustine is no more than a haven for pirates. "
A proof if one is needed that the Maghreb population is largely of Berber or Arabized Berber origin is in this quotation from Ibn Khaldun:
"Abu Abd Allah Ibn Shoib, a member of the Berber Dokkala tribe". Now everyone knows today that in Dokkala, there is not a single individual speaking Berber. In addition, this region was partly occupied by the Portuguese. To oppose the Arabs to the Berbers at the moment does not make sense.

What made the economic and social strength of the Arab-Muslim world is a great openness to other civilizations, tolerance vis-à-vis other religions by non-discrimination against citizens who have adopted another religion than Islam with the support of the political authorities. Thus the Caliph Al-Mamun created in Baghdad the House of Wisdom in 832, making an important place for Greek philosophy which was introduced in the Persian and Arab intellectual circles. The Peripatetic School began to have representatives among them: this was the case of Al-Kindi, Al-Fârâbî, Ibn Sina (Avicenna) and Ibn Rushd (Averroes). Hunayn Ibn Ishaq, a Christian Arab, led the House of Wisdom in 870. They grouped, translating and arranging the best of Greek, Indian and Iranian works. They submitted these writings to grids of reading making it possible to build the bases of the arabo-Moslem philosophy during the 9th and 10th centuries.

Under the rule of the Abbasids, there were many thinkers and scientists considered as "heretical" or non-Muslim Muslims while they played a major role in transmitting Greek, Indian or pre-Islamic, Mesopotamian and Iranian works to the West. The Persian thinkers Al-Farabi and Avicenna, as well as the Arabic al-Kindi, who combined Aristotelianism and Neoplatonism with other currents in Islam. They were considered by some as breaking with religious orthodoxy, even as disbelieving philosophers.

The Arabo-Muslim philosophical school of Greek inspiration (peripatetic, among others) has declined after the death of Averroes, while Spain post-Arab-Muslim domination will experience a new boom.

Moses Maimonides, leader of the Jewish community in Egypt, exerted influence in the most remote countries such as Iraq and Yemen. It is from the twelfth century that Muslim thought will curl up on mystical currents, moving away from the rational critical mind. The texts are rehearsed according to the good will of the dominant political powers by silencing all the heterodox ideas.

It is unfortunate that the Arab-Muslim thought stopped in the fourteenth century to skate around sterile discussions about the sex of angels, not pursuing works like those of Ibn Khaldun, true founder of sociology and socio-political systems. His stroke of genius was to have analyzed the three stages which succeeded one another in three generations, the duration of each being estimated at forty years:

- the first generation is characterized by an austere life, but the members of the tribe and / or the community are animated by an unfailing solidarity and an esprit de corps (Al Assabya) which will overcome the power in place;
- the second generation will settle in ease and opulence and will fully enjoy the enjoyments of the castle life, gradually losing the esprit de corps, but will have the necessary resources to keep the power;

the third generation will lose all esprit de corps and disintegrate in favor of a new tribe or group of tribes and disappear as a civilization and as a dynasty.

The Arabic-speaking world before the Ottoman occupation resembled Germany before its reunification by Otto von Bismarck in 1871. Successive colonizations prevented the emergence of a rallying movement exceeding the fratricidal hostilities. We can also say that the confinement in behavior around outdated principles and the weakening of rationality in the public decision played against this pan-Arab unity or at least that of the Maghreb and Mashreq.

It is more appropriate to understand the present of the disunity of the Arabic-speaking countries in the light of what happened several centuries ago. Who is best placed to tell us the facts using a multifaceted reading chart? Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406), historian, witness of his time and who held office in the big cities of Maghreb?

The author of the Prolegomena (Al-Muqadima) was a sociologist, economist, ethnologist, geographer and political scientist, before the creation of these disciplines. His thought is more precious than that of pseudo-historians in the pay of this or that regime. Throughout his writings, he considered the Maghreb as a single entity shared by several feudal lords. Thus, he explained the existence of territorial budgets and considered the cities mentioned below as part of a single Maghreb space.

"The revenue of the cadi (governor) of Fez suffices for his expenses, and so is the cadi of Tlemcen. The more revenue and expenditure are in a city, the more wealth there is. This is the case in Fez because the products flow quickly to meet the demands of luxury; so this city is in a very prosperous state. In Oran,

Constantine, Algiers and Biskera, one can notice the same proportion between the expenses and the importance of the city ". in Ibn Khaldoun, op.cit.
If we spotlight the economic and social life in North Africa, as highlighted by Ibn Khaldun, we can understand the market mechanisms and fiscal and fiscal policies of his time. This will allow us to better understand the behavioral sociology of economic agents in the Arabic-speaking world of the 20th and 21st centuries.
First of all, let us take tax evasion and the refusal of the wealthy North Africans to pay the tax. This is because the Muslim religion originally allowed Muslims to pay zakaah (alms) as the fifth pillar of Islam. It was freely accepted by the believers in its amount and payment. His performance was low. Only non-Muslims were required to pay a tax called jizia offsetting their non-participation in the war effort.

The newly-conquered state had an austere lifestyle and, as a result, applied low tax rates, which contributed to increased production and broadening the tax base. After a phase of naivety leaders, they tasted luxury, spending lavish, and applied a strong taxation, which was likely to reduce economic activity. Unlike zakat, the tax is seen as an instrument of domination and oppression of the ruling tribes against others. Is this analysis not relevant?

Ibn Khaldun theorized before the classical and neoclassical thought the optimal fiscal policy. He suggests that the sovereign invents new taxes by levying a certain sum on the price of all the objects sold in the markets, and he taxes the goods when they are introduced into the city. The ruler is forced to take these measures because public officials need strong treatment in order to live in luxury, and a large increase has been made in the army.
The author of Prolegomena explains the bankruptcy of entrepreneurs and farmers in the fourteenth century in the Maghreb spoliation tax pressure, the nepotism of the leaders and a stranglehold on the wholesale trade by the entourage of the king, which annihilated the mechanisms of market and pure and perfect competition. This theme is topical. In the Arabic-speaking countries, economic underdevelopment is the result of the rentier behavior of the State as well as its acolytes and the arbitrariness exerted on the economic agents, the only ones able to develop the production and the trade. When I think that this author is absent from history textbooks of economic thought, including in the Arabic-speaking countries, there is enough to remain perplexed.

His analysis of the nepotism of political power vis-à-vis private economic actors sheds light on rentier and clientelist behavior in Arabic-speaking countries and explains their decline. This is supported by Daron Acemoglu (Massachusetts Institute of Technology professor, MIT) and James Robinson (Harvard professor). Indeed, in their book Why Nations Failed: The Origins of Power, Poverty and Prosperity, the authors drew on ancient and contemporary history to explain the unprecedented levels of economic growth. Their new approach to economic institutions and organizations aims to seek ways to improve economic development and eradicate misery. Pluralistic (so-called "inclusive") political institutions contribute to wealth creation. They are "extractive" when an elite invests political power to take advantage of the economic interest.
Nepotism, the economy of rent, the political and economic stranglehold of a small number of families who close the game of competition are the cause of underdevelopment and poverty.

Oligopolies prevent competition, technological innovation, the emergence of a productive economy and give way to parasitic activities.
After the seizure of power, the ruler silenced the oppositions and led political domination and economic domination by increasing his wealth at the expense of other tribes. Ibn Khaldun writes: "Then the sovereign invents new taxes; he levies on the markets a certain sum on the price of all the objects sold, and he subjects to a tax the goods themselves, when they are introduced into the city. This policy is imposed by the operating expenses of the State and the substantial remuneration of public officials whose lifestyle is luxurious, especially in the army.
This mismanagement will lead to excessive taxation negatively impacting production and economic activity. This is the idea that will be defended centuries later by neoclassical economists, as expressed by Ibn Khaldun (op.cit.): "When the empire is ready to succumb, the weight of taxes has usually reached its last limit, The markets are becoming miserable as a result of the discouragement of the traders, which announces the ruin of the public prosperity, misfortune of which the State will suffer. This continues until the fall of the empire.

The beginning of the formation of the empire is marked by a modest level of public expenditure, the new leaders coming from nomadic tribes whose way of life is more humble. Tax rates are lower but tax revenues are substantial. The exercise of power will transform new sultans into consumers of luxury goods like those around them. In order to cope with lavish spending, they raise taxes and weaken the constructive abilities of traders and farmers asphyxiated by the heavy tax. Ibn Khaldun made this discovery several centuries before the American Arthur Laffer and his formula "too much tax kills the tax" as well as his famous curve that bears his name. In the Prolegomena, Ibn Khaldun writes: "In an empire which has just been founded, the impositions are light and bring back a lot; but when it comes to an end, they are heavy and yield little. "
The relevance of this analysis comes from the lack of reference to an ideology. It focused on a more measurable context given the narrowness of the space studied. Nepotism and greed by the public authorities explain the decline of the Arab-Muslim civilization. By robbing men, they are deprived of the will to work and their discouragement is proportional to the vexations they experience. "If the acts of oppression happen often and reach the community in all its livelihoods, we will completely give up work, because the discouragement will be complete" op.cit. This is the beginning of the end of the effort and the creation of wealth. Disorganization wins the empire; towns and villages are empty of their inhabitants.
Of the genius in the pure state of Ibn Khaldun the economist, here is the proof: "the increase of the taxes had been made gradually, without it having noticed that they had carried them beyond the rate primitively established and without knowing who did it. So this increased rate remains as an obligation to which we have always been accustomed. Later, the tax goes beyond the limits of moderation and destroys the love of work among farmers. When they compare the costs and burdens they have to bear with the profits and benefits they can expect, they give themselves up to discouragement, and many of them renounce the cultivation of land "op.cit.

Land is the main source of value creation and wealth accumulation. It concentrates the desires of those in power who impose on it a complex tax system where several methods of calculation coexist according to property regimes. Each region had its property tax that took into account the type of crop or irrigation. The collection of the tax could be done by a rich farmer for a fee. If cities have become urbanized and people's living standards have increased,

allowing the expansion of the empire, it is thanks to sustained growth of agricultural production due to the use of new agricultural and hydraulic techniques . It must be thought that taxation has not been prohibitive, on the contrary. Military and administrative expenditures were financed by broadening the tax base through conquest, improving human capital productivity, and farming.
The control of water management was inspired by Persian, Roman and Byzantine works. The system of qanates (pipes), imported from Iran, has been implemented until Spain. It captures water flowing from the mountains and routes it to the plains. The noria, a bucket wheel stimulated by the force of the current or animals, extracted water under the rocks. The new techniques have been developed thanks to the advances of scientists and engineers in mathematics and physics.
In the 9th century, the Banu Moussa brothers were the first Arab scientists to study Greek texts, especially those of Archimedes. Their oldest known book in the West, thanks to its translation by Gerard of Cremona in the twelfth century, is entitled Book of Measurement of Plane and Spherical Figures. Among other remarkable achievements, the brothers Banou Moussa wrote in 850 a book of ingenious processes in which they give the plans of a hundred mechanical devices and their instructions for use: crank, valve, valve, gas mask, pump, tap, kettle, automatic fountain, etc.
Al-Jazari has to his credit numerous innovations and mechanical creations exposed in his book of the knowledge of mechanical processes (Kitabrifairi al-hiyal al-handasiyya) published in 1206. Among these are the hydraulic pumps , automatic hydraulic pumping machines, automatic machines, an analog calculator (ancestor of the first computers), programmable mechanical humanoids, the crank, the hydraulics connected to the watch industry, the elephant clock and the suction pump double automatic effect (which is part of the contemporary steam engine).
Traditional crops such as olive, vine and wheat have been enriched by tropical plantations from Asia. The extent of the empire has favored the emergence of new fruits and vegetables like aubergine, saffron, citrus, watermelon, melon, artichoke, spinach, shallot, banana ... A first fruit processing gave rise to the making of jams and candied fruits. A food industry was born. Rice and sorghum were staple foods.
Maurice Lombard (1904-1965) is a historian who supported the excellence of textile production under the Roman or Sassanid empires. Indeed, it was necessary to dress the soldiers and equip the tens of thousands of sailboats. The emergence of wealthy social classes and increasing urbanization have been accompanied by a strong demand for luxury fabrics and clothing.
The generalization of paper in the Umayyad Empire increased the demand for textile fibers. The use of linen and wool since Antiquity has been enriched by the cultivation of cotton of Indian origin, particularly in Egypt and Syria. The production of silk in the seventh century benefited from Chinese techniques. The carpet was not only a floor covering but also a liquid placement. All this know-how has been dispersed in the Arab-Muslim world, as far as Asia and Europe.
The Arab-Muslims were great sailors, inventors of terms such as admiral, arsenal, caban, caulking, tar, reef or azimuth.
The Umayyads built a naval power that will take control of the Mediterranean ports. Ports were built and old ones enlarged. If the Maltese language is classified as Semitic, it is because of the Arab domination from the year 1048.

In Egypt, the caliph Abd al-Malik (646-705) mobilized thousands of shipbuilding specialists in the House of Industry (dar al sinâ'a). This intra-Mediterranean trade was intense, which benefited coastal cities. These built fortresses (ribat) forming a chain of Damascus in

Tangiers. Permanent trade flows crossed African countries to Europe, particularly between the Maghreb and the Iberian Peninsula.
In the Mashreq, maritime connections intensified with India and the Far East as early as the 9th century, reaching Canton in China. Navigation on the high seas was possible only through knowledge of the mechanisms of monsoons and techniques imported from Mesopotamia and India. Arab-Muslim scholars will perfect this knowledge by developing maps and measuring instruments to navigate. This industry demanded more or less noble wood. A rigorous management of the forests was imposed but wars were declared to the Byzantines in order to monopolize their wood. The ships also borrowed rivers like the Nile, the Euphrates, the Tigris or the Guadalquivir to supply the big cities of the interior like Baghdad, Córdoba or Cairo by complex mechanisms. The conquests have enabled the reunification of terrestrial, river and maritime networks. The caravans that crossed the Sahara, Arabia, Iran and Central Asia found refuge in what can be likened to a parking area. These are the caravanserais with their foundouk (inns), a kind of building that welcomed the merchants and their pack animals used to transport goods and food, along the roads and in the cities of Mashreq and Maghreb. There was food, feed for cattle and water tanks. These caravanserais (or khans) could be public or private, depending on the period and their location. These khans ensured the safety of property and people and survived the dynasties. A public postal service ensured the transmission of mail from one end of the empire to another.
The empire imported teak from India, cypresses, pines and pines from Europe, especially from Venice. The ports received foreigners whose ships paid taxes ranging from 2.5 to 10%.
Abu Bakr Mohammad Ibn Zakariya al-Razi (865-925) is a multidisciplinary scholar who has had a definite influence on this quickly forgotten Arab-Muslim civilization. He describes the actors of this maritime trade in these terms: "A convoy left Alexandria went to Tripoli in Libya and Seville. Of the twenty-two ships, two belonged to the governor of Alexandria, one to the vizier, another was chartered by a lady of high rank, and finally another was that of the Tunisian ruler al-Mu'izz. This is an overview of the triangular trade between Mashreq, Africa and Europe. Note among the actors of this maritime adventure a woman. We are far from the carriers of the niqab of this 21st century.

During his stay in Spain, this Iranian doctor testifies to the dynamics of the great export of Sevillian notables: "Their properties produce an excellent oil that ships export to the East. The production is so abundant that if we did not export this oil, the inhabitants could not keep it or get the least price.

Arab merchants and sailors were prospecting all over the African coast. They bought gold, ivory and slaves: the Zanj. These were sold in Yemen and Iraq. This triangular trade united Africa, India, China and the Abbasid Empire. The goods exchanged were dates, fruits, olives, oil, leather, silk, cotton, Chinese porcelain, soap, perfumes, pearls, ebony and ivory.
The merchants sold to the Africans fabrics and luxury goods and bought them iron for re-export to India against swords and other weapons.
The Arab-Muslim civilization shone on the world, because its scientists and men of letters innovated. Now it is the reign of ignorance and ignorance maintained by the powers in order to perpetuate their domination.

Among the causes of the socio-economic decline of the Maghreb in the fourteenth century, there is the nepotism of the sultan who appropriates goods by force or makes them yield at a low price, because nobody dares to bid against him, which causes losses for the sellers.
Ibn Khaldun is the privileged witness of the fall of the Arabic-speaking sultanates and the emergence of Europe and Asia, as he says: "If wealth has decreased in the Maghreb and

Ifrīkiya (current Tunisia) they have not diminished in the country of the Slavons and the Franks. If their quantity has become smaller in Egypt and Syria, it has not experienced a diminution in India and China.

On the contrary, what made the strength of the Arab-Muslim empire is the extent of its space. This statement of Ibn Khaldun is edifying: "If the empire is very large and consists of several provinces, we can gather workers from all these countries and join their arms for the accomplishment of the enterprise" op.cit . Even more awesome when the author of Al-Muqadima suggests that the construction of big cities can only be achieved by the combination of a large human capital and machines that strengthen the productive forces such as winches and other gear of this kind. It is therefore through technology and the expanse of territory within the framework of a powerful empire that one can build monuments, buildings and large cities.

There is a link between work and the accumulation of wealth. The scholar of the fourteenth century writes: "See the cities where there are few people; the profits and the profits are very small because they do not do any great work. We can also conclude from this that in the cities where people work a lot, the inhabitants are very rich and enjoy great ease "op.cit.

What commands admiration is that at that time there was an ecological awareness of urban planning projects and what we can now call the master plans of land use planning.

Ibn Khaldun, ecological before the hour, writes: "For a city to be guaranteed against the deleterious influences of the atmosphere, it must be built in a place where the air is pure and which is not subject to diseases . If the air is dormant and of poor quality, or if the city is situated in the vicinity of corrupted waters, foul-smelling exhalations or unhealthy marshes, the infection of the surroundings will be introduced promptly and will give diseases to all the living things that this city contains "op.cit.

The development of Arabic-speaking countries was facilitated by the circulation of a currency which inspired confidence and whose issue was guaranteed by the seal of the Sultan.

The sicca was the term for the making of gold and silver coins as these were instruments of exchange of goods. "It is through his ministry that, in commercial transactions, good money is distinguished from bad, and that it is the known type, printed on the currencies by the authority of the sovereign, which guarantees their goodness and prevents all fraud ". Ibn Khaldun, op.cit.

According to several accounts, it was Mossab, son of Ez-Zobeir, who was the first to strike dinars and dirhams in 690, on the orders of his brother Abd Allah, when he exercised sovereignty in the Hejaz . Mossab engraved on one side the word blessing and on the other the name of God. Previously, Muslims used gold and silver in trade, while dinars and dirhams were carried by the Persians. This means of payment of metal origin prohibited any excessive monetary creation, generating inflation. What Ibn Khaldun calls the bidding of goods is not the cause of monetary imbalances but the insufficiency of the products put in circulation following the increase in demand: "If the city is large and contains many inhabitants , so that the requirements of luxury are very numerous, these conveniences will be much demanded, and each one will try to obtain as much as its means will allow it "op.cit. In reality, we have a photograph of a pure market where the richest monopolize the goods at higher prices than can support the poor, hence the inflationary surges. What explains the insufficiency of the supply is the quasi absence of importation of goods of current consumption. Production is unable to meet demand. Monetary speculation is absent, as evidenced by this quote: "If the fund (or commodities) from which one derives an advantage and a profit is the product of a special art, this advantage and this profit represent the price of the work of labor. craftsman, and this is what is designated by the word gain (kinya); the work is there for everything "op.cit. In this

sense, we find the law of value work developed several centuries later by D. Ricardo and K. Marx.
Money is only a general equivalent of goods and has the three functions: unit of account, means of payment and store of value. This is brilliantly explained by Ibn Khaldun: "As for these two metals, they can not be an object of traffic, since they are the base to which all that is gain, acquisition or treasure" op.cit.
More precisely, metallic money is a store of value and hoarding instrument. Gains are made on gold or silver but "if you look for other materials, it is only with the intention of taking advantage of market fluctuations to sell them advantageously in order to obtain gold and silver. money "op.cit.
Let's turn now to Ibn Khaldun's vision of international trade and trade between North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa.
Before David Ricardo and before the theoreticians of comparative advantage in international trade (exchanging the products which we have a good value for money in his Prolegomena (Al-Muqadima), Ibn Khaldun had already mentioned the wealth provided by the trade with other countries in these terms:
"A merchant who has foresight never carries abroad goods other than those which the rich and the poor, the sovereign and the men of the people, also need. This is an essential condition for ensuring promptness. If it confines itself to bringing to this country objects which only a part of the population needs, it will be difficult to get rid of them. "Op.cit. It is very instructive to see how Ibn Khaldun favors large export, much more lucrative than local trade.
Two destinations are popular: sub-Saharan Africa and Mashreq. "That's why traders who are used to traveling to the land of blacks are more comfortable and richer than others" op.cit. Traders take risks on dangerous roads and desert lands where water is often lacking. Only reckless traders undertake such trips. "So we see that goods from the land of blacks are very rare and very expensive, and so are ours among these peoples.

The individuals who do this business earn, for this reason, a lot of money and quickly amass great fortunes. Those of our country who trade with the Orient also get rich very quickly, which is due to the length of the road they must make "op.cit. Domestic trade is less profitable because of the fierce competition, the large number of traders and the abundance of goods. There is a close relationship between risk taking and profit.
The main lesson to be learned from this economic boom is the entrepreneurial and sometimes adventurous spirit that went hand in hand with creativity and innovation, far from rentier entrepreneurs taking advantage of their political positions as is the case today. Brave all the dangers, the merchants went to distant countries to buy, sell, barter by cargo, which assured them more than comfortable profits. A single ship from China was estimated at 500,000 dinars of gold. Spices, highly prized for their therapeutic qualities, were a profitable investment. Maurice Lombard quotes in Islam in its first magnitude. 8th-11th century A mid-10th century document describing the organization of a business house managed by a family group: "The mother house was in Fustât, Egypt, headed by the head of the family and his eldest son. The younger man was in charge of the Aden counter, the latter traveling to India, as far as Ceylon and Colombo. The maternal uncle of the young men was also sent as a business agent. ". According to the author, the wealthy merchant was a man who taught himself his account books and correspondence as well as his credit notes. Mr. Lombard said that the merchant "had technical treaties in order to better manage his business. [...] Beside this often practical instruction, the great merchant possessed a real culture, he prided himself on religious erudition and poetry. The great merchant played the role of patron and benefactor. He offered shelter and lodging to students, teachers and pilgrims "op.cit.
The commercial interconnections between the Arab space and Europe were via the Black Sea, the Caspian Sea and Russia, where treasures of Arab currencies were found.
The geographer, native of Palestine, Chams ad-Din Al-Maqdisi (946-1000) delivered the products traded at the mouth of the Volga. He writes in "Revivification of Muslim Spirituality": "Furs of sable, gray squirrel, ermine, marten and fox; beaver pelts, spotted hare, birch bark and fur caps, glue and fish teeth, amber, honey; hawks, swords, armors, woods, Slav slaves, sheep and large cattle ".

The development of international trade has created a growing need for metal money whose value has been secured by precious metals. The influx of gold came at once from wars, raids, trade with black Africa and mining, as well as from the recycling of yellow metal from Persian palaces and Egyptian tombs.

Advances in mercury gold processing allowed for steady production. Ten thousand miners worked permanently in the Almaden mines in Spain to extract mercury, which benefited the entire empire. Silver mines have occupied ten thousand miners at Ma'din Benjhîr in the Kabul mountains of Afghanistan. The gold dinar, the dominant currency, was meticulously manufactured in monetary workshops in the main cities of the Arab-Muslim world.

This international trade was ensured by the metal currency, an embryonic exchange market using a method developed by the mathematicians of Baghdad. The conversion of currencies was done by banks whose capital was the property of wealthy merchants. The invention of the check responded to a concern for securing the means of payment, in order to avoid the transport of funds. A check issued in Baghdad could be cashed in Kairouan or Fez. In these commercial relations, there was no discrimination between Muslims, Jews and Christians.

After this historical review of the state of Maghrebian space in relation to the East and sub-Saharan Africa and the socio-political and economic behavior of the peoples of the Arab region, here is a radioscopy of Arab and African economies.

First part. The economic community of North Africa and the Mashreq: how to rebuild the unified space?

First subpart. The North African Economic Community: Strengths and Weaknesses

Chapter 1: Brief Overview of North African Economies.

Table 1. Population of North African countries (2016)

	Population (en millions) Population (in millions) Rates growth	demographic Average	Urban population	Average age	Labor force (in millions) (Activity rate)
Algeria	39 666 519	1,9 %	70,7 %	24 years	11 770 000 (46,8 %)
Egypte	91 508 084	2,1 %	43,1 %	23 years	28 870 000 (52,9 %)
Libya	6 278 438	0,3 %	78,6 %	25 years	1 195 000 (55,4 %)
Morrocco	34 377 511	1,3 %	60,2 %	25 years	12 270 000 (52,7 %)

Mauritania	4 067 564	2,4 %	59,9 %	20 years	Nd (55,1 %)
Tunisia	11 253 554	1,1 %	66,8 %	27 years	4 044 000 (51,3 %)

Table prepared by us using data from the UN, the IMF and the World Bank (2016).

North Africa has a population of 200,150,000, of whom over 100 million live in Egypt and a rate of natural increase, one of the highest in the region at 2.1%, which explains the large proportion of people living in sub-Saharan Africa. 30 years: 62% of the population. In Morocco, adolescents and young people (aged 10 to 24) represent more than 30% of the population, while in Algeria, young people represent 70% of the population.
In Tunisia, 24.5% of the population is aged between 15 and 29, which is a matter of constant concern for all successive governments before and after the 2011 revolution.
According to its Office of the High Commissioner for Planning (HCP), Morocco is expected to reach 43.6 million people in 2050, an increase of 272,000 people per year. Of course, the fertility rate has dropped between the 1960s and the 1990s. Families do not count eight to ten children, but three. However, advances in medicine have reduced infant mortality and contributed to a significant improvement in life expectancy.

The population is divided between discontent and resignation, but the Maghreb youth is bubbling and no one can predict its behavior if despair is the only perspective.
The demonstrations in northern Morocco, Jarada and other Moroccan cities, are indicative of the malaise of this youth without hope or promising tomorrow. After the smear campaign conducted by the Moroccan official media accusing the demonstrators of being manipulated by foreigners, especially Algeria, the idea that I defended in the media has made its way. Indeed, the culprits (to be judged after a thorough investigation) are not the people who have demonstrated, but the corrupt and local officials who have failed in their mission to serve the public interest.

Table 2. GDP (in billions of US dollars, USD) and GDP growth rate of North African countries

	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Algéria	209,70 (2,8 %)	213,52 (3,8 %)	166,84 (3,9 %)	168,32 (3,6 %)	178,43 (2,9 %)
Égypt	285,44 (2,1 %)	301,54 (2,2 %)	330,16 (4,2 %)	342,70 (3,8 %)	356,41 (4 %)
Libyia	66,04 (-13,6 %)	44,42 (-24 %)	39,68 (-6,4 %)	39,39 (-3,3 %)	51,41 (13,7 %)

Morrocco	106,83 (4,5 %)	109,88 (2,6 %)	100,59 (4,5 %)	104 (1,8 %)	111,09 (4,8 %)
Mauritania	5,72 (6,1 %)	5,53 (5,4 %)	4,86 (1,2 %)	4,72 (3,2 %)	4,79 (4,79 %)
Tunisia	46,25 (2,4 %)	47,61 (2,3 %)	43,58 (0,8 %)	42,39 (1,5 %)	41,67 (2,8 %)

Table prepared by us using data from the UN, the IMF and the World Bank.

Moroccan public opinion is convinced of the need for a profound reform of the judiciary and administrations, in order to improve the management of public funds. The example comes from China, where the Communist Party, fearing popular discontent against corrupt leaders, has led an unprecedented campaign of sanitation within it of elements that have been confused in cases of embezzlement of public funds. Several senior leaders have been put under lock and key. The gifts to public officials, once tolerated, have been removed, which has dropped the luxury market. I have always argued that an unrelenting fight against corruption would earn 2 to 3% of GDP.

Population growth is one of the explanations for rural exodus and illegal emigration. Thus, in predominantly agricultural countries, there is a more or less large urban population. Indeed, it rises to 70.7% in Algeria because of the post-independence socialist model, based on poorly controlled industrialization and the sacrifice of agriculture, craftsmanship and tourism.

The case of Egypt, with 43.1% of urban dwellers, is symptomatic of the weakness of fertile agricultural land and the attraction exercised by large urban agglomerations.
Libya has not been spoiled by nature in agriculture, but is full of oil. Hence this high figure of 78.6% urban. But the mono-production of hydrocarbons and the omnipresence of the Libyan state have favored the location of the population in the big cities.

Morocco, which has opted, since independence, for an active irrigation policy through the construction of dams, depends on rainfall for its economic growth rate. The abandonment by power of any rural development policy and the marginalization of the peasantry have pushed rural youth towards cities or Europe. The introduction of electricity and drinking water was effective only recently. According to the HCP, Moroccan cities would house 73.6% of the country's inhabitants in 2050. The rural population would experience a slight decline in its workforce, from 13.4 million people in 2014 to 11.5 millions around 2050.

Tunisia presents in a few details the same characteristics.

In volume, Egypt produces value added almost at the same level as the five Maghreb states combined. Algeria, despite its decline between 2013 and 2016 due to falling oil prices, ahead of Morocco with a GDP of 168.32 billion dollars in 2016 against 104 billion dollars for Morocco.
The GDP of Libya is in constant decline because of the civil war.
We can distinguish the two hydrocarbon-producing countries, Algeria and Libya, which are experiencing a concomitant evolution of their growth rates and oil prices with a marked deterioration of the Libyan situation due to the civil war which does not know of respite.

Morocco and Tunisia depend on tourism, foreign investment, transfers from their diasporas and exports to the European Union, the main customer. Tourism revenues fell by 3.5%. The influx of tourists has slowed down between 20 and 40% according to professionals. Transfers of Moroccans abroad fell by 2.4% in 2008 compared to 2007. This figure reached 14.8% in the first half of 2009. The spate of unemployment in Spain has forced the North Africans, and especially Moroccans, to return to their countries of origin in a definitive way.
Tunisia presents the same fragilities as Morocco, but aggravated by the Arab Spring. The Tunisian economy is slow, tourism is almost at a standstill, many foreign business leaders have left Tunisia, either under the threat of strikers, or for sales because of the European crisis or the recession. Political and security instability has resulted in paralysis of institutions and lack of visibility for domestic and foreign investors. The palaver on the Constitution, the assassinations of opponents, the excesses of the Salafists and their mad aggressiveness, provisional governments whose authority is contested constantly explain the current difficulties. Foreign exchange reserves increased from 6.5 billion euros in 2010 to 5.5 billion at the end of 2011, covering only 123 days of imports. Tunisian governments are on the tightrope and have trouble buckling their budgets. The use of external indebtedness can only be a temporary solution pending the return of growth and domestic and external balances. Financing the functioning of the State and administrations with foreign currency debt carries the risk of loss of economic independence. The IMF has already laid down its conditions by demanding the cessation of subsidies for basic necessities or at least their reduction. It is incomprehensible that the first government after the revolution found it worthwhile to hire 70,000 civil servants, exacerbating budget deficits. But Tunisia can not live on an infusion indefinitely. All funding should help her get through the difficult post-revolution but she must find the springs to bounce back. Tunisia has also not been helped by its neighbors, starting with Libya where the weapons that are used by the jihadists come from and which is a land of immigration for thousands of Tunisians.
During my visit to Tunis on April 16, 2014, I noticed a considerable number (perhaps a million) of Libyans who have made their home in Tunisia. They are the cause of soaring property prices in the Tunisian capital and other cities. The prices of locally consumed products and services have also risen sharply. The presence of this wealthy Libyan community is an explanation, but the weakness of the supply caused by divestments and closures is another.

The deterioration of the Tunisian economic aggregates is not only explained by the repercussions of the financial crisis of 2008 and the debt crisis in Europe in 2011. The mismanagement of the period is the major explanation. I often give the example of the transition period as it was managed by the political forces in the former socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The secret of this success lies in the respect of alternation. I have traveled extensively in this region, before and after the fall of the wall, and I have seen the ease with which communist parties have given up the power they had held in absolute power for fifty years. The other parties that won the post-communist elections did not cling to power and lost the next polls.
The communist parties, which had meanwhile changed their names, returned to power and lost the elections that followed. I interviewed many people in these countries and they confirmed their wish not to see the power of omnipotent parties. They then opted for electoral zapping.
Even political parties have found their account. As soon as they were elected, they set up what is known as shock therapy, namely: withdrawal from the state, privatization, calling into question the right of women to maternity leave, the end of the guarantee of public

employment and free care in the company and free education. In the same logic, overstaffing in public companies is contained and state subsidies to basic necessities are phased out. In addition, the reform of pension plans will support the extension of contribution years and the retirement age is postponed. Depreciations of local currencies aim to stimulate exports with all the perverse effects we have on inflationary pressures. All these measures, unpopular, have led to a turnover of government majorities. In the Arab Spring countries, the opposition parties that took power, impregnated with an authoritarian doctrine, sharia or at least its version in vogue, have set themselves the objective of sustainably controlling all the levers of the State. . This is how they proceeded in Egypt. In Libya, militia led by fundamentalists refused to submit to the rule of law to build and elected institutions. In Tunisia, the Ennahda party belatedly learned the lessons of the Muslim Brotherhood's failures in Egypt and accepted the formation of a government of technocrats and a compromise on the formulation of a constitution considered to be the most progressive in the Arab world.

The countries of Eastern Europe also had a credible perspective, a design and obligations of democracy, governance and independence of justice: membership of the European Union. Tunisia, like other Maghreb peoples, needs to hope for full employment, economic development, dignity, democracy and good governance.

Maghreb integration is both an objective and a catalyst for socio-economic progress, inducing growth. In order to curb unemployment, it would be essential to achieve a minimum growth rate of 6%. The crisis of 2008, if it did not affect the financial and banking sector, because it is disconnected from international finance, negatively impacted the growth rate in 2009 and 2010 (barely 3%).

2011 was the year of the revolution but also of the recession. It is not dramatic, Tunisia was able to get back to work in 2012 with stable institutions. Unfortunately, this transitional period coincided with a number of industrial challenges: the leather, textile, processed and consumer goods sectors faced competition from China, the recession in Europe and the arrival on the labor market of young graduates.

The crisis in Libya, the declarations of successive governments went in the direction of resilience, in order to boost the competitiveness of the economy by deepening the association of the public sector with the private sector, the liberalization of services, energy security.

The world forum in Davos placed Tunisia in 2009-2010 as the leading African country in terms of competitiveness, ranked 6th among Arab countries and 40th out of 133 countries. The transformation of the Tunisian economy into new sectors, such as electronics and aeronautical subcontracting, has not been completed.

The re-industrialization of Tunisia must be based on the dynamics of the private sector, partnerships with foreign companies and a favorable legal, security, social and regulatory environment. Tunisia has springs to revive all its vital sectors. Even in the midst of the financial crisis in 2008, the country limited its fiscal deficit to 6.3 percent of GDP and reduced foreign debt to 3.41 percent in 2009 from 6.42 percent in 2008. The inflation rate was 5.3% in 2009 compared with 5% in 2008.

For the record, the 2010 budget provided for expenditures exceeding 18 335 billion dinars (14, 213 billion dollars), an increase of 5.4%, of which 6 825 billion dinars (5, 290 billion dollars) for wages civil servants (up 8%). The budget "development and investment" amounted to 4,600 billion dinars (40.51 billion dollars), an increase of 18%.

According to the World Bank, a growth rate of 10% is needed to absorb new demands for work, while the effective growth rate hardly exceeds 5% at best and 3% on average since

2009. This is not the recruitment in the public sector that will solve the problem but it will pass by the dynamism of private companies, especially those of the productive sectors.
The former power of Ben Ali had promised to integrate 16,000 executives in the public service, 70% of them from higher education. The budget was dedicated to 258 million dinars ($ 200 million) in 2009 to 304 million dinars (235.65 million dollars) in 2010, an increase of 18%.
The former regime was counting on a reduction of deficits around 4.4% in 2010 against 6.5% expected in 2009. The deterioration of the situation at the time of Ben Ali is not attributable only to exogenous shocks, but also the incompetence of the administration, the reign of corruption, the omnipotence of a few families, the economy of rent and a governance incentive little to the creation of wealth.

Libya is in a dramatic economic, political, social and human situation. Its infrastructure was partly destroyed because of an eight-month war against the Gaddafi regime. Paradoxically, this country which has enormous oil reserves for a population of six million inhabitants could recover quickly, but provided that the Libyan political forces accept the alternation, the democratic game based on the sovereignty of the popular expression and renounce violence as a means of resolving internal conflicts.

It is true that Gaddafi did not favor the beginning of a modern institutional functioning. There was no parliament, no political parties, no constitution, let alone free elections. Despite international financial and fiscal crises, Libya could overcome exogenous shocks as well as the revolution of 17 February 2011.
The Libyan economy needs stable legislation and economic policies that promote training, modernization of public facilities and modern urban planning. Funds from oil exports are expected to revive agriculture, fishing, processing and manufacturing, chemical and petrochemical industries.
Libya has Roman remains and abandoned beaches; it could develop local, regional and international tourism. The jobization of a million Libyans and the use of a foreign workforce that performs manual tasks do not facilitate the emergence of an entrepreneurial spirit.
We must break with the Gaddafi politics, clientelist based on assistantship and opt for the spirit of creativity and initiative. Oil rent has encouraged the business of a class of beneficiaries who prefer to pay into the informal, imports of vehicles, appliances and other consumer goods.
The operating budget of the ministries represents $ 14.9 billion, while the subsidies for staples amount to $ 16 billion. The 2012 budget is the largest in the history of Libya, while tax revenues are minimal, as profits were nil in 2011 for most societies because of the civil war.

The priority of the public authorities that succeeded Gaddafi was to protect the oil sites and make them operational with the help of foreign operating companies. At the same time, the commercial sectors marketing consumer goods were paralyzed, causing a surge of imports not of semi-finished goods and industrial equipment but of food and pharmaceutical products.
This has aggravated the dependence of the Libyan economy on foreign markets, creating imbalances between supply and demand, reflecting those between production and consumption. Productive capacities have been weakened. This resulted in higher prices. Libya knows the Dutch syndrome, but in the worst conditions: under a regime that had no plans to diversify the economy, nor to assimilate and practice industrialization.
Gaddafi did everything to keep society in the dark and assistantship. The circle of leaders and executives who sailed around him benefited from part of the rent, without using it in

commercial activities. Most of them invested in services, real estate or hotels abroad and in the country.
All policies to revive economic activities will be doomed to failure, if there is not a new generation of young entrepreneurs trained in Libya or abroad, experienced in management techniques and new technologies, to create new businesses. Have not the United Arab Emirates managed to build a country open to the world using the most advanced talents and techniques to rebuild a country in the middle of the desert? Libya must emerge from the state model of a gangrene state by the domination of a family and its satellites and adopt a more modern posture, based on the market economy and private initiative.

Public authorities must create optimal conditions for the development of private entrepreneurship, the emergence of projects structuring the economy and a targeting of the sectors to be promoted. They can operate land use planning and business parks to encourage private entrepreneurs and foreign investors. Imperative planning must give way to economic policies that encourage and stimulate productive public and private activities. The state will retain its redistributive role for the benefit of the most disadvantaged and the builder of public facilities and non-market services.

The other challenge facing Libya is to establish independent international partnerships without pressure from the European and American powers who want a return on investment to make their military commitment profitable.
We have seen how European countries and the United States are busy dispatching emissaries and acting behind the scenes to tip the balance in favor of this or that faction (Khalifa Haftar against the National General Congress and the militias, etc.).
Libya, which suffered destruction during the civil war, is far from planning a start of reconstruction. The finance minister of the last Gaddafi government, Abdelhafid Slitini, told the British BBC in April 2011 that his country had lost $ 50 billion because of the insurgency of February 2011. The cessation of oil exports has inflicted Libya 20 billion dollars of loss. Added to this are those recorded by sovereign wealth funds due to the 2008 crisis. Deposits in Lehman Brothers Bank went up in smoke. These losses would amount to $ 550 million. Libya's external debt exceeds $ 34 billion in 2018.

The Libyan state, without oil, is totally helpless. Eighty percent of food and agricultural needs are provided by foreign suppliers. Even the labor market is supplied only by foreign labor. About 1.5 million immigrants, of rudimentary, heterogeneous and changing training, according to the needs of the companies, leave the country as soon as the crises swell.
Of a population of 6 million, 1,300,000 are active, or 79.26%, of which 1 million are civil servants. Unemployment reached 20.74% in 2010 of which 21.55% are men and 18.7% are women. Jobseekers number 200,000 in 2012 and 20,000 each year seek employment. Unemployment reached 35% in 2014 and 35.9% in 2015. Only the stabilization of the security situation would stabilize the economy.

As in all countries with a state economy, the plethora of civil servants is a form of forced employment to share the rent and calm social tensions. Results: demotivation, idleness, incompetence, laxity, bureaucracy, corruption, nepotism and clientelism. After the fall of Gaddafi, the situation worsened. Thousands of fighters have been integrated into the civil service, sometimes receiving multiple salaries because of the chaos and the possibility of being illegally hired by several local governments and collecting multiple salaries.

The operating costs of the administrations are such that the exogenous shocks transmit their effects on the economy very quickly. We have seen the consequences of the 2008 crisis on Libya in several ways:
- oil revenues have fallen following the drop in the price per barrel, from 147 dollars in 2008 to 35 dollars in 2009; this negatively impacted several sectors,
- GDP has fallen because of the decline in tourism,
- commercial activities have been slowed down by the global recession,
- foreign investment has dried up,
- Libyan financial assets invested abroad have lost 20 to 40% of their value,
- the agricultural sector has been disrupted by higher agricultural inputs and competition from agri-food products.

The Mauritanian economy is dominated by sea fishing and iron ore, gypsum and gold reserves. Agriculture, which occupies many farmers, is dependent on rainfall and contributes only 50% to the country's food needs. Agricultural resources include dates, rice, maize and livestock.

Industrial activities focus on fish canning and some seafood processing. The Mauritanian coast is one of the most fish-rich in the world. Oil explorations revealed discoveries, but without concrete results of exploitation.

Table 3. GDP per capita (in USD) of North African countries

	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Algeria	5 476	5 459	4 175	4 129	4 296
Égypt	3 374	3 474	3 710	3 850	4 005
Libya	10 540	7 097	6 277	6 169	7 972
Morrocco	3 252	3 312	3 003	3 101	3 253
Mauritania	1 618	1 526	1 312	1 244	1 234
Tunisia	4 249	4 329	3 923	3 777	3 675

Table prepared by us using data from the UN, the IMF and the World Bank (2018).

Mauritania imports food, machinery and equipment, petroleum and its derivatives, as well as consumer goods. This country is classified by the UN as part of the developing countries.

The Mauritanian economy suffers from unfavorable weather conditions both at ground level and below ground. Added to this are structural imbalances that hamper its economic development: the weakness of the agricultural and livestock sector, the absence of a policy of processing raw materials and seafood. Cooperation with neighboring countries would certainly bring synergies and pooling of resources. The Algerian and Moroccan iron and steel industries need Mauritanian iron.

Despite the cancellation of $ 830 million of its debt, Mauritania remains one of the most indebted countries in the world. Foreign exchange reserves reached $ 900 million in 2012. Inflation is under control and does not exceed 6%.

According to the World Bank, the 2008 financial crisis worsened the situation of 53 million poor people in the world and led to famine and exclusion. Mauritania does not escape this observation. The poor are becoming poorer. This is a sign of intellectual underdevelopment of the ruling elites.
The fragilities of the Maghreb economies place them in a position of dependence vis-à-vis abroad and chronic extraversion. Deficits in current accounts and balances of payments, growing indebtedness and the use of foreign aid are proof of this.

Mauritanian political actors and leaders are bogged down in partisan, tense games with no prospect of political change, and blame each other for being responsible for the crisis.

Despite slogans against embezzlement and the defense of public goods, reaffirmed by successive governments since the fall of President Maaouiya Ould Sid Ahmed Taya, poverty remains widespread in some urban areas and especially in the countryside. Recurrent drought and arid land are driving young people to migrate to big cities or abroad. Children, the elderly, women who do not have supports, suffer from the lack of resources and opportunities to cope. Even livestock lacks food and is sold at a low price.

Cities have become the receptacle for rural people in search of a better life. Entire neighborhoods lack basic infrastructure such as drinking water, electricity and sanitation networks. Slums have become the focus of unemployment, misery, crime, drugs and prostitution.
According to official statistics, the poverty rate in Mauritania exceeds 46% of the population and 75% of these poor live in rural areas. With a population of 3 million, Mauritania has not managed to overcome its difficulties because of poor governance, repeated coups, desertification and climatic conditions.

Libya is ahead of all other North African countries with GDP per capita exceeding in 2016 the $ 6,169, thanks to its small population compared to its oil revenues. However, this figure exceeded $ 10,540 in 2013. Algeria, the other oil and gas country, comes in second place with $ 4,129 in 2016 ahead of Egypt ($ 3,850), Tunisia ($ 3,777) and Morocco ($ 3,101) the same year.

Table 4. Government indebtedness (in% of GDP) in North African countries

	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Algérie	7,744	7,956	9,06	13,028	17,134
Égypte	84,777	86,267	88,971	94,633	93,374
Libye	3,711	36,385	73,844	101,791	100,2

Maroc	61,727	63,454	64,059	64,412	63,774
Mauritanie	66,151	77,076	91,18	75,016	81,548
Tunisie	46,84	51,561	55,707	59,033	58,921

Table prepared by us using data from the UN, the IMF and the World Bank, 2018.

Table 5. Current account balance, in billions of USD and as a percentage of GDP, of North African countries

	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Algeria	0,84 (0,4 %)	- 9,44 (- 4,4 %)	- 27,45 (- 16,5 %)	- 25,34 (- 15,1 %)	24,48 (13,7 %)
Égypt	6,39 (- 2,2 %)	- 2,36 (- 0,8 %)	- 12,18 (3,7 %)	Nd (- 5,8 %)	Nd (- 5,2 %)
Libya	8,90 (13,5 %)	- 12,35 (- 27,8 %)	- 16,70 (- 42,1 %)	- 18,66 (- 47,4 %)	- 18,99 (36,9 %)
Morrocco	- 8,13 (- 7,6 %)	- 6,23 (- 5,7 %)	- 1,93 (- 1,9 %)	- 1,28 (- 1,2 %)	- 1,54 (- 1,4 %)
Mauritania	- 1,64 (- 28,6 %)	- 1,84 (- 33,3 %)	- 1,31 (- 27 %)	- 1,03 (21,9 %)	- 1,19 (24,9 %)
Tunisia	- 3,88 (- 8,4 %)	- 4,34 (- 9,1 %)	- 3,85 (- 8,8 %)	- 3,40 (8 %)	- 2,88 (6,9 %)

Table prepared by us using data from the UN, the IMF and the World Bank, 2018.

Table 6. Imports of goods and services (in billion USD) by North African countries

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Algeria	59 280	60 848	65 304	69 824	62 023
Égypt	72 032	84 757	74 470	88 082	81 702
Libya	11 555	28 279	34 388	25 966	19 966
Morroco	50 985	51 450	51 608	53 525	44 553
Mauritania	3 192	4 097	3 985	3 494	2 901
Tunisia	26 954	27 460	27 405	27 940	22 811

Table prepared by us using data from the UN, the IMF and the World Bank, 2018

Libyan customs revenues have thus fallen dramatically. The only sector that has worked is oil. The 2013 budget allocated $ 20 billion to civil servants' salaries and $ 12 billion to subsidies for essential goods (food, electricity, fuel, etc.). Apart from these expenditures, oil revenues were to be allocated to the construction of state institutions, an army, a justice system, a police force and central and territorial administrations.

Table 7. Exports of goods and services (in billion USD) by North African countries

	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Algeria	77 016	75 436	68 675	66 346	41 409
Égypt	49 559	50 745	46 374	46 629	37 207
Libya	19 036	61 098	43 680	21 079	10 280
Morrocco	37 140	36 393	35 907	39 049	35 632

Mauritania	2 934	2 769	2 820	2 190	1 702
Tunisia	22 133	21 761	21 637	21 311	17 095

Table prepared by us using data from the UN, the IMF and the World Bank, 2018.

Algerian imports amounted to 9, 173 billion dollars in 2000, 9, 940 in 2001 and 12, 009 in 2002 to 39, 479 in 2008 and 59, 280 in 2011. The bulk of Algerian imports is composed of consumer goods (mostly food products) and medicines, as well as capital goods and final goods such as transport and tourism vehicles.

We have ourselves pointed to the explosion of imports since the 1990s following the soaring oil and gas revenues and have advocated for a control of purchases of foreign goods and services. It is in this sense that the Algerian government has taken measures to reduce imports.

Egyptian imports are composed as follows: 30% of intermediate goods (chemicals, plastics, steel products); 22% of consumer goods (mainly vehicles, pharmaceuticals and ready-to-wear); 17% of capital goods (engines, telecoms, optics, electrical and electronic equipment); 16% of petroleum products (hydrocarbons and ores) and 15% of raw materials (mainly wheat, crude oil, corn and tobacco).

Morocco imports almost double what it exports. Imports are concentrated on energy products, capital goods and consumer goods. When rainfall increases, heavy cereal imports are needed.

France occupies a prominent place in Morocco's foreign trade (25% of the value of imports, a third of that of exports), largely ahead of the other countries of the European Union (Spain, Italy, Germany).

Algerian exports are on a par with oil prices.

Egyptian exports are significantly lower than those of Algeria before the collapse of hydrocarbon prices and are not far from the level recorded by Morocco while the Egyptian population is almost equivalent to that of these two countries combined.

Morocco's balance of payments is impacted by fluctuations in exports, foreign investment, the stock market and financial markets, as well as credit, Moroccan workers' remittances abroad and tourism. Moroccan exports of phosphates fell by 59.5% in 2008. The same applies to exports of agricultural food products at 31.8%, almost $ 10 billion compared to 2007, according to the Office.

Exchange. Exports of electrical and electronic products fell by 47.5%, as did leather and textiles. The bulk of exports are manufactured goods in the face of phosphates and agricultural products (fruits and vegetables).

The resumption of exploitation of oil deposits is expected by the entire population of Libya, but the judicious management of this manna should benefit all Libyans. In 2012, the state's national budget totaled 66.9 billion Libyan dinars ($ 52 billion), including $ 16 billion for development projects and $ 16 billion in wages against $ 8 billion in 2011.

Mauritania was an arid land with an area exceeding one million km2 without infrastructure or economic base at the time of its independence in 1960. There were no schools, no training institutes, no roads. The first Council of Ministers was held in a tent. The army had barely 50 soldiers.

Table 8. Trade balance (excluding services) (in millions of USD) of North African countries

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Algérie	25 979	19 930	9 945	352	- 17 84
Égypte	- 19 398	- 25 516	- 22 384	- 30 962	- 31 025
Libye	7 860	35 436	11 968	2 000	- 2 800
Maroc	- 21 387	- 21 885	- 21 592	- 20 687	- 14 688
Mauritanie	282	- 488	- 393	- 712	- 559
Tunisie	- 4 747	- 6 031	- 5 836	- 6 562	- 4 945

Table prepared by us using data from the UN, the IMF and the World Bank, 2016

Thanks to Arab aid, the modern state has begun to rise from the ashes and seek mineral resources. A French company started the exploitation of iron and its export before its nationalization in 1973.

The fisheries agreement with the European Union allows Mauritania to receive € 108 million each year. It stipulates increased surveillance of European vessels, imposes sanctions in the event of non-compliance with the biological reproduction period and prohibits ocean surface fishing, in order to protect the interests of local small-scale fishermen.
However, the Mauritanian state does not have the means to control its territorial waters, hence the need to coordinate the monitoring and control mission with its neighbors. Two hundred European vessels can fish for fish, crustaceans, molluscs, tuna, congers, oysters, cuttlefish and octopus.

Seafood exports account for 25 percent of the state budget, 50 percent of foreign exchange earnings and 7 percent of GDP. The European Union is Mauritania's main economic partner for fisheries, followed by Japan. Both partners receive 95% of fish exports.

Algeria has had its first trade deficit for more than a decade in 2015 with the alarming figure of $ 17.84 billion due to the decline in hydrocarbon exports and their prices.
Egypt's trade balance has been in the red since 1965 and has deteriorated sharply since 2011 due to the drop in oil exports and the slowdown in economic activity after socio-political tensions.

Tunisia is also experiencing an unfavorable development since the global financial crisis of 2008, a development aggravated by what is known as the Arab Spring. Factory closures and untimely strikes in strategic sectors such as oil and phosphates played a negative role.

The irregular curve of the Libyan trade balance is in line with the ups and downs of the civil war that is ravaging this country.

As for Morocco, its surplus trade balance dates back to 1966. But since 2002, it's slipping down. The country's trade balance recorded a deficit of $ 18.3 billion in 2016, an increase of 19.6% over 2015 ($ 14.688 billion). The worsening of Morocco's trade deficit is the result of a much higher increase in imports (+ 9.3%) compared to exports, which, for their part, experienced only a slight increase (+ 2.1%). The increase in imports comes mainly from purchases of food products (+ 25%), capital goods (+ 25.7%), final consumer goods (+ 15.21%) and semi-finished products (+ 5%). The 12.1% drop in phosphate exports aggravated the deficit balance. Some sectors are doing well. These are: automotive (+ 11.5%), aeronautics (+ 14.6%), electronics (+ 10.2%), textiles (+ 6.7%) and agrifood (+ 4.5%).

Table 9. Total public and private external debts due to non-residents (billion USD), public and private external debt per capita, government debt and North African countries' inflation rate, 2016

	External debts	Debt per capita	Indebtedness State / GDP (in%)	Inflation rate (in %) %)
Algeria	3 700	94	17,134	5,9
Égypt	30 610	391	94,633	18,2
Libya	6 378	972	100,2	14,2
Morrocco	75 470	2 219	63,774	13
Mauritania	5 000	1 250	81,548	4,2
Tunisia	18 760	1 779	58,921	4,9

Table prepared by us using data from the UN, the IMF and the World Bank, 2016

Table 10. 2015 Debt Figures (in millions of US dollars) for several countries in North Africa and the Middle East

	External	Internal	Total	% of GDP
Algeria	1 112	14 700	15 812	7
Égypt	46 100	288 000	334 100	120
Libanon	30 608	40 872	71 840	159

Jordan	11 775	20 469	32 244	91
Morrocco	31 684	53 579	85 263	88
Mauritania	3 522	221	3 743	71
Tunisia	16 508	32 861	46 369	104

Data compiled by us using data from international institutions (2016).

Both the Moroccan Central Bank and international institutions are alarmed by the continued increase in debt. If this debt becomes unsustainable, there will be a real risk of placing the Moroccan economy under guardianship. Admittedly, there are international exogenous factors that interfere in the country's economic situation, such as the financial and economic crises of 2008 and 2011 with their negative consequences on foreign exchange earnings (foreign direct investment, sluggish tourism sector and weakening Moroccans residing abroad), but endogenous factors come into play. Firstly, the mismanagement of public funds at both state and local government levels. Second, the persistence of oligopolistic behavior on the part of large groups that goes together with the maintenance of rentier positions. According to a report by McKinsey, the kingdom remains the most indebted country in Africa and the Arab world in terms of debt to GDP, a ratio of 81%.
Tunisia has a debt that is around 70% of GDP. The use of the financial market and public and private donors has not brought the oxygen that would have allowed a revival of the economic machine, quite the opposite. The growth rate skyrocketed to 1% in 2016. Debt to GDP, which was 40% in 2010 and 45.8% in 2013, increased to 63% in 2016.
Algeria is the least indebted country after repaid almost all of its debt since soaring oil prices. The dwindling foreign exchange reserves, which exceeded $ 200 billion in 2014 to break the symbolic threshold of $ 100 billion in June 2017, ultimately threatens the country's financial equilibrium.

Table 11. Unemployment rate in North Africa

	2015	2016	2017
Algeria	11,2	9,9	10,4
Égypt	12,9	12,7	12,3
Libya	26	28	30
Morrocco	9,7	10,2	10,1

Mauritania	30	32	34
Tunisia	15	14	13

Table 11 : prepared by us using data from the UN, the IMF and the World Bank, 2015.

Egypt is experiencing a worrying rise in debt, accounting for 94.63% of its GDP. In 2016, the country negotiated a loan of $ 12 billion from the IMF for $ 4 billion a year, over a three-year period, to finance its very high budget deficit.

Unemployment statistics are far from reflecting reality. In countries where there is no requirement to register as a jobseeker because of the lack of compensation for the unemployed and the lack of prospect of finding a job, many young people and women are not not looking for activity. In addition, there is over-accounting of the rural population as being 97% occupied by the production and maintenance functions of their farms and their livestock, whereas in reality it is more a matter of household chores and activities. seasonal.

The unemployment rate is officially 9.8% in Morocco and Algeria, but in reality the actual rates exceed 40%. When we are told that the unemployment rate in rural areas is around 3%, it is a trap. There is confusion between domestic work of food self-sufficiency and very marginal productive wage activities.

It is absurd to display such ridiculous unemployment figures in comparison with those drawn up by the independent bodies of countries such as France, which has the same unemployment rate as Morocco, whose GDP is 111 billion dollars, and Algeria has $ 176 billion in GDP, while French GDP is $ 2,570 billion. Spain, with a GDP of 1,252 billion dollars, declares 25% of unemployment rate and Greece with 194 billion of GDP is at 35% of unemployment rate. Underemployment in North Africa is explained by the weakness of the industrial sector and the rise of unproductive services. Young farmers came to swell the army of idlers in the big cities or emigrate to Europe.

There is no distinction between full-time work and seasonal work that characterizes the different periods of preparation of the land until harvest. In urban areas, the idleness of young people in working-class neighborhoods is no longer to be hidden. Among the sellers on the sly, those who live in the informal and the precarious workers, assets in position of employees are minority in Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco and Mauritania. However, historically, there has been forced employment in Algeria in public enterprises and administrations. These have been chronic overstaffing. Excessive wage costs were financed by the hydrocarbon rent.

Table 12. Breakdown of economic activity by sector (as% of total employment), 2016.

	Agriculture	Industry	Services
Algeria	8,8	30,4	25,5
Egypt	25,8	25,1	49,1

Libya	2	32	66
Morrocco	37,2	17,7	44,9
Mauritania	48	22	30
Tunisia	15,3	33,3	51

Table prepared by us using data from the UN, the IMF and the World Bank, 2016.

Table 13. Distribution of economic activity by sector in North Africa: value added (in% of GDP), 2015.

	Agriculture	Industry	Services
Algeria	12,7	38,9	25,5
Egypta	11,2	36,2	52,5
Libya	1,9	78,2	19,9
Morrocco	14,5	29,2	56,3
Mauritania	20,8	39,2	40
Tunisie	10,4	28,2	61,4

Table prepared by us using data from the UN, the IMF and the World Bank, 2016.

Agriculture, which employs 8.8% of assets in Algeria, generates 12.7% of value added of GDP, which reflects a low level of productivity and an extensive and low-capitalization mode of exploitation. In industrialized countries, 1% of the population employed in the agricultural sector can generate 20% of value added and the first export item.

In Egypt, 25.8% of agricultural workers contribute only 11% of value added.
The 37.2% of Moroccan assets employed in the primary sector contribute 14.5% of the total value added.

In Algeria, 30.4% of industrial jobs account for 38.9% of value added. These figures hide a contrasting reality; hydrocarbons account for the lion's share of industrial value added. The non-oil and gas industry accounts for only 5% of value added; 25.1% of employees in the industry contribute 36.2% of value added through declining mineral production and other manufacturing industries.

Morocco lost jobs in traditional sectors such as textiles and footwear but gained in the automotive, aerospace and other electrical and electronic sectors. Thus, 10.2% of industrial employees produce 17.7% of the value added because this country does not have a powerful mineral production with the exception of phosphates.

Services are more important in terms of jobs and added value in historically liberal-type economies such as Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia. On the other hand, they are weak in Algeria because of the socialist heritage.

Table 14. Distribution of economic activity by sector in North Africa: value added (annual growth in%), 2016.
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	Agricultur e	Industrie	Services
Algeria	6,4	3,2	4,9
Egypt	3	1	4,7
Libya	nd	nd	nd
Morrocco	13	2,8	0,9
Mauritania	5,1	0,1	8,1
Tunisia	9,2	- 1,5	0,6

Table prepared by us using data from the UN, the IMF and the World Bank, 2016.

Table 15. Inward foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows (in millions of USD) in North African countries

	2013	2014	2015
Algeria	1 693	1 507	- 587

Egypt	4 256	4 612	6 885
Libya	702	50	726
Morrocco	3 298	3 561	3 162
Mauritania	1 126	500	495
Tunisia	1 117	1 063	1 003

Table prepared by us using data from the UN, the IMF and the World Bank, 2016.

The growth rate of agriculture depends on rainfall and climatic conditions. Its variations can be more or less strong from one year to another. Conversely, fluctuations in the growth rates of industry and services are smoother.

Foreign investment in Morocco fell by 28.7%, some companies left the country or froze their projects, while foreign exchange reserves fell by 3.4%, reaching 18 billion euros, covering six to seven months of imports compared with nine months earlier. The critical threshold is three months.
In 2010, investments reached $ 1.368 billion, while forecasts put this amount at $ 1.86 billion. The gap is explained by the international financial crisis. Without a surplus of capital, growth is stuck and employment is not at the rendezvous. The unemployment rate is officially 13% (perhaps 30% actually). Nearly 85,000 young people enter the job market, while hiring capacity does not exceed 65,000 job openings per year.

Non-hydrocarbon Arab countries, such as Mauritania, have become recipients of Arab and international aid and sometimes conditioned loans. This is the only way to pursue economic and structural reforms and develop projects to help meet the needs of the people.

Foreign investment slowed in the Maghreb in the order of $ 5.6 billion in 2012. Morocco and Tunisia received only $ 5.2 billion in FDI the same year.

Only investments in oil installations were supported in Algeria and Libya. The deterioration of socio-economic fundamentals and the shaking up of political institutions can not be explained solely by the impacts of external crises, but also by the weakness of democratic regulatory institutions, corruption, bureaucracy, nepotism and political positions. rentières which dominate at all levels.

Table 16. FDI stocks (in millions of USD) in North African countries

	2013	2014	2015
Algeria	25 313	26 820	26 232

Egypt	82 893	87 485	94 266
Libya	17 036	17 086	17 762
Morrocco	51 816	51 192	48 696
Mauritania	5 475	5 975	6 470
Tunisia	33 001	31 554	32 911

Table prepared by us using data from the UN, the IMF and the World Bank, 2016.

Table 17. Average annual exchange rate for 1 euro of North African currencies

Monetary Indicators	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Libyan Dinar	1,68	1,7	1,62	1,69	1,69
Egyptian Pound (EGP))	8,26	7,78	9,12	9,4	8,53
Algerian Dinar (DZD)	101,53	99,62	105,41	107,05	111,72
Mauritanian ouguiya (MRO))	365,75	391,32	381,1	399,34	360,22
Tunisian Dinar (TND)	1,96	2,01	2,16	2,26	2,18
Moroccan Dirham (MAD)	11,26	11,09	11,16	11,17	10,83

Source: World Bank, 2016

In Tunisia as well as in Morocco, the debate rages on the draft of a flexibility of the exchange rates of the Tunisian dinar and the Moroccan dirham.

After having revised the composition of the basket of currencies which served as a reference instrument for the fixing of the dirham, Bank-Al-Maghrib put on track the process of flexibilisation of its currency in January 2018. According to the statutes of the Moroccan central bank, only the government can change the exchange rate policy.

During a media release on July 4, 2017, the head of government, Saad Eddine El Othmani has created the surprise by not hesitating to address the reform of the exchange rate regime: "The current width of the band of fluctuation of the dirham is 0.6%. The proposal is to move to 5%, a fluctuation of plus or minus 2.5% [...] This is not a big margin. It will not generate negative impacts. This is to say the confusion between the role of the government and the monetary authorities in defining the exchange rate policy.

On the issue of exchange rate flexibility of the Moroccan dirham, I fear the worst for the Moroccan economy since the Central Bank of Morocco has followed the recommendations of the IMF. The channels of transmission of the monetary imbalances are of a considerable magnitude on the transfers of the Moroccans residing abroad, on the foreign investors as well as on the tourists. It will undoubtedly result in a devaluation of the dirham, unless the Central Bank imposes on the market a band of fluctuation of - 2 to + 2%. Maghreb currencies are not convertible and foreign exchange reserves can not provide a solid foundation to meet the foreign exchange demand of households, businesses and financial institutions.

Since the announcement of the possible flexibilisation of the dirham, the Moroccan currency has continued to depreciate. It was the same for the Tunisian dinar. Agents, lacking confidence in private banking or financial players, anticipate a slide in the national currency. In addition, hedging contracts against currency risk flared in Morocco, which angered the governor of the Central Bank.
The prevarications of the monetary authorities and the Moroccan government reveal the difficulty of setting up a semi-floating regime of the dirham.

Algeria suffers from the cohabitation of the parallel market, which really expresses the supply and demand of foreign exchange and the official market that manages the dinar according to politico-financial considerations. After a nationalist management of the dinar, which resulted in its overvaluation and a significant gap between the official and parallel rates (in 1986, 1 French Franc was worth 0.86 dinar against 4 dinars on the black market), the authorities have gradually tried to bring the two rates closer, without success. On July 21, 2017, the official quotation showed 1 euro against 127.309 dinars while in Port Said in Algiers (on the parallel market), 1 euro was sold 195 dinars.

The Central Bank of Egypt announced on November 3, 2016 its decision to let the pound freely float, having devalued nearly 48% under pressure from the International Monetary Fund. The institution called for measures in return for a loan of $ 12 billion over three years to avoid the bankruptcy of the Egyptian economy and face a chronic shortage of dollars after the riots of 2011 and the subsequent collapse of tourism and foreign investment.

The country's foreign exchange reserves have declined from $ 36 billion at the end of 2010 to $ 19.6 billion in September 2017, the equivalent of less than four months of imports. The Bretton Woods Institution's contribution raised the total to $ 26.4 billion in January 2017.
The imbalance between the supply and demand of foreign currencies has caused the parallel rate to flare up for 18.2 Egyptian pounds while the official rate fixed by the Central Bank was maintained at 8.80 pounds for 1 dollar on 1 November 2016 and 17.9215 pounds to the dollar on July 25, 2017. The downward slide of the Egyptian pound and the liberalization of exchange rate policy came under the IMF. In a statement issued on November 4, 2016, Egypt's chief of mission, Chris Jarvis, argues that this decision should help to "support exports and tourism" and "attract foreign investment" that the country badly needs .
The perverse effects did not take long to appear. Importers had begun to pass on the effects of black market depreciation on their prices, pushing inflation up to very high levels in a country where nearly 28% of the population lives below the poverty line. .

Chapter 2. Maghreb: Extroverted Economies

An economic community in North Africa can only be built on the foundation of a united and economically integrated Maghreb. This bloc must join Egypt, the first Arab country from the point of view of its population.

The construction of the Arab Maghreb as a regional union is a strategic option for the peoples of the region in a context dominated by globalization, large industrial alliances and unions with a high density in terms of population.

The Maghreb countries have mineral wealth, agriculture, and a young population that allow them to weigh in international decisions and become a partner of regional economic unions. They are complementary in several areas. This allows them to aspire to accelerated development, thanks to their human and natural resources, scientific and technical skills among the 100 million inhabitants. They are the link between the southern European market and all of Africa.

The interest of Maghreb economic integration lies in the diversity of natural resources and the potentialities to come. The hydrocarbon producing countries have developed a petrochemical industry (Algeria, Libya), while the other countries (Morocco, Tunisia) have relied on tourism and the processing and consumer goods industries. While some may export gas and oil, others may export raw or processed agricultural products, textiles and leather, semi-finished products, phosphates and fertilizers, iron and metals (Mauritania).

But a range of exchangeable products is to be invented, either in partnership or in co-production. Maghreb integration goes in the direction of history and sooner or later will be a reality. The leaders in charge in the Maghreb should give hope to their people and prepare the future of future generations by unlocking real obstacles or caused by political calculations.
The hoarding of wealth by some families and the resulting sense of injustice can lead to social outbursts and discontent among young people, whether they are graduates, unemployed or untrained, and highly marginalized.

Maghreb societies must benefit from a redistribution of the incomes of their respective countries by direct or indirect channels, not according to a Soviet scheme (which has failed) but with the aim of raising the level of purchasing power, of improve qualification and care for all.
Economic progress goes together with social and human progress. Social stability is conditioned by economic justice. Conversely, abuses, injustices, social inequalities, non-redistributive budget policies, underemployment of young people are the ingredients of repeated popular explosions.

Governments have obeyed IMF injunctions and reduced subsidies to basic necessities on the grounds that aid benefits the rich (hydrocarbons for motorists, flour, sugar and oil for the food industry).

Table 18. Trade of the Maghreb countries as% of total flows (1990-2015). With: UMA: Arab Maghreb Union RDM: Rest of the World

	Exports	Imports	Global trade

	Intra-UMA	RDM	Intra-UMA	RDM	Intra-UMA	RDM
1990	2,86	97,14	2,67	97,33	2,76	97,24
1991	3,31	96,69	3,47	96,53	3,39	96,61
1992	3,2	96,8	4,25	95,75	3,72	96,28
1993	3,09	96,91	3,53	96,47	3,31	96,69
1994	3,76	96,24	3,65	96,35	3,7	96,3
1995	3,8	96,2	3,41	95,59	3,6	96,4
1996	3,34	96,66	3,57	96,43	3,45	96,55
1997	2,66	97,34	3,09	96,91	2,87	97,13
1998	3,27	96,73	2,25	97,75	2,76	97,24
1999	2,5	97,5	2,65	97,35	2,57	97,63
2000	2,15	97,85	3,53	96,57	2,84	97,16
2001	2,58	97,42	3,4	96,6	2,99	97,01
2002	2,8	97,2	3,37	96,67	3,08	96,92
2003	2,39	97,61	3,11	96,89	2,75	97,25
2004	2,38	97,62	2,67	97,33	2,52	97,48
2005	1,93	98,07	3,2	96,8	2,56	97,46
2006	1,97	98,07	3,71	96,29	2,84	97,16
2007	1,88	98,12	3,44	96,56	2,66	97,34
2008	2,5	97,5	3,6	96,4	3,05	96,95
2009	2,93	97,07	3,07	96,93	3,01	97
2010	2,56	97,44	2,99	97,01	2,77	97,23
2011	2,74	97,26	3,05	96,95	2,89	97,11
2012	2,79	97,21	3,3	96,7	3,04	96,94
201	3,84	96,26	3,6	96,4	3,72	96,28

3						
2014	4,56	95,44	3,91	96,09	4,23	95,77
2015	6,24	93,76	4,32	95,68	5,28	94,72

Source: Calculations made by ourselves from IMF data.

They offer direct aid to the most disadvantaged. I supported in the media the following positions:

1- Insofar as the poor or poor households do not benefit from family allowances or the unemployed, nor of housing aid, the only channels of transmission of a part of the wealth of the nation, it is these measures of support indirectly by the compensation funds in Morocco and Tunisia.

2- The distribution of social benefits directly to needy families requires a precise census of the population concerned, which can not be done after a minimum of five years. In addition, even identified, beneficiaries who do not have bank accounts will find it difficult to collect their dues, especially those living in the countryside or mountains. Part of the funds will be diverted to local authorities.

3- If it is true that certain companies and wealthy people benefit from state subsidies, they could return them by tax. Moreover, in the Maghreb countries, the rich do not pay their taxes fully. Nearly 25% of North Africans live below the poverty line and 50% of the population living above this threshold is considered "economically vulnerable" to diseases and disabilities, bad weather or job loss.

Maghreb economic non-integration is the cause of the weak intra-Maghreb trade as shown in the following table:

Trade between the Maghreb countries ranges from 1.93% (in 2005) to 6.24% (in 2015). But on average it is around 3 to 4%.

Morocco does most of its Maghreb trade with Algeria and Tunisia. It exports electrical cables and conductors, medicines, rolled steel and capital goods. Tunisia and Libya are better integrated into Maghreb trade. To these official figures should be added the cross-border traffic between Morocco and Algeria and between Libya and Tunisia.

Table 19. Intra-Maghreb trade (1990-2015), in USD millions: intra-UMA exports

	Algeria	Tunisia	Morrocco	Libya	Mauritania	Total
Algeria		397,9	386	12,32	34,52	830,74
Tunisia	214,28		101,99	454,89	10,31	781,47
Morrocco	82,35	67,31		81,24	42,88	273,78
Libya	17,19	305,48	54,87		0,17	377,71
Mauritania	3,94	1,06	0,75	0		5,75

Table 20. Intra-Maghreb trade (1990-2015), in USD millions: intra-UMA imports

	Algeria	Tunisia	Morrocco	Libya	Mauritania	Total
Algeria		195,68	88,37	18,68	4,34	307,07
Tunisia	397,54		71,6	326,34	0,85	796,33
Morrocco	424,8	111,06		60,58	0,8	597,24
Libya	13,6	497,26	86,04		0	596,9
Mauritania	37,22	11,34	47,26	0,17		95,99

Table 21. Overall intra-UMA trade, in millions of USD

	Algeria	Tunisia	Morrocco	Libya	Mauritania	Total
Algeria		296,79	237,1	815,5	19,43	568,9
Tunisia	305,91		86,79	390,61	5,58	788,9
Morrocco	253,57	89,18		70,91	21,84	435,5
Libya	15,39	401,37	70,45		0,08	487,3
Mauritania	20,58	6,2	24	0,08		50,86

Source: Calculations made by ourselves from IMF data

Several factors explain the weakness of intra-Maghreb trade. In addition to the closure of the Algerian-Moroccan border, there are tariffs applied to imported products which remain in many cases prohibitive. To this should be added the tariff barriers as well as the weakly diversified export structure dominated by hydrocarbons, agricultural and semi-industrial products. If trade barriers in the Maghreb region were lifted, this would create a market of 100 million consumers, attract several billion euros of investment and positively impact GDP with a gain of 2 to 3%.

In 2013, according to the Foreign Exchange Office, Morocco's foreign trade with Tunisia, Algeria, Libya and Mauritania totaled 1.1 billion euros, or just 2% of its total trade. In 2012, according to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the Maghreb countries traded 5.7 billion dollars, or 3.3% of their total trade.

The economic relations between Morocco and Tunisia should be strongly boosted in the years to come, given the potentialities of the two countries and the common desire to boost trade within the Maghreb Union, to encourage complementarity and economic integration in this strategic area. Morocco and Tunisia, whose relations of cooperation are governed by a rich and varied legal framework with more than fifty agreements and conventions, have seen their economic exchanges develop significantly in recent years, in favor of including the Agadir Free Trade Agreement, which entered into force in 2004.

Indeed, the overall volume of economic exchanges between Morocco and Tunisia which amounted to 1.56 billion dirhams in 2005 more than doubled to more than 3.35 billion dirhams in 2010.
At the end of November 2012, Morocco, Tunisia's third largest trading partner (15.9% of total trade), imported from this country a total of MAD 2.08 billion: mostly dates (MAD 403 million), raw plant products (MAD 181.5 million), chemicals (MAD 129.5 million) and paper products (MAD 130.3 million).

Tunisia and Libya are better integrated into Maghreb trade. That said, Tunisia's external trade with member states of the Arab Maghreb Union (Libya, Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania) reached 193.15 million euros for the first nine months of 2013 in terms of exports and 207.63 million euros in terms of imports. Indeed, Tunisia remains the largest customer of Libya whose exports reached 107.55 million euros, showing a share of 55.7%, and imports 62.73 million euros.
In addition, Tunisia's trade with Morocco and Algeria remains modest, with € 24.7 million and € 57.2 million respectively in exports. Tunisia imports more than three times what it exports from Algeria, or 135.09 million euros, accounting for 65% of imports. The volume of Tunisia's trade remains, however, very minimal with shares of 0.05% in imports and 1.90% in exports.

Algeria makes 72% of its Maghreb trade with its Moroccan neighbor. The kingdom is the first Arab customer of Algiers and its fourth supplier. Algerian exports to Morocco consist of lubricants, carboys and bottles, flasks and similar articles, rolled products, tires. For its part, Morocco exports to Algeria drugs, electrical conductors, light oils, copper wires and iron bars.

Morocco is also Tunisia's third largest trading partner, importing dates, raw plant products, chemicals and paper products. Moroccan exports to Tunisia are mainly capital goods, semi-finished products and pharmaceuticals.

Trade between Morocco and Libya, for their part, has slowed since the civil war. Morocco imports from Libya mainly hydrocarbons, raw sulfur, ammonia, lubricants and other industrial greases. He sells mainly electrical cables, rolled steel, tea, coffee and fishery products.

In Libya, economic equilibrium is dependent on social equilibrium. We have observed the harmful impacts of the deterioration of the security climate on Tunisia and Libya. Insecurity, delinquency, poverty-laden terrorism generate costs and shortfalls in strategic sectors such as tourism or foreign investment.
Regional economic constructions in all continents of the world have brought prosperity and economic development, as have the European Union, Alena, Asean and Mercosur.

Table 22. Comparison of the level of intra-regional trade in different regions of the world as a % of total flows (1995-2015)

	1995	2000	2005	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015

EU	64,85	64,64	64,56	61,66	60,97	59,08	59,53	60,72	59,77
NAFTA	41,87	47,64	45,11	41,04	40,81	41,1	41,73	42,68	41,94
Asean	21,5	22,51	25,43	24,9	24,41	24,73	24,6	38,72	40,11
Mercosur	18,79	19,3	20,36	17,47	16,72	16,06	16,09	13,53	13,56
SADC	15,54	16,66	13,57	14,97	13,81	13,26	17,9	19,14	20,75
Ecowas	9,35	10,73	11,15	9,44	7,74	8,98	10,46	9,94	10,07
Comesa	4,91	4,79	5,6	7,09	7,94	6,39	8,28	8,56	9,07
UMA	3,76	2,76	2,48	2,83	3,04	3,6	3,62	4,02	3,76
CEMAC	2,66	2,17	2,53	3,31	2,57	2,33	2,65	3,26	2,87
CEPGL	0,47	0,63	0,83	0,99	1,25	2,09	2,37	2,59	2,57

Source: Calculations made by ourselves from IMF data

Chapter 3. A new development dynamic of the North African region is possible

Several ways of cooperation can be set in motion:
- to develop the mobility of labor as well as that of capital is the condition of an optimal economic zone. The opportunity for North Africans to work and settle in the country of their choice must be ensured;
- It will be necessary to involve North African diasporas abroad in the development of their countries of origin and increase the influence of the whole region abroad;
- it is necessary to develop the tourism offer on a North African scale. The variety (mountains, deserts, seas, historical monuments ...) would enrich it and make it more flexible. Moving over an area of several million square kilometers would make the North African destination attractive;
- developing relations with the European Union on a new basis and establishing common institutions with decision-making powers;
- there is also a need for cooperation between financial institutions. Mutually beneficial partnerships are to be established between the stock exchanges to merge them in the long term;
- in order to move forward, it will be essential to harmonize banking and financial regulations as well as payment systems;
- In order to foster a high degree of commercial integration, it is essential to bring trade and business legislation closer together in line with international standards. Access to government procurement at the state level must be guaranteed to all North African companies;
- Solidarities must also be strengthened in the face of shocks, the impact of which varies according to the countries of the North African Economic Community (NECA);
- synergies of all kinds should be promoted and the creation of joint projects and co-investments promoted. This can only be successful if there is a massive training plan, particularly in the technical, technological, electronic and nanotechnological fields;
- Cross-shareholdings between North African companies have advantages in several ways. A pooling of technologies, know-how and distribution networks would help to create industrial champions acting in a wider market;

- exchanges of young trainees in search of training and / or first experience in another CENA country should be developed;
- State-level research and development programs (renewable energies, the fight against desertification, water management, fishing and fish farming, etc.) and at the research companies;
- North African transport must be developed by supplementing national infrastructures;
- the energy issue is one in which North African partnerships can be realized right away;
- the North African Economic Community (CENA) will be a catalyst for foreign direct investment, but also for North Africa, since the region will offer significant advances in technological innovation and qualification;
- we must bring businesses and universities closer together;
- Lastly, it is necessary to control the land and to favor the acquisitions of real estate by nationals of the region by granting tax and patrimonial facilities and by reserving a privileged reception to the investors.

The building of a North African economic community is a source of great hope and a promising prospect for the economic and social development of the entire region. However, political conflicts and bellicose statements between Algerian and Moroccan powers are disconcerting to the most optimistic supporters of such a project.

The North African economies have been hit hard by the crises of 2008 and 2011, in a differentiated way, but the impact is real. Their weaknesses are explained by their extraversion and their dependence on developed countries, especially European ones.

Admittedly, the two hydrocarbon producers saw their incomes rise, but more thanks to the rise in oil prices than thanks to their own dynamism in 2017 and 2018. Algeria and Libya suffer the Dutch syndrome and have the choice of excessive centralization of their productive apparatus and the mechanisms governing the processes of production and distribution of goods and services. The explosion of imports, far from reflecting investment efforts, is it not linked to the distribution of rent? The fall in oil prices has undermined the model followed in Algeria.

Tunisia, Egypt and Morocco present similar development models with activities extremely sensitive to the international situation: tourism, foreign investment, transfers from their diasporas, agricultural, industrial and phosphate exports to the European market .

Structural adjustment plans imposed by the IMF but accepted by the leaders of the indebted countries are at the origin of the austerity policies of the countries of the region. The IMF has imposed on the Algerian, Egyptian, Tunisian, Moroccan and Mauritanian governments a continuous and gradual depreciation of their currencies, the privatization of their companies, a reduction of social expenditures and a greater extraversion of their economies, rather oriented towards the European markets. .

Official statistics of international financial flows and balances of international payments do not reflect reality. Informal transactions of imports and exports go through parallel markets, but illegal activities, whether related to smuggling, prostitution or drug trafficking, should also be taken into account.

Morocco's commitment to reduce the budget deficit in 2018 augurs for substantial cuts in non-performing loans, payroll taxes and offsets, which ultimately leaves the threat of a serious social crisis at risk. unpredictable consequences.

The social problems are very acute because of the gap between the populations integrated into the labor market (working for administrations or public and private companies) and those who work in the informal sector or who have no salaried activity. .

In Algeria, the absence of a self-centered economic growth dynamic, based on production, is explained by the oil rent. There is a wealth of oil and gas that makes the basement is generous and that leaders do not have the motivation or the desire to create wealth through work and production. Those who want to create are not encouraged and sometimes are slowed down. There are certain forces that have every interest in investing in imports, especially those with customs and administrative facilities.

The Algerian development model is unbalanced. He advocates a centralized mode of industrialization that has failed everywhere. The return to the ubiquitous state in recent years is double-edged. It suggests that everything can be regulated centrally. We have advocated time and time again for a diversified economy, which would leave room for private initiative and market mechanisms. We emphasized the role of training, especially technical, in favor of young people. The failure of privatization is a sign of a lack of long-term vision. Restructuring plans for public enterprises are a failure.

The Algerian industry will not be able to come out at the top only. The state must create the right environment to foster the emergence of a generation of entrepreneurs and to drive a real industrial policy oriented towards the internal market. At some point, you have to choose between the importers' lobby and the promotion of domestic production.

There is consensus around the position to prepare post-hydrocarbon now and diversify the economy, but the solutions diverge. It is clear that there is a need to create a business-friendly environment, particularly for SMEs, and to promote private entrepreneurship, but all the parameters of a modern and innovative national economy need to be integrated.

In the process of a diversified and modern economy, all the sectors are called to reform themselves and in the first place the banking and financial sector. Public enterprises, for lack of privatizations, continue to become entangled in inertia and public assistance.

The state must first support the production companies

In Mauritania, political and institutional instability is pervasive and undermines any process of economic development.

Exports of iron ore, copper and gold have increased with the expansion of the fields of exploitation to constitute a respectable base of the Mauritanian economy. The mining sector contributes on average 36.5% of GDP. Fishing could be better off if there was a transformation plan. The fight against poverty must be the main focus. It goes through education and training. In total, the Maghreb economies could only achieve their jump towards emergence by developing within the framework of an integrated economic area.

North African economies need to create synergies and complementarities, seek economies of scale, reduce their dependence on dominant economies, and increase their bargaining power in international relations . The repeated financial and economic crises of recent years pose a serious threat to the future of the peoples of our planet. This could be a salutary warning, prompting North African leaders to rethink their neighborly relations: more solidarity, less permanent stiffening and unnecessary tension.

Countries that agree to form an economic community seek to expand their market and create an optimal space for local economic operators and foreign investors. The economies that have developed rapidly are those with a large territory and a promising market. Countries of medium or small size can experience strong growth as long as they are geographically associated with a dynamic environment.

The North African Economic Community (NECA) would save the economies of the region additional GDP growth of 4 to 6% thanks to the momentum generated by such a project and would lower the race for disarmament between Algeria and Morocco . The fight against corruption and the economy of rent as well as the introduction of rules of competition and transparency are factors of growth and innovation. Only accelerated economic development

can bring down unemployment in countries with high population growth and a young population.
The solution to current economic problems also depends on the behavior of political forces that must place the general interest above partisan and individual interests. Regionalization should place the economic intervention at its heart and be accompanied by the establishment of control bodies preventing the formation of local feudalism.
North Africa must combine market integration and integration through production. Economic integration through the market has as its main objective the realization of a unified area of free trade between the member countries. Integration through production, by combining human and material production factors, aims at fostering collaborative production between several countries (the Airbus case) in order to co-produce and co-distribute on the Maghreb internal market and / or to export. This joint productive activity can take many forms (joint venture, multinational holding, etc.). The integration of the productive apparatus can be based on a division of labor between member countries or a specialization based on comparative advantages. In this perspective, and in order to facilitate economic exchanges within the region, investments and the movement of people, the proposal for a common currency seems to be the most appropriate response. It would coexist with national currencies and would only be used in the North African area as a means of payment in interregional operations. Individuals traveling to the region would no longer be required to use foreign currency.
The construction of a North African economic zone will be based on economic convergences based on real cooperation, the common currency being only a facilitator. A single market only makes sense if governments strive to bring their codes closer to investment and harmonize their customs and trade rules. The construction of a regional area of free trade and the mobility of capital and people is needed from the outset.
The establishment of a common currency will be done in stages. It is technically possible in the short term, but it depends on the willingness of political leaders and their populations to move forward.
The single currency will remain a distant goal for twenty to thirty years. The modalities of transition to it will be defined according to region-specific data and the political and economic parameters to achieve it.
Once the CENA (North African Economic Community) is firmly established, it is necessary to move towards a triangular cooperation Mashreq / Africa / European Union where hydrocarbon exporting countries with foreign exchange surpluses would have an interest in investing in the other countries of the world. the region, in productive and profitable sectors. These are not aid programs but viable co-development projects.
Several objectives are easily attainable:
• achieve economies of scale by expanding the market;
• develop specializations in countries and regions according to comparative advantages;
• combat desertification, which threatens entire regions;
• develop agricultural research based on research institutes (INRA in Algeria and INRA in Morocco). On the agenda: genetic improvement of plant and animal species, the fight against drought and climate change;
• planting crops in desert environments, in collaboration with international laboratories;
• jointly manage the problem of water suppl

Second subpart. The Mashreq countries: state of play

Chapter 1. The Mashreq Countries: Indicators and Diagnosis

Table 23. The socio-economic indicators of the Gulf countries

	Population	Population growth rate	Population Urban population rate	Mean age	Population active	Activity rate
Saudi Arabia	31 540 372	2,1 %	83,1 %	24	11 670 000	56,9 %
United Arab Emirates	9 156 963	0,8 %	85,5 %	30	5 136 000	80,8 %
Kuwait	3 892 115	3,6 %	98,3 %	29	2 473 000	70,4 %
Qatar	2 235 355	2,9 %	99,2 %	31	1 644 000	87,2 %

Table prepared by us using data from the UN, the IMF and the World Bank, 2016.

Unlike the North African countries, the population of the Gulf countries does not have the same population density for geographical, topographical and climatic reasons. The total population of the region will soon exceed 50 million.

Table 24. Gulf countries' growth indicators: GDP in billions of USD

	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Saudi Arabia	744,34	753,83	646	637,79	689
United Arab Emirates	388,6	401,96	370,3	375,02	407,57
Kuwait	174,18	162,7	114,08	110,08	124,87
Qatar	201,89	210,11	166,91	156,6	170,79

Table 25. Gulf countries' growth indicators: annual GDP growth in% (constant prices)

	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Saudi Arabia	2,7 %	3,6 %	3,5 %	1,2 %	2 %
United Arab Emirates	4,7 %	3,1 %	4 %	2,3 %	2,5 %
Kuwait	0,4 %	0,6 %	1,1 %	2,5 %	2,6 %
Qatar	4,6 %	4 %	3,7 %	2,6 %	3,4 %

Tables prepared by us using data from the UN, the IMF and the World Bank.

Thanks to the mineral wealth, well-equipped cities have grown in the middle of the desert, which explains the share of the urban population. In order to support their accelerated development, the Gulf countries have relied on foreign labor, particularly Asian and Arab labor.

Table 26. Current account balance of Gulf countries (in billion USD)

	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Saudi Arabia	135,44	73,76	- 53,48	- 42,28	- 17,67
United Arab Emirates	74,13	40,33	12,31	4,24	12,98
Kuwait	69,49	54,23	5,97	3,94	10,45
Qatar	60,46	49,41	13,75	2,89	0,07

Table 27. Current account balance of the Gulf countries (in% of GDP)

	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017 (p)
Saudi Arabia	18,2 %	9,8 %	- 8,3 %	- 6,6 %	2,6 %
United Arab Emirates	19,1 %	10 %	3,3 %	1,1 %	3,2 %
Kuwait	39,9 %	33,3 %	5,2 %	3,6 %	8,4 %
Qatar	29,9 %	23,5 %	8,2 %	- 1,8 %	0 %

Tables prepared by us using data from the UN, the IMF and the World Bank.

The Gulf countries own 40% of the world's oil reserves and their production accounts for a quarter of world production, but their aggregate GDP (between US $ 1,350 and US $ 1,665 billion) is only 3% of global GDP. The GDP growth rate, around 3 to 4.5%, is slowing down because of the drop in oil prices since June 2014 after a peak at 100 dollars. The shrinking investments and public spending explain the slowdown in economic activities. The resumption of prices from $ 30 in January 2016 to $ 60 in 2018 fails to fill the budget deficits. It is to increase their tax resources that a 5% VAT has been introduced since January 2018, a measure that may marginally discourage expatriates, currently attracted by the absence of taxes.

Several projects have been canceled or postponed by all governments of the GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) and drastic austerity measures have targeted the reduction of fuel subsidies and pressure on the wage bill in the public sector, which represents a significant part of the expenditure in these countries. According to the IMF, a reduction in the salaries and benefits of civil servants in the Gulf monarchies would encourage their nationals to engage in the private sector and to resort to foreign labor. A vast program, difficult to achieve given the habits and privileges granted to nationals.

According to the IMF (see Report on the regional economic outlook, published in 2017), the price per barrel of oil, balanced budget would be 72.5 euros for Saudi Arabia, 62.1 dollars and 56.5 euros for Qatar and 53.3 euros for the United Arab Emirates. This price falls to 43.5 euros per barrel in the case of Kuwait but rises to 70.5 euros for Oman and 85.4 euros for Bahrain.

GDP growth for the entire GCC has not exceeded 2.5% in 2016, is expected to be slightly less than 2% in 2017 and, under the best assumptions, should be between 2 and 2.5% in 2018 .

The growth of Saudi Arabia, the largest Arab economy, was 1.7% in 2016 against 4.5% in 2015. In 2017, GDP growth is 2.6% in Kuwait, 3.4% in Qatar and 2.5% in the UAE, which has the most diversified economy. The same 2016 report warns that "more than two million young people will enter the labor market over the next two years in the GCC".
GCC members are betting on diversifying their economies with plans spanning several decades, as is clearly the case in Saudi Arabia.

Table 28. Goods and Services Imports by Gulf Countries (in USD millions)

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Saudi Arabia	186 540	205 482	219 900	236 517	228 770
United Arab Emirates	358 702	288 301	300 157	313 744	295 650
Kuwait	42 675	47 273	49 172	53 822	54 532
Qatar	45 436	56 326	59 744	64 607	65 390

Table prepared by us using data from the UN, the IMF and the World Bank.

Table 29. Exports of Goods and Services by Gulf Countries (in USD millions)

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Saudi Arabia	375 815	398 976	387 181	354 261	201 537
United Arab Emirates	314 063	364 276	399 422	397 982	291 358
Kuwait	111 606	127 162	120 699	109 999	60 768
Qatar	120 028	141 813	147 061	139 478	105 684

Table prepared by us using data from the UN, the IMF and the World Bank, 2016.

Saudi Arabia, a country that is not very diversified and highly dependent on oil, sees its current account balance deteriorate as of 2015 following the collapse of hydrocarbon prices. In the United Arab Emirates, the deterioration in the current account balance is significant, rising from $ 40.33 billion in 2014 to $ 12.31 billion in 2015, but the balance remains positive. This is also the case for Kuwait and Qatar: the decreases are significant between 2014 and 2015, rising respectively from 54.23 billion dollars to 5.97 billion dollars and from 49.41 billion dollars to 13.75 billion of dollars.
Low-population countries, such as Qatar, have less need to import goods and services than Saudi Arabia with a large population.

Saudi Arabia continued its pace of imports with a slight dip between 2014 and 2015 (from $ 236,517 billion to $ 228,770 billion) while exports decreased from $ 354,261 billion to $ 201,537. billions of dollars. This country imports cars, tractors, cycles and other vehicles, machines, nuclear reactors, boilers, electrical appliances and equipment, fuels, minerals, mineral oils, cast iron, iron and steel, cast iron and cereals.

The United Arab Emirates is in almost the same situation but for different reasons: The UAE is the entry point for imports for direct sale in one of the world's largest commercial hubs. It is also a stepping stone for re-exports to the Gulf countries, Iran, India, Iraq, Pakistan, Russia and Eastern Europe, including for luxury goods. About 70% of imported products are re-exported.

Qatar and Kuwait have not reduced their imports, given their irreducible needs, despite the significant decline in their exports. They drew, like the other Gulf countries, in their foreign exchange reserves.

Table 30. Trade balance of Gulf countries (excluding services) (in millions of USD)

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Saudi Arabia	244 775	246 570	222 557	183 995	44 265
United Arab Emirates	99 000	123 000	140 000	125 000	35 000
Kuwait	80 257	95 401	90 169	77 407	27 993
Qatar	87 518	102 167	101 861	95 557	48 798

Table prepared by us using data from the UN, the IMF and the World Bank, 2016.

Table 31. Total public and private external debts of the Gulf States in 2015

	Total external debts (billion USD)	Debt per capita In USD	Debt as% of GDP
Saudi Arabia	82,920	3 176	19

United Arab Emirates	122,700	24 273	41
Kuwait	56,810	15 754	43
Qatar	71,380	41 988	55

Table prepared by us using data from the UN, the IMF and the World Bank, 2016.

The deterioration of the trade balance of the four Gulf countries is blatant between 2014 and 2015: - 139,730 billion dollars for Saudi Arabia, - 90,000 billion dollars for the United Arab Emirates, - 49,414 billion dollars for the Kuwait, - $ 46,759 billion for Qatar. The external debts of the Gulf countries have worsened, albeit marginally, because the latter have substantial foreign exchange holdings and sovereign wealth funds that are very active on the financial markets.

This list of countries by external debt records the total public and private debts owed to non-residents and repayable in international currencies. Public debt is owed by governments, central or local governments, and private debt is contracted by households and businesses in the country.

However, it is a total gross debt (financial assets outside are not deducted) and includes bank deposits (which are debts for banks).

The public debt of the six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council is expected to double and their assets to fall by one-third by 2020.

The budget deficit in 2015 is $ 160 billion added to that of 2016 is a deficit of $ 159 billion in 2016 due to falling oil prices resulting in an increase in debt or the depletion of foreign exchange reserves. The report prepared by MR Raghu, head of research at the Kuwait Financial Center ("Markaz"), estimates that the debt of the six countries should reach in five years 59% of their total GDP while it was only 30% end 2015. The accumulated reserves of the six countries, which represented 2,200 billion dollars at the end of 2015, or 140% of their GDP, should decrease during these five years to reach 100% of GDP, says the expert. Despite the economic difficulties, the unemployment rate remains stable throughout the region.

Table 32. Unemployment rate in the Gulf countries

	2013	2014	2015
Saudi Arabia	5,6	5,7	5,6
United Arab Emirates	2,3	3,1	4
Kuwait	2,1	2,1	2,1

Qatar	3,9	1,5	0,5

Table prepared by us using data from the UN, the IMF and the World Bank.

Table 33. Foreign direct investment (FDI) in the Gulf countries. Inward FDI flows (in millions of USD)

	2013	2014	2015
Saudi Arabia	8 865	8 012	8 141
United Arab Emirates	9 491	10 823	10 976
Kuwait	1 434	953	293
Qatar	- 840	1 040	1 071

Table prepared by us using data from the UN, the IMF and the World Bank.

Table 34. FDI stock (in millions of USD) in the Gulf countries

	2013	2014	2015
Saudi Arabia	207 897	215 909	224 050
United Arab Emirates	89 340	100 164	111 139
Kuwait	16 097	15 733	14 604
Qatar	31 058	32 098	33 169

Table prepared by us using data from the UN, the IMF and the World Bank, 2016.

The unemployment rate of Saudi Arabia is 5.6% overall, but 12.1% of the Saudi population. The explanation is relatively simple: the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council rely heavily on foreign labor as an adjustment variable. The redistribution of oil revenue is also reflected in the number of public jobs and the near-full employment of nationals, hence these figures are more or less biased. Indeed, unemployment rates do not take into account the unemployment of women who do not look for work but would be interested in the opening of the labor market. On the other hand, immigrants are dismissed as soon as public and private difficulties appear.
Inflows from Saudi Arabia are stable between 2014 and 2015, and down from 2013.

The United Arab Emirates is doing well, thanks to the relative diversification of their economy; progression is arithmetic but sustained. Stability in Qatar contrasts with the collapse of FDI flows into Kuwait.
The stock of FDI has increased since 2013 in Saudi Arabia (224.050 billion dollars), constituting in 2015 more than double that of the United Arab Emirates (111.139 billion dollars), fifteen times that of Kuwait (14.604 billion dollars)) and almost seven times that of Qatar ($ 33.169 billion). Saudi Arabia ranks 26th in the world in terms of FDI stocks.

Table 35. Breakdown of economic activity by sector (as% of total employment) in the Gulf countries

	Agriculture	Industry	Services
Saudi Arabia	6,1	22,7	71,2
United Arab Emirates	4,3	24,3	71,2
Kuwait	2,5	25,1	72,3
Qatar	1,2	54,1	44,6

Table prepared by us using data from the UN, the IMF and the World Bank, 2016.

Table 36. Value added by sector (in% of GDP) in the Gulf countries in 2016
n / a: undisclosed data

	Agriculture	Industry	Services
Saudi Arabia	2,3	45,9	51,8
United Arab Emirates	n/a	n/a	n/a
Kuwait	0,6	51,1	48,3
Qatar	0,2	58,8	41,3

Table prepared by us using data from the UN, the IMF and the World Bank, 2016.

Unsurprisingly, the agricultural sector is the least job-rich in the climatic and topographic conditions of the region. The industry, apart from Qatar (54.1%), employs only 22 to 25% of assets, mainly in hydrocarbons and petrochemicals. Services are the lion's share (around 70%

of assets). These are businesses, banks, services to people, non-market services ... The figures of Qatar are to be compared with its small population.

In terms of value-added with fewer jobs, the oil and gas industry generates value-added because of the heavy use of heavy technology and less reliance on labor.

Table 37. Annual growth rate of value added by sector in the Gulf countries

	Agricultur e	Industrie	Services
Saudi Arabia	1,1	4	2,9
United Arab Emirates	3,1	4,4	3
Kuwait	4,5	- 1,7	2
Qatar	8,5	1,7	7,8

Table prepared by us using data from the UN, the IMF and the World Bank, 2016.

Table 38. Average annual exchange rate for 1 euro of Gulf currencies

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Qatari Riyal	5,07	4,68	4,83	4,84	4,04
Kuwaiti dinar	0,38	0,36	0,38	0,38	0,33
Emirati Dirham	5,11	4,72	4,88	4,88	4,07
Saudi Riyal	5,22	4,82	4,98	4,98	4,16

Source: World Bank, 2016

The annual growth rate of value added in agriculture is generally between 1% and 4.5%, but even more so when it comes to Qatar (growth of 8.5%).

Qatar, Oman, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia have tied the fate of their currencies to the US dollar, which is not without problems in domestic prices, imports, as well as foreign investment. The fall in oil prices should prompt these countries to choose other exchange rate policies that integrate into their reference basket in addition to the dollar, the euro, the Chinese yuan, the yen and the pound sterling.

The Saudi Riyal, for example, should take into account the reduction of its foreign exchange reserves to 80 billion dollars in 2014 and this country has reduced by 27% of its reserves in 2016 and 36 billion dollars in 2017 The parity of the Saudi currency has been set at 3.75 Riyals per dollar since 1986.

The Gulf monarchies have enough reserves to defend their currencies, despite the serious deficits in their budgets, weighed down by the fall in oil prices. But while the financial situation of Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates is solid, Bahrain and Oman are not so much more vulnerable than Saudi Arabia. For their part, the first three countries mentioned can refrain from cutting their current public spending for decades with oil prices at 50 and even $ 30 per barrel in 2008. The Bahrain and Omani reserves could run out. in two or three years. They need a barrel at least $ 80.

Chapter 2. Arab Economic Integration: A Multistep Process

The world's zonal constructions are multiplying from north to south and from east to west of the planet. Even the United States, the leading economic, military and political power, seeks complementarities with their Mexican and Canadian neighbors. Trump's protests will be a parenthesis that will close after his departure from the US presidency.

The Arab-speaking countries are facing domestic challenges (rising unemployment among young people, rapid demographic change, scarcity of mineral resources and their long-term exhaustion) which pose inextricable threats to the stability, integrity and sustainability of these countries. .

The common destiny, which has its roots from the foundation of the Umma mouslima (Muslim nation) which has been reduced to the Imama arabya (atabe nation), has anchored the idea of an Arab nation divided by successive colonialism and especially the Sykes-Picot agreements signed on May 16, 1916, between France and Great Britain (with the approval of Tsarist Russia and the Italians). These agreements cut the Middle East, the Black Sea, the Mediterranean Sea, the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean and the Caspian Sea, then part of the Ottoman Empire.

It was by force of arms that British and French managed to impose on the League of Nations (the SDN, the ancestor of the UN), the new borders of a remodeled Middle East. France receives a mandate on Lebanon and Syria, Great Britain, on Iraq (enlarged of Kirkuk, ceded by the French in exchange for a participation in the profits of the region), on Transjordan and Palestine.

The two colonial powers will install dynasties according to their respective interests, without respecting the territorial logic and the socio-economic equilibrium. Discontinuities in space and geography are flagrant.

In the Maghreb, the line of borders between Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria was to the advantage of the latter, because it was considered a department attached for eternity to the Hexagon, while Morocco and Tunisia were protectorates with limited sovereignty.

Once their independence gained in 1956, Tunisians and Moroccans accepted the idea of not negotiating their borders with their Algerian neighbor as long as this country was under French rule. "Good faith" has prevailed between "good faith" leaders: Mohammed V and the Moroccan-side nationalist parties, Bourguiba and the Neo-Destour Tunisian side and Ferhat Abbas as head of the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (GPRA) from of its creation on September 19, 1958.

The Tangier conference from April 27 to 30, 1958, was devoted to the unification of the Maghreb and "recommends to the governments of the Arab Maghreb countries not to engage separately the destiny of North Africa in the external and defense fields until 'to the installation of federal institutions'.

The question of borders between the Maghreb countries is inseparable from the process of French colonization. Of course, there is no question of changing the boundaries inherited from the colonizers who acted in their own interests with disconcerting myopia, with negative consequences for the colonized populations. I remember what a senior French army told me at the time of the occupation of northern Mali by the AQIM and the MNLA: "France has poorly defined borders and aggregated Arab populations in Mali ".

Both in this expensive country and in the Maghreb countries, I defended the principle of the inviolability of borders and the status quo. Otherwise, if we wanted to reconsider the boundaries according to their historical logic before colonization or in ethnic, linguistic and tribal terms, Africa and the Middle East would burst into a thousand pieces.

The example comes from Europe where Germany, defeated after the Second World War, saw its territory amputated. It was not until 16 January 1992 that the German-Polish border agreement of 1990 defining the Oder-Neisse line as the border between the two countries was concluded. Hungary has been dismembered and Hungarian minorities live in neighboring countries, but this does not prevent it from cooperating with other members of the Union.

If one moves in Southeast Asia, border disputes are significant between Vietnam and Cambodia, and between the latter and Thailand. Remember the skirmishes between Vietnamese and Chinese armies along the border between the two countries.
The major lesson that can be drawn from this is that countries with neighborhood conflicts have come together to form economic unions (eg Asean).
The Arab countries of the Mashreq in the Maghreb should show pragmatism and solidarity and not consider their neighbors as eternal enemies, but as sustainable partners for the benefit of their peoples and their youth.
The fragmentation of Arab countries is not over with decolonization. The example of South Sudan, which has been separated from the North under US pressure, the independence of Kosovo and Serbia as a whole are examples that may emulate.
The notion of self-determination advocated by the United States and its armed wing, NATO, turned against its instigators when the Crimea voted 95% of its independence from Ukraine.
Americans, having gained their energy independence through the production of shale gas and oil, are losing interest in hydrocarbon producing countries in the Middle East. There are fears of minority upheavals demanding independence, as in Iraq, Libya, Syria, Yemen and possibly the Maghreb.

Arab countries, like African nations and more generally developing ones, should regroup in economic communities to join forces and weigh against the great powers. The Maghreb, including Egypt one day as a North African economic community, should move closer to the GCC and the Middle East.
These economic zones should coordinate their integration projects within the Arab League, which should be transformed into an Arab economic community. The latter would aim to turn to sub-Saharan Africa as a source for mutually beneficial investments. Sovereign wealth funds of hydrocarbon exporting countries are expected to invest in other Arab non-oil producing countries and in sub-Saharan Africa with European technology. The institutional framework for this cooperation should include the Arab Economic Community (formerly the Arab League), the African Union and the European Union with the key advantages of access to European markets against the use of Arab capital and investment protection and facilitation.
Arab countries should defend their territorial integrity by grouping themselves around a pole of economic cooperation. They have more or less structured and operational organizations (CCG and UMA). The Arab League was created in 1945. But the political dissensions and the interventions of the great powers in the political and institutional choices prevented the construction of a common economic vision. Several attempts to put in place free trade or investment promotion legislation have taken place but without achieving a grand design for Arab economic integration.

Chapter 3. The Arab Economic Council

The establishment of a Standing Committee on Economic and Financial Affairs in July 1945 was to lay the foundations for economic cooperation and integration as defined by Article 4 of the Arab League Pact. The aim was to define the modalities for facilitating free trade and removing the obstacles to inter-Arab trade.

The Conference of Ministers of the Arab Economy and Finance held in Beirut from 25 to 31 May 1953 approved the facilitation of trade in animal and industrial agricultural products and their full tariff exemption if they were produced in another country. Manufactured goods were exempted from 20 to 50% of customs duties and sometimes 100%.

Arab economic cooperation has entered a new phase with the agreement of the "Arab Economic Union" concluded by the Economic Council of the Arab League No. 85 on June 3, 1975, which came into effect in 1964. The result was the creation of a Council of the Arab Economic Union and the establishment of a common Arab market in 1964 which would aim at the elimination of tariffs and the realization of a common market. However, only five countries have eliminated all tariffs between them: Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Iraq, joined by Libya.

The Arab Economic and Social Council, dated 27 February 1981, was to attempt to overcome past failures by defining the following principles:

- establish links between production, trade and services,
- remove tariffs gradually,
- equitably distribute the benefits and costs of liberalizing trade between countries,
- remove economic sanctions and develop tax incentives,
- create an Arab common market by selecting products according to criteria defined annually.

The Riyadh Summit of 1987 invited countries wishing to do so to begin negotiations to liberalize the exchange of products offered to the Arab League. Sixteen were totally exempted from all taxes and tariff and extraterritorial measures in 1989.

In September 1995, the Economic and Social Council decided to initiate a process leading to the liberalization of trade between Arab countries with a view to creating a free trade area. The enforcement took place in February 1997 but with a ten-year deadline from 1 January 1998.

It is clear that the low volume of inter-Arab trade reflects the failure of these agreements. For this reason, the Assessment and Monitoring Committee established by the Arab Economic Union Council Decision 71/588 was to examine the causes and obstacles to the achievement of an Arab Common Market as defined in 1964. The failure of the establishment of an Arab common market and the absence of adequate conditions to make it viable have been admitted. All the above-mentioned devices have not contributed to the economic development of the Arab countries, nor to the success of their integration.

Created in 1950, the Arab Economic Council of which are the ministers of economy of the Arab countries could not achieve the objectives that had been assigned to it. Although it met 62 times between 1953 and 1998, this Council, which became social in 1978, did not implement mechanisms to ensure economic integration between the Arab countries. The only achievements to his credit are piecemeal and do not include all Arab States. Thus, in 1953, the agreement of liberalization and free movement of goods between Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Kuwait was approved. The result has been a preferential trade regime between these countries in the form of progressive reduction of tariffs. Three lists were drawn up: the first defining agricultural products and natural resources to circulate freely, the second stipulating the manufactured and agricultural products to benefit from a

rebate of 25% of the duties and taxes, and the third admitting the semi-finished products. to benefit from a reduction of 50%. The agreement establishes a preferential import permit and facilities for the circulation of capital financing development projects.
The results of these measures were mixed because of the tensions between certain States and the weakness of the productive apparatus, the only creation of exportable production.

This agreement was concluded within the framework of the Arab League under cover of the Political Committee of May 22, 1956 in Damascus. It recommended that the Arab governments establish a group of Arab experts to prepare a comprehensive economic integration plan and the modalities for doing so.
The experts met in Bhamdoun (Lebanon) on August 6, 1956. They prepared a draft Arab Economic Union agreement and the tools to help it come to fruition. This was adopted in June 1957. The essential points of Article 1 are:
- free movement of persons and capital,
- Free trade in goods and domestic and foreign products
- possibility for all citizens of the signatory countries of residence, work and employment as well as the exercise of any economic activity within the Union
- free transport, passage and use of all means of circulation (ports, civil airports ...),
- property, transfer and inheritance rights.

Article 2 of the Agreement identifies the instruments for achieving the objectives of the Arab Economic Union as follows:
- constitute a single customs zone,
- harmonize import and export policies and all related regimes,
- unify the transport and transit codes,
- to conclude concerted trade agreements and payment systems with foreign countries,
- harmonize agricultural and industrial policies and domestic trade,
- to unify the economic legislations so that the operators have the same conditions of exercise of their professions,
- harmonize labor and social security legislation,
- harmonize taxes and tariffs and all taxes related to agriculture and industry,
- coordinate monetary and financial policies,
- to unify the scoring systems and the statistics.

Although this agreement was approved by the Arab League Economic Council in 1957, only the following countries approved it on 6 June 1962: Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Jordan and Kuwait. Later other countries will follow: North Yemen, Southern Sudan, United Arab Emirates, Libya, Somalia, Mauritania and Palestine.
The result was the establishment of a Council of the Arab Economic Union between the countries, whose seat was fixed in Cairo. Decisions were taken by a two-thirds majority and committees specialized in customs, financial, monetary, agricultural, commercial, transport and telecommunications matters.
These ambitious projects have failed each time because of political differences and cleavages between countries with nationalist tendencies and other frankly liberal. The cold war has amplified these disagreements. Other more economic reasons have negatively impacted all unification processes, namely differences between hydrocarbon producing countries and others, and countries with large populations and those with low population.
On the merits, all agreements focused on the free movement of goods and services as countries needed more integration through production and coordinated plans to revive productive activities and create synergies on the basis of specialization and / or

complementarity. It required both a timetable for implementing agreements and mutual obligations.

It is instructive to note that without a supranational institution, playing the role of regulator, arbiter and legislator, all agreements are dependent on the goodwill and often on the mood of Arab leaders.
The three powers, legislative, executive and judicial, should be entrusted respectively to a directly elected universal parliament, a permanent full-fledged commission and an Arab court to enforce common decisions. There are several advantages to this: firstly, being visible to economic operators in the Arab region and to foreign investors; secondly, the economic union will be able to function whatever the changes of the powers in place and the wishes of the Arab rulers or their objective or transitory divergences. This reflection applies to the Maghreb economic community.
In any case, it is absolutely essential that the existing economic unions (AMU, GCC) or to be created (the CEM-Maghreb Economic Community, the Economic Community of North Africa and the Community of Arab States) focus on the economic issues and leave out political conflicts. It is also true that the Arab countries are more linked to foreign powers and chronically depend on the United States, Europe or Russia (former USSR), as part of a division of labor that has put them in the configuration of exporters of raw and primary materials and agricultural products and net importers of manufactured goods. It is time to consider economies oriented towards productive and progressively industrializing activities.

It is noteworthy how the Arab countries had the desire to build economic integration and a free trade area and how each step was followed by failure. Our great challenge, in this book, is to build the schemas of a progressive economic union, to lead us step by step from a Maghreb integration (CEM) to privileged and fusional links with the Mashreq (Egypt, GCC).
The work of the 89th session of the Economic and Social Council was held on 10 February 2011, at the ministerial level, under the Lebanese presidency. It was a question of taking stock of the implementation of the 88th session and preparing the economic and social aspects for submission to the Arab Summit held in Saudi Arabia in January 2013. The topics covered concerned the area free trade, the Arab Customs Union and the timetable for implementing economic and social decisions.

During this session, remedies to the problem of unemployment were discussed. The aim was to evaluate the employment support program decided at the 2009 Arab Summit on Economic Development and to assess the obstacles facing the Arab Labor Organization with regard to the decisions taken to help the unemployed find work. a job.
Decisions were taken in Sharm el-Sheikh in January 2011: monitoring economic cooperation projects, some concerning tourism, water management, sustainable development and the fight against natural disasters. The social aspect was mentioned as well as the growth objectives of the millennium.

The meeting, chaired by the Qatari Minister of Economic Affairs and Trade, was to assess the reasons for the establishment of an Arab free trade zone and the completion of the Arab customs union in 2015. There was talk of promote small and medium-sized enterprises as vectors of economic and social development, financing instruments for agriculture, in order to ensure the food security of Arab countries still to be defined.
At the social level, the Council is committed to fighting the illiteracy of Arab women through awareness campaigns. According to Nabil al-Arabi, secretary-general of the Arab League, the

economic and social issue has become increasingly important, notably by convening a biennial summit dedicated to economic issues and launching joint projects. In all areas. Al-Arabi said that following the 2013 Riyadh summit, several Arab-state partnership projects had been concluded and significant progress had been made in relation to the 2009 Kuwait Summit and the 2011 Sharm el-Sheikh summit. The goal is to achieve this Arab common market.

Chapter 4. Arab Regional Partnership Agreements

All statistics show that Arab economies are dependent on international circumstances. Being extroverted and oriented towards developed and emerging countries, they experience exogenous shocks or recover when the global growth rate is rising.
In the same vein, we can note the low level of inter-Arab trade. Exports between Arab countries did not exceed $ 57.4 billion in 2012 out of a total of $ 662.6 billion, or 8.4%, while imports between these countries amounted to $ 52.03 billion. $ 373 billion, or 14.01%.
Excluding hydrocarbons, these figures would be dramatically lower. While it is becoming increasingly clear that regional integration has become the norm in all regions of the world, Arab countries are struggling to form an integrated economic zone. The benefits of an integrationist process are obvious and unanimously recognized by international institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank, the WTO and the European Union.
It is frustrating that the countries that launched the first attempts to bring their economies closer together were Arab countries as early as 1945. The aim was already to facilitate trade by providing preferential benefits and removing slow down the intensity. The conference of Arab Economic Affairs Ministers in Beirut from 25 to 31 May 1953 was to facilitate trade in agricultural and industrial products by introducing the principle of "preferential treatment" with exemptions from customs duties ranging from 20% to 50% depending on the products. .

The exemption was total for agricultural and animal products as well as the natural wealth since they come from an Arab country. The benefits of regional economic integration can be identified as follows:
- countries grouped within economic entities achieve an optimal size in terms of population, GDP and specialization as well as the comparative advantages of community members,
- the synergies achieved and the complementarities established, the countries of the economic zone will be able to achieve economies of scale and increase their respective competitivities,
- this should result in additional annual economic growth (from 2 to 4% for Arab countries), a reduction in unemployment, an optimization of trade and a pooling of knowledge, innovation and the free movement of goods and services as well as capital,
- economic integration allows the coordination of the economic policies of the member countries and strengthens the community in its negotiations with major groups and international institutions. Negotiations within the WTO, for example, give rise to arbitration between major industrial powers: the United States, the European Union, Japan, China and other BRICS.

The other countries attend as spectators and undergo the decisions taken, even if they go against their interests. When the WTO approved the removal of Chinese textile quotas, Chinese companies dumped their products around the world. The victims were the Moroccan, Tunisian and Egyptian companies that closed one after the other. They lost large parts of their European markets.
The Arab countries negotiate in a position of weakness, separately, with the great powers. It is enough to remember the difficulties encountered by Algeria when it tried to renegotiate its

free trade agreement with the European Union in the fields of fisheries and agriculture. The same goes for Tunisia with the EU.

The development of inter-Arab trade offers several benefits:
- raise the level of business opportunities and their productive capacities,
- to substitute imports from countries outside the Arab zones by buying products from member countries, even if the consumer claims to suffer from quality. I remember during our missions in China that our Chinese interlocutors told French companies that I accompanied them: "If you offer us products that are made here, we will prefer them to yours even if they are of superior quality".

Arab economies are both complementary and similar. Some opponents of Maghreb and Arab economic integration, motivated more by political considerations than by a technical argument, advance the idea that we can not group countries with the same activities (eg Morocco and Tunisia). This is wrong in many ways.
o All economic zones (EU, Asean, Mercosur, etc.) include countries with similar economic structures. In their evolution, they have reinforced each other and increasingly.
o For small economies, it is even recommended to co-produce and seek partnerships in niche markets where some countries have comparative advantages.

During my trip to Tunisia in April 2014, I made an inspection on the origin of products sold in Tunisian stores. Tunisia produces on its own or in partnership with foreign companies thousands of consumer goods. Given the tightness of the Tunisian market, it would have been much more profitable to seek to expand the markets to other Maghreb states, as part of a co-production and / or division of labor. Take the example of the automotive industry. It is recognized that any passenger car production unit requires a critical size market. A plant dedicated solely to Algeria will not be profitable unless it is an assembly. Moreover, the Algerian State subsidizes this industry.
The example of Renault Tangier is different because they are cheap vehicles for re-export. The best configuration is that of a car industry, partially or totally integrated for a market of 90 to 100 million inhabitants.
On the model of Airbus in Europe, one could imagine manufacturing units located in the five states of the Maghreb with a fabric of subcontractors and assemblers. Opportunities could be for the whole of Africa, the Arab countries and part of Asia.
The high level of tariffs stimulates local production and vice versa, even more if the market is large. Of course, bilateral and multilateral agreements prevent the imposition of prohibitive taxes, but protecting the internal market with standards, as the newly industrialized Asian countries do, would be legitimate.

I warned the Maghreb countries, through the media, against the harmful consequences of unbalanced free trade agreements on their own industries. Thus, Chinese nationals took control of the wholesale trade in Morocco, massively buying the stores of the Derb Omar district in Casablanca, heart of the distribution of goods throughout the Kingdom. The goal is to supply the entire country with Chinese suppliers.
On the other hand, how can we expect to benefit from a free trade agreement with Turkey under the influence of the lobbies of Moroccan imports? Turkey produces on a large scale and with colossal means consumer goods competing with local productions.
Finally, the massive arrival of Spanish processed food products, sometimes out of date, and other manufactures from the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilia has destroyed entire sectors of Moroccan industry. For historical and political reasons, the northern regions were left

abandoned, without investment, nor agricultural development, except cannabis, until the accession to the throne of King Mohammed VI. Smuggling was erected as an alternative to misery and tolerated. It is no coincidence that Morocco is losing 30,000 industrial jobs each year, according to the president of the CGEM (General Confederation of Moroccan Enterprises). Have I been listened to or is it a coincidence? The "new industrial policy" presented to the Head of State by the Minister of Industry plans to assess the impact of free trade agreements on Moroccan industrial activities. In addition, the Moroccan government has taken measures against the illegal entry of goods from Europe by road or sea.
The Arab integrationist strategy should be dynamic, long-term and not short-term in nature. The forms and methods of its implementation should take into account demographic changes, natural resources and their duration, climate change, geostrategic changes in the partner countries (European, African, Asian ...). Through a grid of current and future parameters, taken from the aforementioned considerations, the need to move quickly towards economic integration will be needed from the outset.
Take demographic developments in Arab countries with large populations. We must distinguish those who produce hydrocarbons, whose energy consumption will increase. Some estimates put forward a gas consumption in Algeria higher than the national production by 2030. Without the exports of this natural wealth, what would become of this population which lived with a redistribution of the rent from the top, whose imports flamed , and this spending state to the extreme?

Morocco, Egypt and Syria will face millions of working-age people, mostly young, but with limited job prospects. The depletion of fossil resources is inevitable. Economic diversification and the search for new forms of partnerships within their geographical area will come sooner or later. While the Arab countries are quarreling and setting obstacles against their neighbors, the major powers and emerging countries are making great strides.
The post-industrial world is being built without the Arab countries and the gap is growing day by day in their disfavor. Their economies evolve at best according to a (slow) arithmetic progression, while developed and emerging countries follow a geometric progression.

The scarcity of water resources, the lack of agricultural research specific to agricultural land and desert in the Arab countries, the threatening desertification must worry, except to pool human and financial means.
Economic integration creates a multi-faceted dynamic:
- The volume of domestic and foreign investment will expand considerably as opportunities become proportional to the enlargement of the economic space which, from a national point of view, becomes transnational. Companies expect to realize economies of scale and expand their markets.
- The virtuous circle is triggered, ranging from investment to growth and job creation. Consumption will increase and business opportunities will be positively affected. National budgets will be balanced because of the growing strength of the labor force; income distributions should broaden the tax base.
- Maghreb enterprises will gradually change in size and could cross critical thresholds, favorable to competitiveness, innovation and technological progress. Research and development budgets are low in developing countries. The Maghreb is no exception. The possibility of integrating R & D expenditure into GDP has been universally recognized instead of considering it as intermediate consumption.

In order to achieve an optimal economic zone, conditions must be fulfilled:

o a high degree of trade liberalization should be achieved in order to create a truly competitive, productive and diversified economic community;
o The economic role of the state should combine social equity, redistributive virtues and economic efficiency. If the Soviet model did not work (in Algeria and Libya), the ultraliberal model inspired by the recommendations of the IMF and / or the Washington consensus did not give all the expected results in terms of industrialization, employment and innovation (in Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt).
It is necessary to abandon any dogma or reductive ideology, to move away from the uniform positions formalized by world economic thought and to take into account the specialties of the Arab countries.
Some sectors require state intervention: either because they have a strategic and security role (energy, telecommunications, transport and military industries), or because they are profitable only after several decades (railways, road infrastructure, civilian nuclear, dam construction, mining industries), or because they are useful but not marketable (health, education, internal and external security).
On the contrary, the State must not directly manage businesses, the hotel industry, taxis, non-strategic industrial enterprises, or military ones. Whatever the private sector can do for itself, the state has nothing to do with it. However, it needs to create an enabling environment for entrepreneurship, negotiate bilateral and multilateral agreements that are supportive of domestic industries, and regulate commercial and productive activities in a flexible, non-bureaucratic manner that benefits the public interest and the public. employment.

It means that :
- the State must ensure that its trade legislation and investment code are legible, transparent, simple and stable. The creation of activity and jobs must not become a way of the cross and discourage creators and entrepreneurs. This does not exempt economic operators from their obligations to the community, such as paying taxes and respecting labor and citizen rights. This does not prevent civil society from organizing itself into associations or consumer groups.
- Justice must be independent and incorruptible. This provides additional insurance for domestic and foreign investors. How many economic missions have aroused the enthusiasm of entrepreneurs in view of the potential of the country and then their discouragement. when they were aware of the slippage of justice, its partiality or even its duplicity vis-à-vis the local lobbies?
- Members of the economic community must enjoy privileged benefits and regimes as in all economic zones.
It is also necessary:
- harmonize national taxation and avoid double taxation in two or more countries,
- conclude agreements to protect intellectual property rights,
- organize and participate in exhibitions and economic fairs under the banner of the Arab economic community,
- coordinate commercial policies and legislation and why not institute a unified corporate and business law,
- exploit the common fisheries resources and enter into fisheries and distribution agreements in adjacent areas, with some ports in neighboring countries closer to fishing grounds,
- to promote concerted actions in the field of training and to create an Arab Erasmus for young people,
- to increase university exchanges and scientific partnerships,
- to promote the sharing of the costs and results of research centers by bringing companies closer to universities and why not to found poles of specialization,

- institute arbitration mechanisms to resolve disputes between private or public agents (it is a security for investors and companies that fear arbitrariness and a two-tier justice, favorable to locals),
- develop and strengthen collaboration between chambers of commerce (by their vocation of information and support to companies, they are well placed to create Arab business scholarships, support companies who wish to prospect and / or invest in a country in the community),
- create export promotion centers.

During my long experience as a French foreign trade advisor, I have measured the power of France's diplomatic and consular networks and the support given to exporting companies. In each country surveyed, I could count on the active support of the economic services of the embassy and the French Chambers of Commerce and Industry. Thus, we had reliable, tailor-made macroeconomic and microeconomic information and access to institutional and business leaders in the country visited. I have used economic diplomacy fully and efficiently.
The Arab countries taken separately will not be able to compete with the economic diplomacy of the developed countries, but if they pool their diplomatic services and their business networks, as well as their banks and subsidiaries of large companies, they would help their nationals to benefit means thus pooled.
We have successfully tested formulas such as SME sponsorship by groups and banks.
Carrying consists of accommodating compatriot companies in the offices of expatriate companies, in order to maximize their technical and human capacities, which sometimes are not fully utilized.
Arab entrepreneurs' clubs could also be set up in each country and encouraged to work in a network through a federating organization that would provide information on national legislation and business opportunities and pass it on to local authorities.

Chapter 5. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)

The GCC is a regional economic, political and social organization with principles and objectives, defined by a fundamental regulation. The GCC aims to coordinate the actions of its members, in order to face regional and international challenges. Its areas of intervention include: economics, politics, security, culture, health, information, education, legislative, administrative, energy, industry, mining and raw materials, agriculture, water and animal resources.
GCC countries have geographic, climatic and geological similarities, the same strengths and the same local and regional constraints. In a few nuances, political regimes are monarchical, with different forms of political representation.
The GCC was established on May 25, 1981 at the Abu Dhabi summit on the initiative of Sheikh Jaber al-Ahmad as-Sabah, Emir of Kuwait, and Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan al-Nahyan, leader of the United Arab Emirates. Its headquarters are in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.

The GAC consists of the following bodies:
- The Supreme Council. This is the highest instance. It is made up of the heads of state of the member countries. The presidency is rotating, respecting the alphabetical order. It meets in two annual, regular and consultative sessions. It may also meet in extraordinary session following an express request from one or more of its members. The Board can validly deliberate when one third of its members are present. Each member has a voice. Decisions are taken unanimously. The Council oversees the Dispute Resolution Committee, which is composed of citizens from non-dispute-sharing member countries. These are co-opted by the Supreme Council and their number can not be less than three. This Committee deals with disputes between Member States and disagreements over the interpretation or applicability of important Council decisions.

- The Council of Ministers is composed of the Foreign Ministers or their representatives. It is chaired by the country holding the presidency at the previous summit of heads of state. This body meets every three months to propose policies and recommendations aimed at strengthening cooperation between Member States and coordinating ongoing actions between member countries in all areas. All the points treated will be submitted to the Supreme Council which will decide finally. The Council of Ministers sets the agenda of the Supreme Council, according to a consensus.

- The Advisory Committee of the Supreme Council was established at the 18th session held in Kuwait in December 1997 to intensify consultations and contacts between Member States. The aim is to surround ourselves with the skills of thirty citizens representing the six GCC countries to gather their opinions on issues that will advance the integration of the GCC countries. This committee is chaired by a national of the country holding the presidency of the GCC. The vice-presidency is the next country on the list of presidential candidates. The consultants of this committee may not allow themselves to deal with subjects other than those referred to them by the Council. An office based in Muscat (Oman) assists the Committee but reports to the GCC General Secretariat.

- The General Secretariat prepares specific studies for cooperation, coordinates and plans programs of common interest. He prepares the reports requested by the Supreme Council and the Council of Ministers. It organizes the agenda and the progress of the Council of Ministers. The Secretary General is appointed by the Supreme Council for a period of three years, renewable once.

> Despite all the efforts, meetings and attempts, the GCC has created in two decades only a free trade area and a customs union, which is a minimum. The GCC has failed to transform itself into a truly integrated economic community. Even the creation of a single currency is constantly being pushed back. I had the opportunity to propose in the Arabic-language media a common currency among the GCC countries and to consider a single currency in a future as distant as the total completion of economic,

budgetary and fiscal convergences and the achievement of a real unique market. The United Arab Emirates opposes the creation of a single currency among the six GCC states, apparently because of the choice of Riyadh as the headquarters of the Central Bank of the member countries.
But the reasons are more fundamental, at the same time economic, political and geostrategic. The exchange policies of the Gulf countries differ from one to the other: some practice the PEG (the attachment to the dollar), others index their currencies on a basket of currencies, finally some are tempted by a floating regime managed.

On the political and geostrategic levels, the reports of the ambassadors of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar reveal profound differences on sensitive issues. Examples include the ouster of the Muslim Brotherhood and the imprisonment of their leader, Mr Morsi, in Egypt, support for Hamas by Qatar, and Al-Jazeera's alleged role in mounting tensions in Arab countries.
The basic idea, of which I am convinced, is that the Arab regimes have not been able to overcome the califal syndrome aggravated by the Sykes-Picot agreements and the successive processes of decolonization. The Arab-Muslims accepted the caliph successors of the Prophet. The schisms took place because of deep disagreements over succession.
The way the first empire was constituted is worthy of a Machiavellian seizure of power that has nothing to do with piety. The extent of the lands conquered by Islam has prevented the creation of a centralized state, from East Asia to North Africa, through the Middle East. Hence the creation of dynasties built on a geographical basis. Each one of them felt obliged to defend its specificity and its reason to exist.
Each leader, accepting only his own legitimacy, claims to exercise leadership over others. Whether in the Maghreb or the Mashreq, the temptation to weaken its neighbors is stronger than the rationality that requires seeking mutually beneficial cooperation.
At the end of the Second World War, France, which suffered three wars on its territory between 1870 and 1945, did not seek to strengthen its political supremacy on the European continent as a victorious power. It could have taken advantage of the weakening infrastructure, human and industrial of Germany to maintain it, once again a political dwarf, inferior. On the contrary, General de Gaulle, Monnet and Adenauer worked with all their might to build the ECSC (European Coal and Steel Community) in 1951 and in 1957 the EEC (European Economic Community) with the Treaty of Rome . We know what is followed: a strong growth during the Thirty Glorious.
EU members, despite their different levels of development, agreed to surrender some of their sovereignty to supranational bodies but in return received the benefit of a force that weighed regionally and internationally. Seeking to dominate countries whose total GDP does not exceed that of a multinational firm or a medium-sized European state is like being one-eyed, king in the land of the blind.

If the Arabs want to regain their dignity and prestige, they have no choice but to join forces and optimize their human and financial resources by expanding their space from Tangier to Baghdad. It is through technological, technological and scientific progress, and by establishing a greater economic power, that the Arabic-speaking peoples will be able to illustrate themselves and to compete with the rest of the world.
It is appalling to see some Arab powers resort to arbitration by the United States or Europe to settle disputes with their neighbors. De facto, they consolidate their dominated positions. Instead of choosing the union, which is strength, the Arab

countries fall into the trap of "divide and rule" that has been stretched from the Ottoman Empire to the present day.

The concern of the GCC countries about losing some of their sovereignty by furthering regional integration is contradicted by the functioning of economic unions around the world.

While it is true that France accepts European norms and legislation, national political power retains most of the prerogatives that any state assures. On the other hand, this country weighs in the decisions which concern 511 million citizens and makes admit its interests in international negotiations from which it would leave helpless if it went there alone.

The GCC has, however, put forward the principle of national sovereignty and the free choice of the Member States as regards their position vis-à-vis regional or border disputes, and more generally Foreign Affairs. The GCC has refrained from intervening in conflicts between Member States, particularly those linked to borders.

I have always advocated for economic and non-political communities, be it in the Maghreb or the GCC. This does not preclude dealing with security issues and why not put in place a common defense against terrorism and foreign invasion. But economic interests are the guarantee of close, mutually beneficial and long-lasting links.

When we see the low level of trade and investment between Arab countries, we can conclude that there is some way to go. The obstacles are known:

- the mood swings of some Arab leaders and their impulsive behavior, reacting to the slightest excess of language did not contribute to the revival of economic exchanges. The summits of the Arab League have been the scene of clashes between pro-Soviet countries and pro-Western countries. At present, the approaches are different. But, most often, the tensions of the past are rehased for domestic policy purposes and / or to justify legitimacy for unjustified regimes.
- Arab countries are oriented towards developed countries because of their specialization (hydrocarbons, phosphates, other raw materials and agricultural products).
- The economic policies of Arab countries must move towards more transparency and sincerity in statistics.
- Inter-Arab trade is limited to a small number of food and industrial products as well as raw materials.
- Productive structures are weak and unable to meet the demands of consumers in sufficient quantity and quality.
- International development services, both public and private, are underperforming and the means of communication and financing are not at a sufficient level to accelerate inter-Arab exchanges.
- The products coming from the Arab countries are less sides than their peers in the eyes of the local populations. There is also an alienation, a cult of European and American brands. Fashion and snobbery are aggravating factors. There is an effort to raise awareness and highlight local products to provide. How many times have my Moroccan and Algerian friends not reproached me for buying their shoes and textiles while the stamped Made in France items are made in their countries?
- There is a need for real economic coordination among member countries of Arab economic communities.
- There can be no progress in economic integration without harmonization of commercial, monetary, financial and customs legislation.

- The lack of competitiveness of domestic production has prompted successive governments to increase subsidies, creating distortions in competition. Integration through production and co-production could create comparative advantages and specializations based on the strengths and resources of each country.
- While some barons have facilities to clear their imports, most importers suffer the arbitrariness of a fussy custom.
- Standards need to be harmonized.
- Some decisions are taken without prior studies of medium and long-term impacts. The whole architecture of economic integration must be subjected to investigations and simulations to make the optimal choices. Econometric models can help better guide economic choices and avoid pitfalls.

The GCC countries do not experience a population explosion like Egypt and the Maghreb. According to some studies, the population of the GCC countries stood at 46.8 million inhabitants in 2012 against 33.2 million inhabitants in 2004.
The average population growth rate between 2004 and 2008 was 5.9%, whereas this rate was barely 3.2% between 2009 and 2013. Foreign residents in the Gulf countries accounted for 49.6% of the population in 2013 against respectively 37.8% in 2004 and 48.8% in 2011.

The GCC countries face major challenges by 2025. Geostrategic tensions will be significant and, as a result, military and intelligence spending will continue to increase at high levels. Fluctuations in hydrocarbon prices create uncertainties exacerbated by competition from oil and shale gas and renewable energies
New technologies will emerge and no one can predict what the energy market will be in ten to twenty years. Unemployment and income distribution will be critical to security and the social climate in the six GCC states.

The purpose of this book is to make recommendations that will ensure the prosperity and economic development of the Gulf people in connection with their brothers in the rest of the Arab world and all of Africa.
The deepening of the GCC integration process and the success of industrializing partnership projects must be carried out in conjunction with the industrialization of other Arab countries organized in subregional communities. These are win-win cooperation and preparing the future of all Arab economies.

Once again, the example comes from the European Union whose six founding states by the Treaty of Rome in 1957 opened up and invested in the newly integrated states, such as Spain, Greece and Portugal. The Germans have been the main beneficiaries of the enlargement of the Union to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. They have become their industrial partners, co-producing with them capital goods and other manufactured and sustainable products. They are reaping the benefits today, in both heavy industry and agribusiness, dethroning at all levels France, whose African policy has not helped Africa's development and, in turn, prevented it from having a rear base of subcontracting, of coproduction but also of outlets. Instead of focusing solely on their raw materials, it was necessary to help African countries to embark on a process of industrialization and transformation of their natural resources. When I accompanied the East-Parisian companies in North Africa or sub-Saharan Africa, our wish was to find the most promising business opportunities. We would have liked to have as interlocutors African companies and institutions of a higher level of technology and purchasing power. That is why the triangular relationship that I propose seems to me the most appropriate: the capital of the Arab countries with a surplus of foreign exchange profitably

and profitably funds the other Arab non-hydrocarbon producing countries and the rest of Africa with European technology.
This should be structured by the regional organizations: Gulf Cooperation Council, Maghreb Economic Community, ECOWAS, North African Economic Community and European Union.
China must be excluded because the so-called "factory of the world" has the ambition to sell its products while Africa has vocation to industrialize. The Arab countries with large populations, non-hydrocarbon producers and sub-Saharan Africa need to improve their road, motorway, rail, maritime, port and energy infrastructure. It is obvious that the factories will not be able to run and the agricultural and agri-food goods will be exported only by modern transport networks and electrification that meets the needs of manufacturing units and inhabitants.

The schooling of all children, girls and boys, and health are assets for trained and productive employees.
Support programs for European countries and regions with the least basic equipment have benefited from the Structural Funds. Spain has become the place of production and consumption of other EU Member States. Intra-European trade accounts for 50 to 60% of the total trade of European countries.

Some African and Arab states have enormous difficulties in electrifying their countryside, resulting in the persistence of extreme poverty and mass rural exodus, while land is just waiting to be exploited. The rural world has been scorned by the African and Arab elites while economic science teaches us since the eighteenth century that it is through agriculture that we produce value, we make the substitution of imports and that we finance industrialization. Keeping farms in a state of fragmentation that barely satisfies the needs of families is a considerable loss of revenue for the national economy. Many young people are deserting the countryside to seek a better future in big cities or abroad. Such a waste ! It was enough to create health, school and leisure facilities and technical training schools in agronomy to enhance the profession of farmer.

The Gulf countries and many Arab countries suffer from drought and depend on rainfall. Exploiting the flora and fauna and fertile land of Africa according to mutually beneficial long-term agreements, producing food and animal goods to ensure the self-sufficiency of the African continent and Arab countries are objectives that must be added to a industrialization of agriculture for local markets and export.

The energy component offers enormous potential for profitable investments in wind, photovoltaic and hydroelectric power. We already have the example of the solar complex of Ouarzazate financed by capital of the Gulf countries. It is about renewable energies ensuring the electrification of countries whose development is hampered by cuts, load shedding or lack of energy in certain regions.

Africa and the Arab countries have huge potential for tourism. They face two challenges: building and improving tourist facilities and communicating assets and sights. Tourism marketing requires huge investments. There is a need to pool resources and coordinate to better target and reach the public and the media.
We are not born a specialist in tourism; we must learn, train and create institutions in partnership with international schools of tourism. Tourism activity generates jobs and additional activities in several sectors, with a direct impact on the well-being of the

population. For some countries, it constitutes the second or third item of the balance of payments.
The return on investment is guaranteed by foreign currency entries. Tourism is becoming more democratic and the price factor is becoming more important. It is not normal for an Algerian to choose Turkey out of spite because this destination is cheaper than Morocco. There is an effort to be made in terms of the price of the air. Arab and African companies are in tight domestic markets. There is a need for transport consortia across Africa and the Arab world. Some large companies form alliances and regroup (Air France-KLM for example). Attempts to liberalize Saudi civil aviation are aimed at opening the skies of Saudi Arabia and making it more competitive. North African airlines (Air Algérie, Royal Air Maroc, Egyptair) could be the spearhead of a continent-wide air transport.
We must come up with competitive packages to develop mass tourism. The prosperity of Africa will bring peace and security, guaranteeing a better image of Africa.

We already have experience supporting the scheme proposed above: tourism partnership projects between Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Morocco. Another sector is touched by the grace of South-South cooperation: telecommunications. The acquisition by Etisalat, the historic operator of the United Arab Emirates, Maroc Telecom allows the Moroccan operator to achieve 44% of its turnover south of the Sahara, through its traditional subsidiaries in Gabon (Gabon Telecom), in Mali (Sotelma), Mauritania (Mauritel) and Burkina Faso (Onatel), and the acquisition of six subsidiaries of its new shareholder in Côte d'Ivoire, Benin, Togo, Niger, the Central African Republic and Gabon.

Etisalat, which had difficulties managing these subsidiaries from Abu Dhabi, has left Maroc Telecom to highlight its sub-Saharan experience.
This is the model that I recommend in this triptych: capital from the Gulf countries → Africa → European know-how and technology. This is not a utopia as some claim. We can go further and duplicate it to other more productive sectors in industry, agri-food and the processing of primary products and raw materials.
The liberalization of the telecommunications market in the Gulf countries has stimulated competition for the happiness of consumers who may have competitive prices and more time for communication. The GCC countries have liberalized their economies by giving more responsibility to the private sector. Economic reforms should be pursued further, while safeguarding the maximum number of jobs threatened by privatization.

The problem of unemployment persists in three GCC member states: Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and Oman. Only Saudi Arabia publishes fine and precise statistics on the labor market and unemployment, which is the best way to find remedies. According to some official statistics, the average unemployment rate among Saudi jobseekers and other residents exceeds 12.7% in 2017. The objective was to reach 5.5% in 2014 thanks to growth. Measures tend to limit irregular immigration. It is the young people who are most affected by unemployment, which worries the authorities. 43% of 20-24 year olds are job-seekers, while they are the most likely to contribute a lot to the development of their country.
Youth unemployment was one of the causes of socio-political tensions in Oman at the beginning of 2011. In Bahrain, even though the demands were essentially political, youth unemployment pushed up the pressure by at least a notch. Of course, the problem of unemployment is not limited to certain Gulf countries. On the contrary, the overwhelming majority of Arab and African peoples suffers.
Accelerated economic expansion is the only bulwark against rising unemployment. Most countries in Europe, Asia and the Americas that have chosen to join economic communities

have seen a significant improvement in their economic aggregates. The Gulf countries and more generally those of the Mashreq and Maghreb can not stay away from the zonal constructions in the context of inextricable globalization.

The GCC's economic integration has been at a standstill since 2010. The disputes between Qatar, on the one hand, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Bahrain, Yemen and the United Arab Emirates, on the other do not dare advance in the desired direction. As for the Maghreb, the Arab countries should give priority to the economy and put aside political conflicts. So far, the GCC has only concluded agreements with Singapore in 2008, with the EU in 2009 as well as with EFTA (European Free Trade Association, which brings together Switzerland, Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein). The agreements with EFTA are to liberalize trade and to reach agreements on trade in goods and services, protection of intellectual property, public orders and dispute settlement instruments.

In 2010, agreements were concluded with the 19 Comesa States (Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa).

The great difficulty for the GCC is to conclude a free trade agreement with the European Union whose procrastination has delayed any significant progress under different pretexts. These include respect for the environment or the granting of new rights to minorities, and more generally the usual arguments concerning human rights and political reform.

Chapter 6. The Arab Maghreb Union (AMU)

This name is contested by most components of civil society who prefer the name of Greater Maghreb. Moreover, the Maghreb associations have lobbied for the inclusion in the Constitution of "the membership of Morocco in the Greater Maghreb".
The idea of founding a great Maghreb is old. Mohamed Amatta provided a compilation of historical facts showing the extent of solidarity among the peoples of the Maghreb (see our collective work published in 2014: What governance and what institutions in the Maghreb facing geostrategic issues?).
The first formalization of a Maghreb union took place in Tangier from April 28 to 30, 1958, at the initiative of three parties: the Moroccan Istiqlal, the Tunisian Destourian party and the Algerian FLN. It was an opportunity for Moroccans and Tunisians to express their support for the struggle of the Algerian people against French colonialism.
After the independence of Algeria, the idea of cooperation and partnership between the countries of the region found a first concretization with the creation of a Consultative Commission of the Great Maghreb in 1964, whose objective was to stimulate economic ties.
In the same vein, we can cite the call of Djerba which sealed a rapprochement between Libya and Tunisia in 1974, the Mostaganem agreement between Libya and Algeria and the Convention of fraternity and friendship between Libya and Algeria. Algeria, Tunisia and Mauritania in 1983.
The summit of Zéralda (Algeria) held on June 10, 1988, in its final communiqué, highlighted the desire of the heads of state to build a united Maghreb. A commission was created to achieve this Maghreb unity.

The organizational structures of the UMA
The General Secretariat of the UMA is set in Rabat. According to the constitutive conventions of the Union, the Secretary General is appointed by the Council of Heads of State for a period of three years, renewable once.
The animation team of the structure is composed of officials recruited by the secretary general. They must meet the imperative of competence and loyalty to the Maghreb cause. They are all nationals of the Maghreb area, respecting a certain balance between the nationalities of origin.
The General Secretariat's missions are:
- implement the decisions of the WBU Council of Heads of State in coordination with all the organizations of the Union,
- participate in the elaboration of the operational and programmatic projects of the Union in partnership with the Monitoring Committee,
- prepare research and studies, compile information and documentation, give an opinion on specific issues by surrounding themselves with Maghrebi skills.

This is the principle. But, in fact, we have been contacted once by the General Secretariat for our collective works. Yet, I participated alongside the former Secretary-General in the meeting of experts under the aegis of the UN in Rabat. Even if the AMU team is not expanded, there is nothing stopping the organization of symposia with specialists who work hard on the Maghreb and whose theoretical and empirical contribution is recognized.
Instead of rethinking the conclusions of international bodies such as the IMF and the World Bank, the WBU, even limited in financial and human resources, could be a source of proposals to foreign ministers and heads of state.

The other tasks of the General Secretariat can not bring about any significant progress until the political will is there. Indeed, the General Secretariat must:
- prepare periodic reports on the progress of Maghreb construction,
- to coordinate with the secretariat of the Presidential Council and the Council of Foreign Ministers as well as with the Monitoring Committee and the committees of specialized ministers (agriculture, energy, industry, fisheries ...), in collaboration with the host country,
- draw up the minutes of the ministerial proceedings or the heads of state and keep all the official documents issued by the specialized ministerial commissions, the Consultative Council, the judicial authority, and all the acts concluded between the members of the Union,
- liaise with the Union's information and documentation bodies in order to have a statistical, empirical and practical database on Member States and make it available to practitioners. Without sincerity of national accounts and statistics, there will be no need for economic operators and investors to form an opinion from the evidence provided by the WBU;
- to contact the General Secretariat of the Arab League and the executive commissions of Arab sub-regional clusters and unions in order to look for areas of cooperation and strategic partnerships (the same approach is carried out with African sub-regional economic communities, economic unions around the world and international institutions);
- build on grassroots associations and non-governmental organizations to reinforce the unitary process.

The constitutive convention of the UMA sets the following objectives:
- institutionalize the bonds of friendship between the peoples of the region,
- achieve the progress and prosperity of Maghreb peoples and defend their rights,
- safeguard peace in justice and equity,
- promote common policies in all areas,
- gradually move towards the free movement of people, goods, services and capital.

The founding convention of the UMA states that the purpose of common policies is to achieve understanding between Member States and to establish diplomatic cooperation based on dialogue.

I have repeatedly supported the broad scope of joint economic diplomacy to help Maghreb businesses explore and find opportunities around the globe. A Moroccan Embassy in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, if it has a good commercial service, could support a Tunisian company in search of prospects.
Unfortunately, the Moroccan and Algerian diplomacies are fighting a merciless struggle. One gets the impression that the main mission of each Embassy is to counter the actions of the neighbor. It is frankly dismal and of a level of harmfulness highly destructive for both countries.

In the field of defense, states commit themselves to protecting the independence of each of them. Terrorist attacks against; Algeria, Libya and Tunisia are organized and fomented by the AQIM, which, as its name suggests, is a transnational organization of North Africans and some sub-Saharans.
The AQIM has done in its own way the Maghreb of terror, while the States of the region play solo, without consultation or coordination in military matters. The circulation of an astronomical quantity of arms in Libya and the presence of fundamentalist militias constitute

a major risk for all of North Africa and the countries of the Sahel. The return of ISIS terrorists from Syria and Iraq is a threat throughout the Maghreb.
Salafist-jihadist operations on the Algerian-Tunisian border are a major destabilization of Tunisia and prevent Tunisia from returning to the stability and security that are the key to success for tourism and productive activities. A common defense would have the merit of ensuring peace in the region and mark a stop in a costly military escalation for Algeria and Morocco. Specialized Ministers present their conclusions in the Council of Foreign Ministers in coordination with the Monitoring Committee and the General Secretariat.

In the economic field, the objectives were ambitious: to develop agriculture, industry and trade through the creation of joint projects. Obviously, we are far from it. In the face of demographic, geostrategic, water-related challenges and the depletion of natural resources, it is urgent to progress in economic integration.
In the cultural field, WBU advocates self-help from primary to university. This part of the agreement, if it had been implemented, could have prevented Algeria from bringing fundamentalists from the Middle East and Egypt to teach subjects in Arabic within the framework of the forced Arabization that excluded the French-speaking Algerian elite.
It would have been possible to intensify exchanges of teachers and experiences between the Maghreb countries. School exchanges would allow children to discover the realities of their neighbors. Collaborations between academics and researchers would bring new innovations and stimulate the growth of each other. Contrary to what is stipulated in the agreements, there is no need to focus on the safeguarding of religious education, since each country is provided with imams, doctors of theology and Koranic structures. By demagogy, some regimes build mosques every hundred meters and in this case little used.
The aberration reaches its peak when we see Algeria and Morocco compete to have the largest mosque, the largest budget. When we know that Islam, religion tolerant to its origins, has never stipulated what should be the minimum surface for a place of worship. Is the construction of health centers and hospitals, schools in rural areas not so useful for citizens?

The constitutive conventions of AMU have defined the organs of the Union at the legislative, executive and judicial levels as follows:
- The Presidential Council is composed of the Heads of State of the member countries. They have the power of decision on all subsidiary instances and on all subjects. The vote is unanimous. The presidency is rotating, for a period of one year, non-renewable.
- The mission of the Council of Foreign Ministers is to prepare the sessions of the Council of Heads of State. It has a right of scrutiny over the proposals of the Monitoring Committee and the sectoral ministerial commissions. This council coordinates policies and positions vis-à-vis regional and international organizations. It brings together the ministers and the Secretary of the People's Committee of Foreign Affairs of the countries of the Union. Regular and extraordinary sessions may be held at the initiative of the President or at the request of a member, but the presence of the representatives of the five States is indispensable.
- The Monitoring Committee is composed of the members who have been chosen by their own Council of Ministers to ensure the permanence of the Union's files in collaboration with the organs, in particular the General Secretariat and the specialized ministerial committees, avoiding the duplicates. This Committee presents the conclusions of its work to the Council of Foreign Ministers.

- The specialized ministerial committees were installed by the Presidential Council of 23 January 1990 and are as follows:

• The Committee on Food Security is responsible for the agricultural and animal sectors, water and forests, agriculture and agri-food industries, upgrading of agricultural land, sea fishing, food trade, agricultural and veterinary research , the environment and agricultural support institutions;

• the Economic and Financial Committee is responsible for planning, energy, mining, trade, tourism industry, finance, customs, banking and insurance, investment financing, services and crafts;

• The Infrastructure Committee deals with transport, public works, housing and urban planning, post and telecommunications;

• The Human Resources Committee's fields of activity are: education, culture, information, training, scientific research, social affairs, employment, sport and youth, health, justice , the movement of people and residence, Maghreb workers abroad.

Specialized ministerial committees put plans and agendas into perspective in order to implement Union programs that have been approved by the Presidential Council, in coordination with the Monitoring Committee and the General Secretariat.

These committees consist of specialized ministries in sectors that fall within their areas of expertise or specializations. Working groups are organized according to themes and are helped by Maghreb experts. The committees Specialized Ministers present their conclusions in the Council of Foreign Ministers in coordination with the Monitoring Committee and the General Secretariat.

Chapter 7. Project to create a common Arab currency: the dirial.

Taking into account the specificities of the Arab world and the likely refusal of countries, at least for a few decades, to abandon their national currencies and transfer monetary sovereignty to a supranational entity, it is proposed to set up a common currency: the dirial (contraction of the words dirham, dinar and rial). It would coexist with national currencies. Its role would be to facilitate the exchange of goods, services and capital without altering the right of each State to mint money. The objective would be to move from an exchange rate between Arab countries of 2 to 40%, which is the average trade within the international economic zones.

The absence of an Arab economic union prevents the development of trade in goods, services and capital as well as the circulation of human resources. The Arab world is the only region in the world that knows no regional construction. The inter-Arab trade is insignificant.

The question of the common currency and compensatory payment systems should be considered within the framework of ECA (Arab Economic Community). The financial constraint is heavy for some economies in the region. The need to be creative in developing trade by saving foreign currency is imperative. The compensation mechanisms that govern, albeit still timidly, part of the international economic relations are today sufficiently elaborated to allow to circumvent the obstacle of the insufficiency of the external means of payment which each one of these countries faces. Thus, the outcome of the inter-Arab trade crisis lies in the two-fold series of actions to be carried out in favor of productive industrial and agricultural cooperation and the establishment of elaborate compensation mechanisms. These external constraints alone justify an Arab economic grouping.

Thanks to this common currency, Arab economic and financial operators could export, import, invest in ECA without using foreign currency. Arab travelers could use this currency and move freely in the territory of this Union. An Arab monetary institute would be responsible for making offsets between cash flows each year. The negative (or positive) balance at the country level would be paid (or cashed) in foreign currency to the other creditor (or debtor) country or postponed, by mutual agreement, over the next year. But it would also be possible to consolidate the accounts by aggregating the needs and surpluses of currencies across all Arab countries.

Arab co-traders have to face the obstacle of financing inter-Arab trade because Arab banks rarely accept letters of confirmation of the credentials between them. International banks play the role of arbiter with substantial financial cost and delays in settlements.

The dirial would be much more operational and would further fluidify trade and investment than the barter regime, which implies a coincidence, at a given moment, of the supply and demand of tradable goods. The advantage of this proposal is to facilitate the exchange of goods and services as well as inter-Arab investments.

The Arab common currency

During the first period, a common currency would be introduced, insofar as it would be a measure of the values, the means of payment and the store of value like the ECU (European

Currency Unit), but much more used than this European monetary instrument was not (for political reasons and because of the hegemony of the German deutschmark).

At this stage, the Arab Central Bank would be more of a clearing house and settlement of inter-Arab payments. The objective would be to intensify trade and the movement of capital and people without going through the currencies.

Monetary cooperation would take the form of bilateral or multilateral clearing and payment agreements with the objective of achieving convertibility limited to the Arab currency area. There would be no exchange control on the common currency or on capital transactions. At the end of the fiscal year, the deficits (or surpluses) between the states would be settled in a consolidated manner or postponed by mutual agreement. Otherwise, it could be considered free credit.

The single currency would intervene in a second stage, after twenty to thirty years, depending on the pace of structural reforms and the realization of the convergence mechanisms of the Arab economies. But the final decision would be political. Monetary integration imposes a transfer of certain prerogatives from national authorities to Arab supranational authorities and harmonization exchange rate policies. This means coordination of national monetary policies.

The dirial would not need to be convertible, outside the Arab zone.

Economic and monetary convergences impose a transparency of the statistical data. Budget and debt data can be insincere.

By not proposing to introduce a single currency from the outset, but rather a common Arab currency, I take into account the historical, cultural and developmental specificities of the Arab entities. The objective is twofold: to promote the exchange of goods, services and capital in order to go further in economic and monetary integration and achieve economic convergence.

The dirial can be done in two steps:

1st stage whose duration can be from twenty to thirty years: the dirial is a common (and not unique) currency. It is a simple means of billing, an instrument of account and reserve used by the banks, the companies as well as the administrations. Arab travelers may have endowments in dirial whose amounts would be governed by the intergovernmental agreements in force. During this period, the calculation of the value of the dirial would be based on a basket of Arab currencies represented according to the GDP of each Arab State. It would be a kind of ECU whose quasi-compulsory generalization as billing currency I had advocated (C. Sari, 1987). But the dirial would have broader features, going as far as a fiduciary issue. It would be convertible only within the Arab Economic Community as a common currency coexisting with national currencies. Since the common currency is bound in this phase to inconvertible national currencies, the question of the flexibility of its exchange rate would not arise.

The dirial would greatly enhance the monetary, financial and economic links. Thanks to the elimination of foreign exchange risks and the non-use of third-party currencies, the costs of information and transactions would be greatly reduced. The dirial would allow the realization of considerable savings, thus increasing the savings realized according to the square of the number of operators who would use the common currency. This would imply a high degree of fluidity in the exchange of goods and services and greater transparency of prices that would be displayed in the same unit of account. Foreign direct investment flows would experience unprecedented rationalization and scale.

- Step 2: Advance in the creation of an Arab bank for investment and foreign trade. It would not be a prefiguration of the future Arab Central Bank but a tool to accompany Arab investors in their efforts to develop alone or in association with other partners of the Arab Economic Community.

- creation of the Arab Monetary Institute (AMI), the forerunner of the Arab Central Bank. At this stage, the national central banks would fully continue their traditional actions: management of the national currency, conduct of monetary policy and supervision, refinancing of commercial banks. They would be in charge of control and supervision, with a role of lender of last resort. The IMA would ensure the transition between the common currency and the single currency. In his first steps, he would begin to identify economic, monetary and financial realities and to coordinate with national banks. The IMA would be a force of proposal for the transformation of the economic community into a monetary union. The prerogatives of the cash flow compensation fund would be progressively transferred to this Institute which must:

- strengthen cooperation between national central banks,

- coordinate monetary policies and prepare the conditions for the creation of a common central bank

Second part. Africa-Mashreq-European Union: the winning Trilateral.

First subpart. Africa and its potentialities, existing and future regional integrations

Chapter 1. Presentation of African Economies

The growth rate of the African population is twice the world average. If the African continent does not engage in an unprecedented development process, the risk of a worsening of its economic difficulties is considerable.

Sub-Saharan Africa, which has 1.2 billion inhabitants today, will see its population double in 2050 and reach more than 4 billion in 2100. Countries producing and exporting raw materials, such as oil and gas, will become importers. Despite growth rates of between 3% and 5%, African countries are lagging behind the rest of the world and are not creating enough jobs to stem the flow of young people into the labor market.

The continent depends on international markets that fix the prices of natural resources. In addition, these are exported, without transformation under unfavorable contractual conditions and dubious practices of senior operational managers. The tertiary sector is dominant with a share of GDP exceeding 44.7%. Industry ranks second, accounting for 41.5% of GDP. This significantly higher figure hides an industrial underdevelopment of non-mining branches. The weakness of the agricultural sector (13.8%) is the result of the aridity of African lands, the low level of rainfall and the absence of any agricultural policy worthy of the name.

In 2013, Africa's overall GDP was US $ 2,513 billion, representing only 4.45% of global GDP (compared to 2.62% in 2008). This roughly corresponds to the GDP of France or Brazil for the same year. Of course, this figure expressed in constant size compared to 2004 must take into account the statistical inaccuracies of countries that do not have reliable and efficient tools.

Value creation is concentrated in the North Africa zone, Nigeria (whose GDP amounted to $ 594.257 billion in 2013) and South Africa, which accounted for more than half of Africa's GDP in 2015. Given its small population and mineral wealth, Equatorial Guinea has the highest GDP per capita.

Fiscal policy is correlated with the rate of economic growth. In the event of cyclical downturns, expansionary fiscal policies are recommended. Conversely, and in order to avoid overheating, it is suggested that more restrictive fiscal policies be put in place.

Figure 1. budgetary policies in africa since 2000



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Figure 2. GDPgrowth by countries (average 2014-2015)



Note : Les prévisions pour la Libye, la RCA, la Somalie et le Soudan du Sud ne sont pas intégrées dans cette figure, dans la mesure où la croissance y est éminemment incertaine actuellement, du fait des conflits politiques en cours.

Source : Département des statistiques, Banque africaine de développement.

StatLink http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933034372

Table 39. Real GDP growth rate, by region (in%)

Tableau 1.1. **Taux de croissance du PIB en volume, par région (en %)**

	2012	2013 (e)	2014 (p)	2015 (p)
Afrique	**6.4**	**3.9**	**4.8**	**5.7**
Afrique centrale	5.8	3.7	6.2	5.7
Afrique de l'Est	3.9	6.2	6.0	6.2
Afrique du Nord	9.4	1.9	3.1	5.5
Afrique australe	3.3	3.0	4.0	4.4
Afrique de l'Ouest	6.9	6.7	7.2	7.1
Pour mémoire :				
Afrique hors Libye	*4.1*	*4.2*	*4.8*	*5.2*
Afrique subsaharienne	*4.9*	*5.0*	*5.8*	*5.9*
Afrique subsaharienne hors Afrique du Sud	*5.8*	*6.1*	*6.8*	*6.9*

Note : (e) estimations et (p) prévisions.
Source : Département des statistiques, Banque africaine de développement.

Of course, within African countries, disparities are substantial. Some such as Ivory Coast, Gabon, Ghana, South Africa, Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, Senegal, Equatorial Guinea, Angola, Mozambique can accede to developing country status . Others such as Mali, Liberia, the Central African Republic, Congo, Somalia can claim the status of poor countries. The World Bank estimates that most African economies are candidates to join the category of middle-income countries before 2025. It is possible but it is not acquired in advance.

This book aims to chart the tracks that can help the recovery of Africa. But Africa must overcome its own pitfalls, in the first place corruption, a governance below international standards, a demographics unmaintained with all that follows: exodus towards the big cities become unmanageable cities, incapacity of the States to provide financial and human resources to build the appropriate infrastructure for education, training, health and integration by the economy.

Civil wars and / or between neighboring countries have ruined the stability of the continent and have lost the confidence of investors, including from the African diaspora. The change in economic model based on the export of raw materials will be the subject of an innovative analysis in the fourth part.

Figure 2. Macroeconomic developments in Africa (summary)

Tableau 1.4. **Évolutions macroéconomiques en Afrique (synthèse)**

Taux de croissance du PIB en volume	**2005-09**	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**	**2013(e)**	**2014(p)**	**2015(p)**
Afrique centrale	4.1	5.9	4.4	5.8	3.7	6.2	5.7
Afrique de l'Est	7.1	7.3	6.3	3.9	6.2	6.0	6.2
Afrique du Nord	4.9	4.3	0.3	9.4	1.9	3.1	5.5
Afrique australe	5.2	3.7	3.9	3.3	3.0	4.0	4.4
Afrique de l'Ouest	5.7	7.1	6.9	6.9	6.7	7.2	7.1
Afrique	**5.3**	**5.2**	**3.6**	**6.4**	**3.9**	**4.8**	**5.7**
Afrique (hors Libye)	5.3	5.1	4.3	4.1	4.2	4.8	5.2
Pour mémoire							
Afrique du Nord (avec le Soudan)	*4.9*	*4.5*	*0.4*	*8.9*	*2.0*	*3.0*	*5.4*
Afrique subsaharienne	*5.6*	*5.6*	*5.5*	*4.9*	*5.0*	*5.8*	*5.9*
Afrique subsaharienne hors Afrique du Sud	*6.5*	*6.6*	*6.3*	*5.8*	*6.1*	*6.8*	*6.9*
Pays exportateurs de pétrole	*5.8*	*5.6*	*3.0*	*8.3*	*3.8*	*5.0*	*6.4*
Pays importateurs de pétrole	*4.8*	*4.6*	*4.4*	*4.0*	*4.0*	*4.4*	*4.8*
Prix à la consommation (inflation en %)							
Afrique centrale	6.2	4.2	4.4	3.8	1.9	3.3	3.1
Afrique de l'Est	11.1	7.3	20.3	19.6	12.0	9.8	8.9
Afrique du Nord	6.4	6.9	7.7	7.1	5.0	7.6	6.3
Afrique australe	8.1	6.1	6.7	6.5	6.5	6.2	5.7
Afrique de l'Ouest	9.8	10.4	9.3	9.9	7.5	7.0	6.9
Afrique	**8.0**	**7.3**	**9.1**	**8.9**	**6.7**	**7.2**	**6.4**
Pour mémoire							
Afrique du Nord (avec le Soudan)	*6.7*	*7.7*	*8.4*	*8.9*	*7.0*	*8.8*	*7.3*
Afrique subsaharienne	*8.9*	*7.2*	*9.5*	*8.9*	*6.5*	*6.2*	*5.9*
Pays exportateurs de pétrole	*9.2*	*10.1*	*10.4*	*10.8*	*8.0*	*9.2*	*8.0*
Pays importateurs de pétrole	*7.1*	*4.4*	*8.1*	*7.3*	*5.4*	*5.3*	*5.0*
Solde budgétaire total, dons compris (en % du PIB)							
Afrique centrale	7.8	1.8	2.1	0.1	-2.1	-3.7	-4.4
Afrique de l'Est	-2.5	-2.9	-2.0	-4.0	-2.7	-2.3	-2.2
Afrique du Nord	3.2	-3.1	-6.3	-5.0	-7.3	-8.2	-5.8
Afrique australe	-0.9	-2.8	-1.7	-1.5	-2.5	-4.3	-4.6
Afrique de l'Ouest	-0.1	-3.6	-3.2	-1.9	-2.2	-1.8	-2.3
Afrique	**1.0**	**-2.8**	**-3.3**	**-2.9**	**-3.9**	**-4.5**	**-4.0**
Pour mémoire							
Afrique du Nord (avec le Soudan)	*2.7*	*-2.7*	*-5.7*	*-4.8*	*-6.6*	*-7.4*	*-5.3*
Afrique subsaharienne	*0.0*	*-2.8*	*-2.0*	*-1.8*	*-2.5*	*-3.0*	*-3.4*
Pays exportateurs de pétrole	*3.3*	*-1.8*	*-2.5*	*-2.0*	*-3.9*	*-4.8*	*-4.2*
Pays importateurs de pétrole	*-1.5*	*-4.2*	*-4.4*	*-4.3*	*-4.1*	*-4.0*	*-3.8*
Solde de la balance extérieure courante, dons compris (en % du PIB)							
Afrique centrale	0.6	-4.8	-1.4	-3.6	-3.6	-4.6	-4.0
Afrique de l'Est	-6.8	-5.4	-4.4	-10.5	-8.8	-9.1	-8.9
Afrique du Nord	10.7	2.9	0.5	1.6	-2.0	-2.2	-0.8
Afrique australe	-2.7	-1.2	-0.7	-2.9	-4.7	-5.0	-5.1
Afrique de l'Ouest	19.1	1.6	-0.1	0.0	1.3	2.3	1.5
Afrique	**5.8**	**0.1**	**-0.7**	**-1.7**	**-2.7**	**-2.5**	**-2.2**
Pour mémoire							
Afrique du Nord (avec le Soudan)	*8.7*	*2.4*	*0.3*	*0.6*	*-2.7*	*-2.7*	*-1.4*
Afrique subsaharienne	*4.0*	*-1.2*	*-1.2*	*-2.7*	*-2.4*	*-2.1*	*-2.5*
Pays exportateurs de pétrole	*15.1*	*3.7*	*3.4*	*2.3*	*0.8*	*1.1*	*1.4*
Pays importateurs de pétrole	*-4.9*	*-4.2*	*-5.6*	*-7.6*	*-8.0*	*-8.5*	*-8.4*

Note : (e) estimations ; (p) prévisions. Le Soudan du Sud n'est pas pris en compte pour la période 2013-2015.
Source : Département des statistiques, Banque africaine de développement.

Tableau 40. Croissance du PIB de l’Afrique en volume

2013	2014	2015	2016
+ 3,5	+ 3,9	+ 4,5	+ 5

Continental GDP continues to grow at the beginning of the 2010 decade despite falling oil prices.

Economic prospects in Africa often depend on exogenous factors: international conjuncture, commodity prices, rainfall, tourism, foreign direct investment, remittances.

In addition to these variables coming from elsewhere, African countries are impacted by the insecurity prevailing in certain geographical areas, armed conflicts and revolts (as in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya ..), corruption and degraded governance etc. .

Figure 3. Real GDP growth rate, by group of countries (in%)

Tableau 1.2. **Taux de croissance du PIB en volume, par groupements de pays (en %)**

	2010	2011	2012	2013 (e)	2014 (p)	2015 (p)
Par niveau de revenu						
Pays à revenu intermédiaire de la tranche supérieure	3.5	3.1	3.2	2.8	3.9	4.3
Pays à revenu intermédiaire de la tranche inférieure	5.5	3.8	4.3	4.7	4.7	5.5
Pays à faible revenu	7.2	6.2	5.2	6.1	7.0	6.9
Par source des recettes d'exportations						
Pétrole	5.5	4.1	5.4	5.4	6.4	6.3
Produits primaires hors pétrole	6.1	3.8	7.1	6.1	7.5	7.4
Par degré de diversification des exportations						
Indice de diversification élevé	4.0	2.9	2.8	2.8	3.0	3.9
Indice de diversification moyen	4.5	2.8	5.8	5.9	6.5	6.8
Indice de diversification faible	6.2	5.3	5.2	5.5	6.3	6.4
Par critères financiers						
Pays créanciers nets	5.5	4.3	5.3	5.6	6.3	6.4
Pays débiteurs nets	4.9	2.9	6.8	3.2	4.2	5.4
Par fragilité						
Pays en situation de fragilité	6.2	2.2	2.7	4.7	6.2	6.5
Pays enclavés	8.6	6.8	4.6	6.2	7.0	6.7
Africa hors Libye	**5.1**	**4.3**	**4.1**	**4.1**	**4.8**	**5.3**

Note: (e) estimations et (p) prévisions.
Source: Département des statistiques, Banque africaine de développement.

African countries import manufactures goods, final goods, multinationals and international companies. The prices of exported African products (63% of which are hydrocarbons, 10% of and 2% of agricultural raw materials) are located in Chicago, Newcastle, London or Paris.
It is necessary to reflect on the geostrategic issues and perspectives of the African continent, but also on its progress or delay in its development and especially on the consequences of the geostrategic struggles that weaken and prevent Africa from taking off.

Africa's wealth contrasts with the difficulties of access to drinking water, electricity and primary health care. Maternal mortality continues to increase during deliveries, etc.
How to eradicate hunger and food insecurity in sub-Saharan Africa where 25% of the 856 million people are undernourished and 15 million at risk of famine (in the Sahel and the Horn of Africa)?

According to the United Nations, sub-Saharan Africa is the most food-insecure region in the world and is particularly alarming.
The agricultural sector still employs the majority of Africans (62% in 2012) and remains a low-productivity sector. The continent thus has the largest yield gap in the world: when cereal producers in the United States, China and the eurozone countries get six tons of cereals per hectare, farmers in sub Saharan Africa produce only one on average.
Africa has 16.5% of the world's arable land for 16% of the population.

Recall some basic facts about the African continent:
- number of inhabitants: 1 trillion, or 16% of the world's population of 7 trillion.
area: 6% of the earth's surface; 30 310 000 million km2, or 20% of the land area.
- electricity consumption: 3% of global consumption (Africa is the smallest polluter in the world).
- research and development expenditure: 0.65% of global expenditure.
Life expectancy: 54 years old, in several European countries, it exceeds 80 years thanks to advances in medicine and food.
- growth rate: more than 5%.
- investments: $ 80 billion.
- roads: 16% are paved in Asia, the rate is 80%.
- poverty: 50% of households are very poor.
However, Africa is today considered the continent richest in mineral resources. We are talking about the potential of exceptional natural resources. The question is to know who benefits from their exploitation: to the populations or the multinationals holding the tools of production, the technology and the marketing circuits?
Every month, virtually, discoveries of mineral deposits are announced: gold, diamond, cobalt, uranium, iron, oil, etc. It is thought to be dreaming, to the extent that the African continent has sometimes been called a "geological scandal".
Section 4. Geographical situation of Africa
Africa is presented as a link between the Americas and Asia or an extension of Southern Europe. The African continent is said to be at the center of the world.
The geostrategic question in Africa arises in the course of the race between developed and emerging countries: each seeks to protect its own interests. There is somehow "a new sharing of the cake". France is back with a new vocation and strategy for its troops in Ivory Coast, Chad, Senegal and Gabon. It has set up a military contingent to ensure maritime traffic in the Horn of Africa and protect tankers.
The United States, Japan, Saudi Arabia, Italy and Germany have deployed a military arsenal in Djibouti to protect world trade. In recent years, the Pentagon (United States Department of Defense) has created an operational command center for Africa to protect and defend the country's interests on the African continent. In addition, they launched spy satellites to monitor Africa on a daily basis. There is a kind of encirclement of Africa.

In Africa, the mining sector is very profitable and announces prospecting every month. The great powers are all present: the Russian Federation, France, the United Kingdom, the United States and above all China, which breaks the record for investment in the mining sector since it is this sector that arouses the most covetous and conflicts of interest, resulting in chronic instability in West and Central Africa. Today, Africa has reserves equivalent to 120 billion barrels of oil, half of that of Saudi Arabia, and 600 million hectares of uncultivated arable land, half of the world total. Recent studies have indicated that over the next 20 years the continent's natural resources would contribute $ 30 billion a year to state revenues.

According to all official estimates, the African continent has a third of the world's reserves of minerals, but whose prices depend on the international financial markets dominated by the United States and the major European powers (the United Kingdom, Germany and France).

Figure 4. Commodity prices

Figure 1.11. **Cours des matières premières**



Source : Banque mondiale.
StatLink http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933034391

We can cite :
- platinum: 89% of world reserves (platinum is mainly used in the automotive industry)
- thorium: 10% of world reserves (in Egypt and South Africa)
- chromium: 81%
- manganese: 61%
- cobalt: 60% (chromium, manganese and cobalt are used in steel alloys)
- gold: 21%
- diamond: 46% (South Africa and Angola are the major exporters)
- nickel: South Africa and Madagascar are major producers
- Bauxite: Guinea holds two-thirds of the world's reserves of bauxite, despite its low level of infrastructure and water supply equipment. Foreign tourists, but also locals can stay several days without washing or doing laundry.

- natural gas. Africa's main natural gas reserves are located in Nigeria and Algeria, with 2.45% and 2.16% respectively of world reserves. Algeria is the leading producer, well ahead of Nigeria.
- the coal. South Africa is the only country in Africa with significant coal production, ranking it 7th in the world.
- oil. New discoveries of deposits have been made recently in Ghana and in the vast Virunga Forest in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

US companies are competing for oil protection and exploitation areas, while NGOs are supporting the preservation of the classified forest, the environment and the ecosystem to save endangered animals. Oil arouses lusts and appetites. Strong pressures (sometimes even aggression) are being exerted on the DRC government to declassify this virgin forest, open it to the world market and exploit the resources. As for the DRC, she would like to keep her forest intact for future generations.

Oil is almost a curse. He is responsible for several civil wars, the most deadly in Angola and Nigeria. In 1975, during the independence of Angola, the two liberation movements competed for oil and diamond deposits. On the one hand, the People's Liberation Movement of Angola (MPLA), on the other hand, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (Unita). The MPLA was supported by the USSR and Cuba, while Unita was supported by the United States and South Africa. The conflict lasted until 2002, killing more than 800,000 people.

Nigeria, with its 200 million inhabitants, is the largest oil producer in Africa and the eleventh largest in the world. This country beats the sad record of military coups. The putschists have always had the support of American or British oil companies. And when a government challenges a contract with a western oil-holding power, the latter "creates instability" for it by promoting an armed rebellion as in the Biafran War of 1967 to 1970, which did more than a million deaths.

The looting of oil pipelines, the kidnappings and the actions of militants against oil installations have brought down production. Nigeria is highly dependent on the oil sector which accounts for 95% of its revenue. Paradoxically, fuel shortages are frequent because of corruption and the organization of the political system in place.

While Libya has been chronically unstable for several years, several Gulf of Guinea countries are being monitored and defended by Western powers that have deployed warships and patrols to protect oil facilities and refineries.

This is the case in Angola, Gabon, Nigeria, Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea.
Increased oil production has led to high growth rates in Libya, Chad, Guinea and Algeria. But in Sudan, it unleashed a new war between North and South. In fact, South Sudan has deposits, while North Sudan has only refineries. The sharing of wealth is not respected. And the rivalry between China and the European companies does not facilitate peace because no one wants to lose this windfall.

Algeria, a major producer of oil and gas, faces domestic political inertia and threats from armed Islamist groups in the South.
- Uranium is at the heart of all the greed of Western countries. France, through the company Areva, has the monopoly of the exploitation of the second largest uranium mine in the world, that of Imouraren, in Niger. France needs this uranium to produce electricity of nuclear origin, while at the same time, Niger is experiencing power cuts plunging the country into the dark. This country, object of multiple military coups, tries to find a semblance of return to normal and a certain stability.
This is also the case in Central Africa (with uranium from the Bakouma mine). The country has been in chaos since March 2013. In Namibia, it is the Trekkopje uranium mine that attracts foreign investors.

Uranium is used by France, which produces with nuclear electricity, but also manufactures nuclear weapons. It is also found in South Africa and Angola. Africa has about 21% of the world's uranium reserves: Niger (7% of world resources), Namibia (6%), South Africa (6%), Tanzania (1%) and Botswana (1%). The main producer is Niger, fourth in the world with 4,528 tonnes in 2015. Namibia is fifth at 4,315 tonnes. Malawi produced 1,132 tonnes in the same year.

Currently, geological research focuses on manganese in Gabon, coal in Mozambique, South Africa and Zimbabwe, iron in Mauritania, zinc in South Africa and Zimbabwe, phosphates in Senegal, Morocco, Tunisia and in Nigeria.
There is growing evidence of Indian investors exporting fertilizers and sulfuric acid.

Ghana, Mali, Senegal and South Africa are full of gold with no real valuation policy for the first three countries.

Other raw materials include zircon, a mineral used in plasma screens and the aerospace industry. In Senegal, two companies, Australian and French, share the market after investing more than $ 650 million. They hold 7% of world production. The Diogo mine is 150 km from Dakar. Its exploitation poses problems for the populations who observe that, every year, 4 km2 are taken on land by the operating group, without counting the risks for the water table.

Coltan is an essential material for the manufacture of mobile phones. A huge field in the Democratic Republic of Congo is at the center of the war in Kivu, which has claimed more than 5 million lives. Gabon has cobalt and manganese, while Madagascar gets its sugar from the Chinese.

Morocco has the largest silver mine in Africa, in the Imiter region, 150 km east of Ouarzazate. Managem owns the mine, which employs a thousand people. Mining is listed on the Casablanca Stock Exchange.
Residents blame the mine operators for polluting the environment with cyanide and mercury, two chemicals used in the processing of silver. People are demanding a better redistribution of wealth and especially that is stopped the excessive pumping of groundwater that feeds the entire region. The world's tenth largest mine has produced cyanide-based toxic waste that is stored locally, posing a risk to the public. If the mining company does not have the means to process this waste, it must pay the price for its treatment abroad. It must also develop a sustainable development strategy to fight against poverty in this desert region and so that the population benefits from the income of the mine.

However, this company has built schools, clinics, and plans to build dams to capture rainwater. It also supports women's associations for hygiene and literacy. Thirty women make work clothes for the mine and its subcontractors with the help of Managem.
African wood, whether Gabonese, Congolese, Cameroonian or Ivorian, is as rich and rare as it is poorly valued. A French manufacturer of pleasure boats has settled in Cameroon for the quality of its wood. But the case of this SME, if it proves the existence of enormous potentialities, also reveals policies of a comprador African capitalism which is satisfied to be an intermediary between the national consumers and the foreign exporters.

The wealth of seas and oceans, very real in Morocco, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania and Senegal, benefits more powers that impose their law. One can ask the following question: why Afriqca Does it export its fishery and agricultural products while millions of Africans can not feed themselves? Africa continues to sell fishing licenses and its seas and oceans are out of fish. Traditional fishermen are becoming poorer and poorer. They are sitting on the beaches watching the sky waiting for better days.

Table 41. Mining production in Africa, 2015

South Africa 96.9%
Zimbabwe 2.2%
Nigeria 28.4%
Libya 19.4%
Algeria 15.1%
Egypt 11.4%
Angola 11%
Gabon 4.8%
DR Congo 4.2%
Guinea 3.3%
Algeria 74.5%
Egypt 12.2%
Libya 5.3%
Nigeria 5.2%
Uranium Niger 42.7%
Morocco 39.4%
South Africa 13.6%
Gabon 4.3%
Namibia 3.8%

Tableau 41. Production minière en Afrique, en 2015

Energy agent	Producer country	Share
Coal	South africa	96,9 %
	Zimbabwe	2,2 %
Oil	Nigeria	28,4 %
	Libya	19,4 %
	Algeria	15,1 %
	Egypt	11,4 %
	Angola	11 %
	Gabon	4,8 %
	Congo DR	4,2 %
	Guinea	3,3 %
Natural gas	Algeria	74,5 %
	Egypt	12,2 %
	Libya	5,3 %
	Nigéria	5,2 %
Uranium	Niger	42,7 %

	Morrocco	39,4 %
	Saouth africa	13,6 %
	Gabon	4,3 %
	Namibia	3,8%

Sources: data compiled by us

Table 42. Leading African exporters of petroleum products in 2016

Tableau 42. Principaux exportateurs africains de produits pétroliers en 2016

Pays	Country Value (in billions of dollars)	Percentage of African exports
Nigeria	87,8	36
Angola	46,3	19
Libya	43,2	18
Algeria	31,4	13

Cotton produced in Burkina Faso and Mali, in addition to being unprocessed locally, suffers from fluctuations in international prices and subsidy policies on the part of the United States. Some countries with no minerals have developed their agriculture, such as Morocco (citrus fruits, tomatoes, vegetable products) and Côte d'Ivoire, the world's second largest producer of coffee and cocoa.

The African continent loses more than $ 100 billion each year due to illegal capital outflows and the manipulation of mineral extraction tariffs. To this must be added the harmful role of the trade in narcotics, cigarettes, weapons and human trafficking. According to World Bank figures, between 2000 and 2008, Africa lost three billion euros each year as a result of illicit financial flows. It is time for African governments, in collaboration with bodies like Tracfin, to strengthen the control of illicit financial flows across the continent.
Many African governments have sold or sold their mineral resources at cheap prices, sometimes to buy weapons, equipment, flour or cars. It is time to denounce several mining codes that disadvantage populations.
Africa has about 30% of the world's mineral reserves, 40% of which is gold, 60% cobalt and 90% platinum. These resources are unequally distributed across the continent, as shown in the table below.

In 2013, Africa was expected to own 7.7% of the world's proven oil reserves, or 130.3 million barrels. The two largest African oil producers are Libya and Nigeria. Libya leads with 2.9% of world reserves, Nigeria has 2.2%. In 2013, Africa accounted for 10.1% of world oil production, or 8.8 million barrels a day. This production came mainly from Nigeria (2.3 million barrels per day), Angola (1.8) and Algeria (1.6).
During the Cold War, several European countries, including France, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Italy, imported hydrocarbons from African countries, while the United States maintained privileged relations with Middle Eastern countries. East. After a significant

decline in demand in the 1990s, the continent is again attracting the attention of industrialized countries to meet their growing hydrocarbon needs.
In 2015, Africa exported $ 265 billion worth of petroleum products, or 19% of world exports in value terms.

Oil-producing countries have experienced positive balances in their current account balances since 2000, with a positive acceleration between 2003 and 2007, while hydrocarbon importing countries have seen their current account balances deteriorate since 2003.

Figure 5. Current account balance of oil exporting and importing countries

Figure 1.16. **Balance courante des pays exportateurs et importateurs de pétrole**



Note : (e) estimations ; (p) prévisions.
Source : Département des statistiques, Banque africaine de développement.
StatLink http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933034467

Intra-African trade is hampered by under-equipment in road, rail, air and sea transport. Africa has 2 million kilometers of roads, but only 27.6% is paved. The low density and distribution of the road network can be seen, with respectively 12 kilometers per km2 and 2.71 kilometers per inhabitant. Africans use road traffic for 90% of intercity transport.
The rail system, which covers 89,380 km of rail, or 2.96 km per 1,000 km, is old, poorly maintained and uncomfortable.

Africa is separated from other continents by the Sinai Peninsula. As a result, Africa's trade is 97% seaborne. The boats mainly transport African raw materials.
Tonnage decreased from 7.1 million tonnes in 1995 to 5.8 million tonnes in 2003, or 0.8% of the world total. Only container ships increased their share to 16% of the world market in 2001. Their average age (11 years) is also closer to the world fleet (10 years), while the rest of the merchant fleet is older. an average of 19 years (world average: 14 years). Liberia, which provides carriers with facilities, alone accounts for 93.9% of the deadweight tonnage.

Africa weighs only a small 1% of global air traffic. A total of 286 airports were approved by Air Mobility Command in May 2000. Only 84% of military airports can accommodate C-130 cargo planes and less than 65% of C-17s. The filling rates for the transport of people and goods are 12 to 20% lower than the world average. The Yamoussoukro Declaration adopted in

1999 by the Conference of Heads of State and Government accelerated market liberalization and airport management reforms.

Of every 100 Africans, 3.21 have fixed telephone lines and 28.44 have cell phones. These figures are unevenly distributed at the continental level. It is not a surprise. Countries like Cambodia or Vietnam have experienced the same evolution after an exhausting war. The wired network is long to install and difficult to maintain compared to the mobile network. Between 2000 and 2010, the number of mobile phone users increased 43-fold to reach 281 million subscribers and a penetration rate of 30 per cent.

Electricity production is 79.3% thermal, 17.1% hydroelectric and 4.6% nuclear. Sub-Saharan households use biomass as cooking fuel.
The dams of the continent produce 88 TWh of electricity per year. Recurring power cuts lead to breaks in production lines, administrations, schools and public and private services. This is a brake on development.

Exploitation of several mineral resources triggered ethnic conflicts and inter-communal violence in Liberia and Sierra Leone, conflicts that resulted in civil wars, favored by multinationals with the complicity of armed rebellions.
Elsewhere, in Central Africa, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo or in the Central African Republic, the revision of mining contracts previously with the multinationals created secession movements: in the DRC (in Katanga), in Nigeria (the Biafra war) and recently in Central. Did not the Séléka rebel coalition in the CAR have the support of foreign powers to overthrow President Bozizé?

All reports of the UN Security Council have denounced the illegal exploitation of coltan by Western companies, relayed by armed gangs and other rebel groups in the region, from neighboring countries (Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda) or the United States. DRC itself.

Madagascar is the center of gravity of precious stones. These include emerald, sapphire, topaz, quartz, rock crystals. But their exploitation gives rise to inter-communal conflicts between Madagascans of African origin and those of Chinese or Indian origin. Tensions and confrontations have often opposed the communities, conflicts born of tariffs set by companies and foreign investors.

In the DRC, in the Katanga region and around Kolwezi as far as Lubumbashi, armed brigades sowed terror for many years to defend foreign companies that exploited malachite or copper. When the companies did not keep their promises, these armed militias would attack the people and kidnap expatriates to demand ransoms.

Since 2002, the fundamentalist Nigerian sect Boko Haram has led a savage guerrilla warfare to impose an Islamist state in northeastern Nigeria and part of Cameroon. Terrorist acts targeting civilians and the military make French, British, American, Canadian and Russian investors hesitate. An international coalition has come to support the countries of the region and prevent terrorists from attacking the oil fields and spreading terror among the people.

The French intervention in Mali, known as "Operation Serval", which began on January 11, 2013, was beneficial in view of the threats of well-armed jihadists and taking advantage of the aftermath of the Libyan civil war. From the beginning of the offensive of the fundamentalist groups, I expressed on Africa24 many times the moral and peacemaking role of an African

intervention supported by the French armies, without forgetting that there was a risk of partition of the country and erasure of its three borders. Indeed, 60% of the Malian territory was occupied by the armed rebellion, the MNLA, supported by an international jihadist that includes the Mujao, Ansar Dine and Aqmi.
Germany and other European countries have gone on the ground as part of the aid to Mali for its reconstruction.

Finally, it must be said that this socio-political crisis has crossed the borders of Mali. After the first French bombardments during Operation Serval, Tuareg refugees settled in neighboring countries. Their occupation of space at the three borders has de facto erased these, inherited from colonization, and destabilized Mauritania, Burkina Faso and Niger. The war in Mali, already regional, has internationalized with the involvement of Morocco and Algeria. This "illegal occupation" of Tuareg populations has created panic among countries with economic interests in the region. So they decided to send soldiers to protect power plants, oil and gas refineries ... since they felt that Tuareg refugee camps could serve as a rear base for armed Islamist groups.

Morocco proposes to give priority to the reconstruction of Mali through investment. This new Moroccan diplomatic offensive has resulted in the signing of multiform cooperation agreements and the involvement of Morocco in the resolution of the socio-political crisis in Mali. The goal of the jihadists was not to stop in Mali, but to create an Islamic Republic encompassing other countries in the region such as Niger. This country is the second largest producer of uranium. Life expectancy does not exceed 49 years and the world ranking relegates him to 171st place.

The New Partnership for Africa's Development (Nepad, acronym for New Partnership for Africa's Development) is a continent-wide development project through infrastructure. It was initiated by the heads of state of the following African countries: Algeria, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa. The ultimate goal of Nepad is to bridge the gap between Africa and the rest of the world. It was integrated in the African summit of March 2007. This summit, held in Algiers, allowed the absorption of Nepad by the AU (African Union). In 2008, in Senegal, the presidents of the five main Nepad member states met (South African Mbeki, Senegalese Wade, Algerian Bouteflika, Egyptian Mubarak and Nigerian Yar'Adua) to prepare the report. on the progress of Nepad to present at the next AU summit. The following was not convincing.

Africa has an Infrastructure Development Program (PIDA), which is the strategic priority framework for infrastructure investments at the regional and continental levels for the period 2012-2040 in four strategic sectors: energy, transport, water and new information and communication technologies (ICTs). Sixteen major regional infrastructure projects selected by Nepad and its technical and financial partners must begin to be implemented, such as railways, roads and power plants, to serve millions of Africans. An estimated 18 million jobs are created, with improved living conditions for millions of Africans.

Today, Africa is trying to produce what it consumes to reduce its imports of food products like rice. How can Africa develop its own resources for the benefit of its people? Structural adjustment plans imposed on African countries have not solved the issues of youth unemployment and alarming poverty. Alas, hunger persists in Africa and the continent begins to develop its food policy in agriculture under climate pressure by seeking to improve yields. On the contrary, people are suffering from rising prices for staple foods and reduced wages. What should be the priority? Pursue policies to combat poverty with successive strategic plans or implement plans to reduce social inequalities ?

The United States has chosen to intervene in Africa so that Africans have access to electricity: thus, in December 2013, President Obama proposed in South Africa an energy plan for Africa, Power Africa, inviting American companies like General Electric and others to come to settle on the continent. The announced figure was $ 7 billion to provide 10,000 kilowatts per year to sub-Saharan Africa. With such an investment, the United States comes to control all the production circuits of the mining operations.

A new energy dependence of nascent African industries on the United States will be expected, which will only increase even if several African families will now have access to electricity, as well as to hospitals and universities .

Morocco has made the decision to buy primary banks in several African countries, so that its economic diplomacy can be at the rendezvous of the economic takeoff of several African countries that suffer from lack of funding.

Yesterday was the marginalization of Africa. Today, investors, both public and private decision-makers, are scrutinizing business opportunities and medium- and long-term prospects for cooperation with the continent. The role and contribution of the diaspora are not to be neglected. Africans living in Europe and America have become true ambassadors for their countries, enhancing the attractiveness of African markets.
Finally, we must welcome the ongoing democratic process with a wave of elections on the African continent. Africa is striving to hold transparent and free elections to elect its leaders, even though election campaigns are often challenged by organizational or fraud issues and the persistence of some leaders to remain in power ad vitam aeternam

In this mixed picture of social, political and economic data, sub-Saharan Africa has several economic and monetary zones. The franc zone, despite its vicissitudes, has enabled member countries to benefit from monetary stability and facilitated the exchange of goods, services and persons between the member countries of the zone.
But these monetary areas could not rise to the level of an economic community. It is through a process of intra- and inter-regional regional integration that Africa will be able to embark on a new development model based on production and wealth creation and abandon the extrovert model we are currently experiencing.

Chapter 2. African Economic Zones

CEMAC (Economic and Monetary Community of Central African States) has six members: Cameroon, Congo, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Central African Republic and Chad. Its purpose is to promote a true common market. It took over from the Udeac (Customs and Economic Union of Central Africa) and the UDE (Equatorial Customs Union). This institution has set itself the following objectives: the creation of a common market based on the free movement of people, goods, capital and services; optimal management of the single currency by ensuring its stability; securing an environment of economic activities and business in general; harmonization of national sectoral policy regulations.
According to the Cemac site, the population of the area is 44.1 million, with a population growth rate (average) of 2.8%. The average growth rate (real GDP) is 4.6%. The main products exported are: crude oil and petroleum products, cocoa, coffee, cotton, fiber and its derivatives, timber and logs, sawnwood and their derivatives, aluminum (crude or its derivatives) , natural rubber, eucalyptus logs, bananas, cattle, diamonds (raw and cut), gold, tobacco, sugar, manganese, uranium, methanol and other gases.
Jeune Afrique has summarized the statistical data of the area as follows:

Figure 6. The savings of Cemac



The inflation rate (annual average consumer price) is 2.6%.

CEMAC represents the institution whose mere evocation recalls the serial privatizations of public companies, the waves of layoffs and the drastic cuts in public spending on health and education that occurred on the continent in the 1980s.
The PER, regional economic program, of Cémac presents an agenda of emergence (2010-2025) in three five-year phases for the realization of the vision 2025. It wants to make Cémac an emerging integrated economic space, where reign security , solidarity and good governance, at the service of human development ". The 2010-2015 phase consists of building the institutional foundations of emergence. The 2016-2020 phase should lead to "anchoring the pillars of the Community's economic diversification". The 2021-2025 phase aims at consolidating the previous phases in order to lead to the creation of an emerging economic area at the Cémac level by 2025.

The implementation of the PER is supervised by a Steering Committee, a Regional Experts Committee and national PER units. To ensure a close and effective follow-up of a dynamic animation of the Program and to assist the Steering Committee on a daily basis, it is decided to set up a support unit for the implementation of the PER. This PER is divided into 5 axes, 12 strategic objectives, 29 programs and 86 projects.

The economic and financial indicators published in early December 2016 by the Bank of Central African States (BEAC) are quite alarming. Growth experienced a strong and rapid "deceleration" to less than 1%. The inflation rate exceeds 3%. Requests for statutory advances from states to BEAC only worsen public debts and reduce foreign exchange reserves. Budget deficits will exceed 9% of the region's total GDP. Some will go so far as to question the role of the CFA franc in this situation. However, oil seems to be the real catalyst for the crisis in the Cémac zone. With the exception of the Central African Republic, which is sinking into a long-lasting and contagious crisis, the other five Central African states are oil-producing countries. Obviously, the fall in the price of a barrel combined with a slowdown in aggregate demand affects, to varying degrees, these states.

If oil accounts for nearly 70% of the zone's exports, its weight in the GDP is more or less important depending on the country. In 2015, it accounted for 85% of Equatorial Guinea's GDP, 50% of Congo's, 45% of Gabon's, 18% of Chad's and 9% of Cameroon's. The fall in oil revenues comes as these countries, with the exception of Cameroon, have barely embarked on strategies to diversify their economies through multi-year plans. Before the Yaoundé summit, freezing major infrastructure and public investment projects was already on the agenda in Equatorial Guinea, Congo and Gabon. While the decline in oil revenues is far from negligible, it should not be forgotten that these states are constantly cited for their poor financial governance and that corruption is endemic. Admittedly, for Chad and Cameroon, spending linked to increasing insecurity and the fight against Boko Haram is becoming irrepressible and can partly explain the increase in budget deficits. It should also be remembered that in 2016, presidential elections were held in five states in the region, resulting in expenditures that were not compatible with budget availability and thus increasing the stock of public debt.

The question of the devaluation of the CFA franc was quickly dismissed at the Yaoundé summit. It is true that the traumatic devaluation of 1994 did not have the desired effects, especially in the fight against poverty. In spite of agreed speeches aimed at preventing the outbursts of shields, all that remained was to repeat the old IMF recipes invariably applied in Europe or Africa.

The IMF has certainly changed since the 1980s, but its austerity policy in the Cémac zone will remain based on budgetary adjustments, the freezing of ceilings for BEAC statutory advances, the limitation of the budget deficit to 3% over five years, the recourse to concessional loans, limitation of investment expenditure, reform of the tax system and downsizing of the civil service. Structural adjustment will not be subregional but will affect each of the six states that will have to open and conclude bilateral negotiations with the IMF quickly, as is already the case for the Central African Republic and Chad.

Given the lack of legitimacy enjoyed by the heads of state of Cemac and the rise of disputes in a society increasingly isolated by social networks, new announced austerity measures may add a political crisis to the economic-financial crisis and, paradoxically, undermine regional integration. Has Cameroon not already disassociated itself from CEMAC by negotiating, alone, an economic partnership agreement with the European Union?

In 1992, SADCC became the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Its main objective is to move towards economic integration that brings development. Article 5 of the SADC Treaty (1992) links economic growth with poverty alleviation, improving the standard of living and quality of life of people in southern Africa and supporting socially disadvantaged people. Twenty-eight years later, progress is weak. We are far from the development of common political values, institutions and systems. The Malagasy crisis shows the limits of this strategy to bring peace and security to the region. Complementarity between national and regional strategies and programs and the promotion of productive employment through the use of resources in the region remain to be completed.

The SADC Member States are: Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The head office of SADC is in Gaborone, Botswana.

The wish of the founders of this community was to achieve industrialization characterized by import substitution.
Conceptually, there are interesting elements in the formation of these economic and monetary communities, namely the realization that countries born after decolonization are small, sometimes landlocked, and highly extroverted. The need for intra-regional cooperation has been promoted by several international institutions, such as the Economic Council for Africa (ECA), established in 1958 by the UN Economic and Social Council. The role of the CEA is more a matter of co-ordinating research and analysis and technical assistance than interference in the decision-making processes of States.

The merit of this UN organization is to put technical and political interlocutors at the table and help them to develop working lines converging towards regional integration and sustainable development, the fight against poverty, not to mention good governance. . However, the CEA does not have a magic wand. The partners must play the game and move forward positively. This is the conclusion that I drew from this CEA held in Rabat in 2012 and where I had the pleasure to make a presentation on the Maghreb common currency and the project of a Maghreb economic community. The so-called meeting of experts had given rise to passes between Algerian and Moroccan delegations, which is not constructive.

The Organization of African Unity (OAU), created on 25 May 1963 by the Heads of State and Government of thirty independent countries, has managed intra-African conflicts with varying degrees of success, but has not success in the field of African economic integration and the creation of an African common market. For decades, this pan-African institution has become entangled in fratricidal struggles between the pro-Soviet camp and the pro-Western camp. African leaders have looked elsewhere instead of going to the basics: ensuring the emergence of modern, productive, wealth-creating and job-creating economies. If all the OAU members had combined their efforts to build inter-African infrastructures, business groups and complementarities, Africa would have experienced another face.

He was happy to have considered the establishment of the African Development Bank (AfDB) following the agreement signed by 23 states on August 14, 1963 in Khartoum, Sudan. This group supports projects contributing to the economic and social development of the continent, by involving public and private investors. The AfDB provides strategic advice, technical assistance and facilitation of investment operations to Member States.

The treaties, protocols, conventions and formal agreements concluded by States and international organizations, including Pan-African, and regional economic communities have not always been respected despite their binding nature. National interests, especially those of the ruling leaders, prevailed at the expense of a long-term vision for the benefit of the African people. However, there was a desire expressed by the Heads of State and Government who adopted the Lagos Plan of Action in 1980, during the occasion of the extraordinary summit of the OAU in Lagos. , with the support of ECA. The goal of this initiative is to achieve regional integration in order to achieve self-sufficiency at continental and national levels and to establish an autonomous continental economy. If the institutional framework is appropriate, the means and method, or even the mechanisms to achieve it, are poorly defined and suffer from theoretical and empirical formwork insufficiently developed. The creation of an African economic community was utopian given the difficulty of articulating the existing regional economic communities among themselves and overcoming sterile rivalries between certain states.

Prior to the Lagos Plan, there were already groupings of countries such as SADC, ECOWAS in West Africa and Comesa (Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, established in 1993 as a successor to the Preferential Trade Area. itself created in 1981). The members of the Customs and Economic Union of Central Africa (Udeac) created ECCAS in 1983.
The Lagos Plan of Action will lead to the signing of the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community in Abuja (Nigeria) by the Heads of State and Government of the OAU. Other groupings of countries will benefit from the status of regional economic community through this Abuja agreement. It is the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (Igad), founded in 1986, the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), established in 1989, the Community of Sahelo-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), established 1998, and the East African Community (EAC), which began in 1999.

The Abuja Treaty can be considered as the foundation of a process of regional integration, economic, social and political convergences to be spread out over a long period going from 1994 to 2028. In reality, disagreements remain on the way of to make the OAU Charter and the Abuja Treaty coherent. These disagreements subsist even after the transformation of the OAU into an African Union on September 9, 1999, in Sirte, Libya. Noting the delay in the implementation of actions aimed at regional integration, the Fourth Conference of African Ministers adopted the Minimum Integration Program on 9 May 2009.

In addition to the definition of an action plan aimed at accelerate coordination, convergence and cooperation among the regional economic communities, the obstacles were highlighted. They are structural and financial.

On 22 October 2008, three country groupings, Comesa, the East African Community and SADC, agreed to negotiate an agreement for a continental free trade area. The 18th ordinary session of the AU summit (in January 2012), in Addis Ababa, was held on a theme that could not be clearer: "Stimulate intra-African trade" with the key to a plan for action to accelerate the creation of the continent-wide free trade area. Negotiations continued in the Ethiopian capital in May 2016, as part of the second forum after the first, dated February 22 of the same year.

Figure 7. The African Regional Economic Community



Source: Office of the Councilor for Africa (UN)

The best-structured economic zone of the continent is undoubtedly ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States), created by the Treaty of Lagos on May 28, 1975, by some 15 African countries. West: Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. While Cape Verde joined the ECOWAS in 1976 and Morocco is seeking to join, Mauritania decided to leave it in 2000.
The main objective of the ECOWAS is "to promote cooperation and integration in the perspective of a West African Economic Union with a view to raising the standard of living of its peoples, to maintain and to increase economic stability, strengthen relations between Member States and contribute to the progress and development of the African continent ". Beyond the economic agreements, in 1990 ECOWAS set up a peacekeeping force (Ecomog) to settle conflicts in the region.
The Community, with headquarters in Abuja, Nigeria, has a population of 295 million.

Figure 8. The CDEAO ECOWAS

Source: ECOWAS website

For the moment, there is no instance at the level of ministers or heads of government to coordinate the economic communities of the continent. Only the Observatory on African Regional Integration (OIRA) acts as a "one-stop-shop" providing economic operators with statistics of experiences and achievements as well as obstacles encountered by the Regional Economic Communities (RECs).

The different RECs did not experience the same path, the same obstacles or the same successes. The Arab Maghreb Union has made no progress on the free movement of goods and people. On the contrary, in 1994, Algeria closed its borders with Morocco after the Sherifian kingdom imposed visas on Algerian nationals. The customs union has remained a dead letter and no negotiations are planned in the medium or long term. The regional payments system project is still not on the agenda. My proposal for a Maghreb common currency arouses interest in public opinion and among specialists, but the Maghreb political leaders remain silent on the issue. However, the late Hassan II had evoked in 1995 a common identity card, a common passport and a single currency Maghreb.

CEN-SAD has launched its free trade zone but without advancing in the customs union or in the movement of people. The ECOWAS has been well advanced and advanced in its free trade area, in the movement of people with a common passport, but without making progress in the customs union. A single currency project is under discussion.
In Central Africa, ECCAS has made its free trade area operational and is making real progress in building a customs union. Progress has also been made in the movement of people.
The EAC launched its free trade area and customs union and developed a single currency project. If the common passport is effective, the single tourist visa project is in progress.

CEMAC has an effective single currency and a regional operational payment system, without yet having achieved its free trade area and customs union. Progress has been made in the area of free movement of persons. Igad is at a standstill in all areas of integration. SADC has made significant progress in establishing a free trade area and a customs union. However, intra-Community trade would be facilitated by a payment system that remains to be built.

Figure 9. WAEMU



Source: WAEMU website

WAEMU (West African Economic and Monetary Union) has been well inspired in making its free trade area and customs union operational, while an effective single currency facilitates intra-community trade and makes possible a payment system regional.

Obstacles have sprinkled along the long road of intra-African trade that is marked North-South and rarely South-South. It is easier for Senegalese companies to export to France than to neighboring countries. It is not trivial that trucks carrying goods need a full day to cross an intra-African border. Fussy controls by zealous customs officers or bribes to the carrier are detrimental to trade. The condition of roads and transport is also a factor in slowing trade. The assumptions made about Africa play a negative role in the choice of the African consumer.
We have seen a deficiency in production and processing capacity and the small and medium size of African firms operating in tight markets. The role of banks is to be analyzed objectively. Given my experience of trade with Africa, the banking and financial system has been cautious, perhaps also because of lack of confidence in the entrepreneurial sector that does not display the transparency required in terms of its accounts and prospects.

Yet, according to a document jointly published by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in May 2017, rising intra-African trade has boosted economic growth . "Africa's gross domestic product (GDP) and domestic trade have quadrupled in twenty years," said the source. Since 2011, African exports to the United States and China have dropped by 65% and 48%, respectively, due to a general slowdown in international trade. A slowdown that does not, according to the report, undermine the intra-African trade dynamic with trade volumes that rose from 10% to 16% between 2000 and 2014. Still according to this report, intra-African trade has a growth vector through the heterogeneity of national exports: "If neighboring countries can compete on certain export niches, the wide range of products available on the continent opens the way for intense exchanges between regions. ". Half of the products traded within the continent are manufactured products from light industries. The report stresses that "countries with more advanced manufacturing sectors could advance as long as they have access to the African market as a whole". The strong emergence of a middle class and the flow of capital from international organizations and institutions as well as the contribution of the African diaspora favor such intra-African trade. Perhaps the development of electronic commerce could facilitate trade and innovation provided that payments are secure.

The African Center for Trade, Integration and Development (Cacid), based in Dakar, calls for a strengthening of intra-African trade and argues that "further integration of economies through strengthening interconnections and unification markets is now considered an ideal of development ". Intra-African trade accounts for only 25% of the continent's total trade with the rest of the world, while the ratio is 56% in the Americas, 60% in Europe and 67% in Asia.
In African hotels, you can find jam imported from anywhere except an African country, while Africa is full of exotic fruits of high quality. Another example is cocoa, which is exported without any transformation, while the continent consumes low-grade chocolate. Revenues from African oil exports approached $ 85 billion in 2015, while imports of fuel from the rest of the world cost between $ 63 and $ 84 billion between 2010 and 2015.

Chapter 3. Regional Integration

The project to create a Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA) was signed in January 2012 at the 18th Ordinary Session of the African Union Conference to see the light of day in 2017. This project aims to consolidate 54 States by aggregating the tripartite free trade area including Comesa, EAC and SADC on the one hand, and ECCAS, ECOWAS, UMA and the Community of Sahelo-Saharan States on the other.

Intermediate steps have enamelled this process. In 2015, at the 25th Ordinary Session of the African Union Conference, the objectives and directions for the establishment of the CFTA were established. In 2016, negotiations were supported by the African Union and the United Nations will try to define the boundaries of the CFTA. The expected results are increased intra-African trade, more regional integration, GDP and employment growth, and resilience to exogenous shocks from declines in world commodity prices.

In 2013, five East African countries set themselves the challenge of creating a monetary union and building a single market that would bring together 135 million citizens. The resulting single currency would look like the euro.

Intra-African trade, by its structure, could stimulate the industrialization of Africa and the transformation of agricultural products, primary products and commodities. In fact, African countries exchange manufactured products that are already elaborate or semi-finished. Raw materials are destined for developed or Asian countries for their final elaboration.

Since 2011, as an editorialist at Africa24, I have consistently and systematically stressed the need to develop South-South economic relations, the transformation of primary products into semi-finished or finished products, the industrialization of the continent, the fight against corruption and transparency in economic relations. In recent years, there has been a resurgence of intra-African trade.

Second subpart. Africa and its relations with Arabic-speaking countries

In the preliminary chapter, Afro-Arab relations were highlighted by embracing all aspects: economic, cultural, human, geostrategic, political and religious. These links took on another dimension, more institutional, following the first AU-Arab League summit held in Cairo in 1977: cooperation bodies were created in various fields.
Several Arab, bilateral and multilateral financial institutions provide technical and financial assistance to the development of African countries. We can mention the Arab Bank for economic development in Africa.
The second Afro-Arab summit, held in Libya in 2010, emphasized the need to intensify efforts to adopt an Arab-African partnership strategy in the face of the challenges of globalization. A draft "partnership strategy" has been approved as well as a joint action plan for the period 2011-2016.

The Arab-African summit in Kuwait City from 16 to 20 November 2013 was more a catalog of laudable intentions than a program to engage the 60 Arab and African states, both in terms of funding and implementation schedules. recommendations. However, the emir of Kuwait, Sheikh Sabah al-Ahmad al-Sabah, announced a two billion dollar soft loan to African countries.
There are associations between Arab companies or banks and their African counterparts but they come under bilateral and non-multilateral agreements, such as a program of productive investments and not just financing and donations implemented under joint authority of the Arab League and the African Union. Projects could be carried out under the auspices of regional Arab and African economic communities.

The Arab-African trade reached 25 billion dollars in 2010. This figure challenges when we know that it is exports and imports between 80 countries including hydrocarbons. Trade between Arab countries and China is $ 116.8 billion. With Japan, this figure is $ 119.7 billion and with the European Union, the amount is more than double, $ 289.2 billion. According to the unified Arab economic report of 2012, the bulk of Arab exports are directed to Asian countries (21.2%). Next come the European Union (12.7%), Japan (9.4%), China (8.3%) and America (7.7%).

As for imports from Arab countries, they come from the European Union (24.7%), Asian countries (18.6%), China (11.9%), America (8%) and Japan (3.8%). According to the same report, Arab aid (mainly hydrocarbon exporting countries) amounted to 6.3 billion in 2011, of which only 12.2% went to sub-Saharan African countries behind other Arab countries (54.7% of aid) and Asian countries (24.4%).
The accumulated stock of Arab aid to sub-Saharan African states between 1970 and 2011 reached 154 billion dollars, placing these recipients in 3rd place at 12.2%, behind the other Arab countries (in 1st position with 60%) and Asian countries (2nd with 24.5%). In comparison, according to the OECD, sub-Saharan Africa received 36.7% of total international aid in 2015.
The Arab States are lagging behind other political and economic poles. African-US summits compete with the China-Africa and European Union-Africa summits, already adding to the France-Africa summits.
With an average growth rate of 4.9 percent in 2015, sub-Saharan Africa has attracted $ 50 billion in foreign direct investment (FDI). Arab countries attracted only 47.1% of FDI. The

investment attractiveness indicator in sub-Saharan Africa is 57.2% compared to 43% in the Arab countries.

Meeting in Rabat on 22 and 23 February 2017, Arab and African countries have laid the foundations for the Arab-Africa Trade Bridges (AATB). They started from the observation that exports from 17 Arab countries to 22 countries in sub-Saharan Africa (OIC members, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation) amounted to 160 billion dollars, while exports from these countries to the rest of the world reached 1,006 billion US dollars. They concluded that there was a potential to exploit. The AATB program, which lasts three years, aims to focus on sectors where substantial value added can be achieved, particularly in industries. In order to achieve this, instruments such as trade finance, credit insurance and improved trade capacity building tools will be favored.

In order to facilitate access to different markets, there is a need to improve market communication and invest in infrastructure. This made the Director General of the International Islamic Trade Finance Corporation (ITFC), Hani Salem, say: "Trade between the two regions remains below the aspirations and expectations of the countries of the region".
According to the president of the Islamic Development Bank (IDB), the group's participation in economic projects and infrastructure in Africa amounted between 2008 and 2015 to $ 43.3 billion. The IDB has financed $ 14.7 billion in trade between Arab and African countries. The fact is that Africans are waiting for long-term and mutually beneficial productive investments.

Economic diplomacy should be conducted at the level of embassies, but also chambers of commerce and industry under the effective authority of Arab heads of state and government. In universities and grandes écoles, modules must be taught on the history, culture and specificities of African markets. The Arab-African ties must be strengthened through solidarity in the military, security and migration, as well as in training and education, the reception of African students in Arab universities, the multiplication of twinning between municipalities, regions, universities, grandes écoles ...

Creating a climate of sympathy also means building hospitals and health centers in the poorest countries. Among the successful initiatives of the Arab-African joint commission, we can mention the organization of an Arab-African Trade Exhibition every two years, the creation of an Arab-African Cultural Institute in Bamako (which became the Institute Arab-African culture and strategic studies), as well as the establishment of a preferential trade zone between Africa and the Arab world. The Arab Bank for Development in Africa was established following a decision of the 6th Arab Summit held in Algiers on November 28, 1973. Its headquarters are in Khartoum, Sudan. This independent international financial institution is owned by 18 member states of the Arab League. Among the Bank's objectives: support for economic, financial and technical cooperation between African and Arab countries; the contribution to financing the economic development of African countries; increasing the participation of Arab capital in development projects.

Chapter 1. Cooperation institutions

Several Arab-African or Arab institutions, intended to cooperate with Africa, are levers to develop. Their role could be more constructive.
The fund was established in 1974, by a decision of the Arab Petroleum Ministers' Conference, at the seventh Arab summit held in Rabat, Morocco. The Fund aims to provide technical assistance to African countries by sending experts and providing scholarships and training in various fields. Since its establishment, the Fund has provided technical assistance to 40 African countries, with 3,814 experts and 1,270 training grants.

The Arab-African Exhibition was established regularly (every two years) by the Tenth Session of the Standing Committee for Arab-African Cooperation, which was held in Kuwait in June 1989. The main objective of this exhibition is to promote trade and investment between Arab and African countries by facilitating direct contacts between Arab businessmen.
The Arab Bank as well as the African Union and the League of Arab States have contributed to the establishment of all the sessions of the exhibition that have taken place so far with the actual presence and funding of the least developed African countries. advances. The first session took place in October 1993 in Tunisia; the second in October 1995 in Johannesburg, South Africa; the third in October 1997 in Chardja, United Arab Emirates. The fourth session was held in Dakar, Senegal, and the fifth in October 2001, in Tripoli, Libya.

In 2004, the General Secretariat of the League of Arab States and the African Union Commission agreed to hold a joint meeting in the presence of senior officials from both sides and representatives of relevant Arab and African institutions (including the Arab Bank).) to discuss various issues related to Arab-African cooperation. The annual consultative meetings between the two organizations took place during 2005-2010 at the headquarters of the Arab League in Cairo and at the headquarters of the African Union in Addis Ababa, alternately.
The first joint Arab-African Ministerial Meeting on Agricultural Development and Food Security was held in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, on February 16, 2010. The meeting, entitled "Joint Plan of Action for Agricultural Development and Food Security in Africa and the Arab World ", was approved by the Second Arab-African Conference in Bizerte, Tunisia, on October 10, 2010. The meeting created the Facilitation Unit for the implementation of this plan. 'action. It was decided to hold a ministerial meeting on food security and agricultural development in Arab and African countries every two years.

The Arab and African Summit is composed of the leaders of the African Union Member States and the League of Arab States. It is the supreme organ of Arab-African cooperation, which defines its policies and sets out its general orientations.
As decided at the summits of 1977 and 2010, the joint summit is held every three years. The third Arab-African summit was held in Kuwait in 2013.
The first Arab-African summit adopted a declaration and a program of action for Arab-African cooperation in the political, economic, financial, commercial, cultural, scientific and media fields. The summit had also approved the organization of joint actions through institutions that function regularly, including the Council of Heads of State and Government, the Ministerial Conference, the Standing Committee for Arab-African Cooperation and the Coordination Committee.
The second Arab-African summit confirmed the institutions created by the 1977 summit and approved an Arab-African strategic partnership program and an action plan for Arab-African

cooperation in various fields, with emphasis on on the economic aspect for the period 2011-2016. The Arab Bank contributed to the preparation of the joint work plan to organize a "high-level forum on Arab-African cooperation in the area of investment and trade".

The Arab-African Ministerial Council is composed of the Foreign Ministers of the Member States of the League of Arab States and the African Union. The Joint Ministerial Council oversees the preparation of the summit, which will be held annually in accordance with the 1977 Summit Resolution. Two Ministerial Council sessions were held, once in 1977 in Cairo, Egypt, and the other in 2010 in Sirte, Libya.

The Permanent Committee for Arab-African Cooperation was established by decision of the first Arab-African summit in 1977. The Standing Committee is made up of 24 ministers of the Arab League and the African Union: half are Arab and one is Arab. half African (sometimes they are their representatives, at least ambassadors). The 1977 summit decided that meetings of the Standing Committee should be held twice a year at the headquarters of the two organizations, alternately, except in the case of an invitation from a Member State. The Standing Committee oversees the implementation of Arab-African cooperation and monitors developments in the different areas. It examines and directs this cooperation with regard to the political, economic, cultural and social objectives set out in the resolutions adopted by the summit.

The Coordination Committee for Arab-African Cooperation was established by a resolution of the 1977 Summit. The Coordinating Committee is composed of the Presidents of both Arab and African sides of the Standing Committee and the Chief Executives of the Arab League and the Arab League. African Union. It monitors the implementation of resolutions adopted by Arab-African cooperation bodies and deals with practical and administrative issues requiring urgent decisions. He also coordinates the work between the different working groups and submits their reports to the Standing Committee. The Coordination Committee has held several meetings since its establishment in 1977.

The Arab Fund for Technical Assistance to African Countries was established in 1974 by a decision of the Conference of Arab Petroleum Ministers, adopted by the Seventh Arab Summit held in Rabat, Morocco. The Fund aims to provide technical assistance to African countries by sending experts and providing scholarships and training in various fields. Since its establishment, the Fund has provided technical assistance to 40 African countries, with 3,814 experts and 1,270 training grants.

The Joint Arab-African Ministerial Meeting on Agricultural Development and Food Security, held in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, on February 16, 2010, approved the establishment of a Facilitation Unit for Implementation. of the "Joint Action Plan for Agricultural Development and Food Security" within the Arab Organization for Agricultural Development. A steering committee has been set up to monitor the implementation of the joint plan and the work of the facilitation unit. This committee includes the Arab Bank, the Arab League, the African Development Bank, the Islamic Development Bank, the Arab Organization for Investment and Agricultural Development, the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development and the Arab Organization. for agricultural development.

In 2004, the General Secretariat of the League of Arab States and the African Union Commission agreed to hold a joint meeting in the presence of senior officials from both sides and representatives of relevant Arab and African institutions (including the Arab Bank).) to discuss various issues related to Arab-African cooperation. The annual consultative meetings between the two organizations took place during the period 2005-2010, alternately at the headquarters of the Arab League in Cairo and at the headquarters of the African Union in Addis Ababa.

The long road of relations between the Arab world and sub-Saharan Africa is not without pitfalls. During the 4th Arab-African summit held in Malabo in November 2016, in Equatorial Guinea, Morocco and eight Arab countries withdrew to not sit alongside the Polisario Front. We hope that this kind of incident will remain an epiphenomenon of the past. Rationality must take precedence over political calculations.

Chapter 2. Arab-African trade

Trade between the Gulf countries and Africa soared by 270 percent during the 2000s. Kuwait was a pioneer in setting up the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development (KFAED). The Kharafi family and other family groups have invested in the African market.
The UAE has been able to adapt to the globalization and diversification of its economy by seeking opportunities in promising markets. In 2013, the Emirates organized the first edition of the Africa Global Business Forum. Dubai has emerged as the "New York City of the 21st Century" for Africans who come en masse to shop at retail and wholesale. Qatar has seized its media coverage and through charitable organizations to strengthen its presence on the African continent, especially since the boycott decided by its neighbors (led by Saudi Arabia). The project to launch a French-language version of al-Jazeera that will primarily target the African public will undoubtedly help to increase the emirate's influence on the continent.
Saudi Arabia is trying to use its religious ascendancy to strengthen its political, geostrategic and economic presence through its investments in mining, agriculture, construction and religious tourism. In fact, 35% of the population of sub-Saharan Africa is of Muslim religion.
Oman has been present for a long time in Africa, especially in the Zanzibar archipelago and east of the continent.

The Gulf countries are less focused on development aid than on investment. Because they are not interested in commodities, they can participate in the diversification of sub-Saharan economies.
Gulf airlines have multiplied links between African capitals. Emirates ranks first with the largest network. Then come Qatar Airways, then Etihad.
In shipping, DP World, the third largest port operator in the world, a subsidiary of Dubai World, a holding company owned by the Dubai government, has been present on the African continent since 2000: in Dakar, Djibouti and Mozambique.
In telephony, Gulf companies are among the market leaders, with Kuwaiti Zain and Emirati Etisalat, via Maroc Telecom.
In the financial sector, Saudi Prince al-Walid has invested heavily in investment funds Pan African Investment Partners I and II. Qatar National Bank, one of the two leading shareholders of EcoBank, has become an iconic pan-African bank on the continent. Investment Corp of Dubai (ICD) has invested in Dangote Cement, the largest listed company on the Lagos Stock Exchange. The sovereign wealth funds of the Gulf countries are strengthening their Africa departments and increasing the issuance of sukuk ("sharia-compatible") bonds.
In the media, CNBC Africa is funded by the Dubai consortium. Today, it is al-Jazeera that drives the market.
The Gulf countries invest in mines, like Mubadala and Amer, a fund co-led by Mohamed Alabbar, but also in hydrocarbons. Qatar Petroleum International has taken a stake in Total E & P Congo and Hamad bin Jassem has bought the junior oil company Heritage Oil. Africans, entrepreneurs, public and private decision-makers, experts and financiers, make the following observation: Africa needs capital, the Gulf abounds ...
The relations between these two regions of the world, with complementary economies, should be strengthened. It is to this problem that the last sub-part of this book will try to answer, with the help of the expertise, the experience and the technology of the European Union.
The Gulf countries need to diversify their economies so as not to suffer sudden fluctuations in oil prices. Saudi Arabia has launched plans to prepare for the post-oil era by promoting construction, industry, transport, renewable energy, tourism, real estate, education, and so on. Remember that 80% of export earnings and nearly 85% of the Kingdom's budget revenues come from the oil sector. Forty promising investment opportunities are highlighted in the $ 71 billion US healthcare sector, including the manufacturing of medical equipment, drugs and vaccines, and the creation and management of hospitals.
In a Coface report dated September 16, 2015 entitled: "Falling oil prices: the reaction of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries", we read: "Since oil continues to play a major role in the economic performance of the GCC, it is vital that the Gulf countries diversify their economies to ensure healthy and continuous growth. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have some have the demonstration. »In the website

of Coface. Sustained GDP growth requires significant public investment in non-oil sectors. In the UAE, the food and beverage sector is expected to grow 36% between 2014 and 2019. Saudi Arabia's auto industry is expected to grow in the coming years. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates should further engage in economic diversification to mitigate the effect of falling oil prices.

Africa has enormous natural resources, still unexploited, while most of its people suffer from poverty, disease and hunger. The continent has real potential to take advantage of opportunities and help African countries grow, create jobs and reduce poverty.
The United Arab Emirates has put the development of relations with African countries and their contribution to the development of their economies on the agenda through the creation of an economic partnership to share common interests and achieve mutually beneficial objectives. .

While relations between the United Arab Emirates and the Arab countries of North Africa are relatively advanced, relations with other countries in sub-Saharan Africa need to exploit new investment and business opportunities.
The Ministry of Economy, in cooperation with the Economic Development Department of Abu Dhabi, organized the UAE Investment and Trade Forum in Tanzania and Kenya at the end of June 2013. Fifty participants participated. 25 public and private Emirati institutions.
This trend is occurring at a time when economic and trade relations are developing rapidly with African countries. Trade between the UAE and Africa increased by 27% in 2016 to reach 184 billion euros (50 billion dollars) against 145 billion dirhams emiratis (39.5 billion dollars) in 2015. This amount is likely to increase over the next few years.

The choice of these two countries by the UAE is appropriate. Together, they form a point of contact between the countries of East Africa and a gateway to the countries of the Central African continent, via relatively advanced infrastructures, in particular ports, airports and roads.
Due to the availability of the UAE's investment capabilities and its strategic positioning, this country can be a transit point for African trade exports and imports to and from various countries of the world, particularly for Asian continent. Their partnership can revive many areas, such as transport, particularly air transport, mining and renewable energy. The United Arab Emirates can help African countries develop renewable energy projects; such as solar, wind and hydro.

In the area of foreign trade, the United Arab Emirates has many facilities provided by free zones and airlines, such as Etihad Airways and Emirates Airlines, which have opened daily direct lines with most African capitals, allowing to develop trade and re-export but also to revitalize the tourism sector. African countries have tourism potential (especially their landscapes and natural relics) and aspire to achieve global trade standards by diversifying and offering favorable prices. The desire of the GCC countries to diversify their economies and industrialize large sectors creates mineral needs such as aluminum and uranium in order to meet the demands of nuclear fuel producers.

Since food security is a priority for the Gulf countries and African countries have arable land and water resources, there is reason to believe that there is scope for cooperation. Africa would gain in agricultural development, agribusiness (after transformation), and in massive job creation and could feed its populations. For their part, GCC members would for a long time ensure their food self-sufficiency and the re-export of their surplus production.
In July 2013, Emirati government officials prospected in Kenya and Tanzania, targeting neighboring countries Burundi, Rwanda and Zambia. I defended in the Arabic-speaking media

the idea of investing sovereign wealth funds in the real agricultural, industrial or technological sector. Investments in US or European financial assets did not only generate profits, quite the contrary. McKinsey Global Institute summarized in Financial News (study cited by Le Monde of August 19, 2009) the following data:

The top ten funds (in billions of dollars) are:
Abu Dhabi Investment Authority: 470 billion dollars (333 billion euros)
Saudi Arabia Monetary Authority: $ 390 billion
Norway Pension Fund (Global): 326
Government of Singapore: 300
Kuwait Investment Authority: 240
China Investment Authority: 210
Russian Reserve Fund: 137
Russian Wealth Fund: 88
Singapore Temasek Holdings: 80
Qatar Investment Authority: 60.

Figure 10. The main sovereign wealth funds of the world

Les principaux fonds souverains du monde

Pays	Nom du fonds	Année de création	Milliards de dollars
Abou Dhabi	Abu Dhabi Investment Authority	1976	875*
Norvège	Government Pension Fund - Global	1996	330
Singapour	Governmental of Singapore Investment Corporation	1981	330*
Arabie saoudite	Divers non encore constitués	non disponible	300*
Koweït	Kuwait Investment Authority	1976	250
Chine	China Investment Corporation	2007	200
Singapour	Temasek Holdings	1974	159*
Libye	Oil Reserve Fund	2005	50
Algérie	Fonds de régulation des recettes	2000	43
Qatar	Qatar Investment Authority	non disponible	40
Etats-Unis (Alaska)	Permanent Reserve Fund	1976	38
Brunei	Brunei Investment Authority	1983	30
Malaisie	Khazanah Nasional BHD	1993	26
Russie	Stabilization Fund	2003	24**
Corée du Sud	Korea Investment Corp.	2006	20

* Estimation. ** Projection du gouvernement russe. Source : Morgan Stanley - *The Wall Street Journal.*

At the end of 2008, the total holdings of sovereign wealth funds amounted to $ 3.2 trillion (€ 2.3 trillion). At the end of the first quarter of 2009, the value of the Sovereign Wealth Funds declined by $ 800 billion compared to the end of 2007.

In comparison, the holdings of sovereign wealth funds prior to the 2008 financial crisis are presented in the following table.

In a study published on December 17, 2014 by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) in collaboration with Falcon and Associates, entitled "GCC Trade and Investment Flows", it states: "The one of the key findings is that the GCC strengthens its presence in Africa by sector and geographical area. " Investment flows are diversifying and include both telecommunications and private equity activities in West Africa and energy projects in South Africa and Mozambique.

Chapter 3. Economic relations between the Maghreb and sub-Saharan Africa

An Algerian-African Forum was held from 3 to 5 December 2016 in Algiers. It brought together hundreds of African economic operators. However, Algeria has not yet defined a doctrine and strategy for the deployment of its state or private enterprises, large or small and medium, on the continent. The organization of the Forum was to define which Algerian non-hydrocarbon products to export to the African continent, as indicated by the Minister of Industry and Mines, Abdesselam Bouchouareb.

In the speech, the executive is ready to relax some administrative and banking provisions that slow down Algerian exports and investments to the sub-Saharan part of the continent. Only 10 exporters out of the 700 officially listed in the customs files account for 97% of the export turnover.

According to the National Association of Algerian Exporters (Anexal), Algerian exports to sub-Saharan Africa are ridiculous: $ 83 million excluding hydrocarbons. The exported products are: petroleum derivatives, such as mineral fuels and mineral oils, organic and inorganic chemicals, bituminous materials, plastics, rubber and aluminum.

Other products exported are: glass, paper and paperboard, pharmaceuticals, mechanical machinery, vehicles and tractors, textile articles, liquid and alcoholic beverages, milk and pastry, electrical machinery and apparatus, processed food products.

In an interview with the daily El Watan on December 3, 2015, Ali Bey Nasri, president of Anexal, deplores "the lack of a national strategy targeting the African market, a lack of knowledge of regulations, distribution channels, sectoral needs, etc. ".

It also notes "the absence of trade agreements with the economic areas (UEMOA, Comesa, Cédéao, Cémac) as well as a deficit in agreements for the promotion and mutual protection of investments (APPI)". Ali Bey Nasri calls for a double action on the African continent through the revision of the 14/04 regulation of the Bank of Algeria, support for operators by a consortium of public banks (or) a single bank on target markets, lobbying donors who finance major structural projects in Africa, etc.

The president of Anexal suggests the establishment of a revolving credit line with Niger which would constitute a platform for dissemination of Algerian products to Nigeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali and Chad, as well as the opening of a free zone or bonded warehouse in Tamanrasset to capture the demands of border countries.

In order to rectify the situation, it is necessary to readjust the banking regulations and allow Algerian public and private investors to carry out transactions in foreign currency, provided that profitability and return in foreign currency are demonstrated. Among the obstacles, it is quoted the absence of a logistics chain, adapted financing instruments, an Algerian banking presence in African lands, insurance for prospecting, installation and credit to Africa. export.

Morocco has increased its presence in sub-Saharan Africa both commercially and in terms of investment since 2009. Trade with this part of the African continent recorded an annual growth of 12.8% between 2000 and 2015. This evolution should not hide that the weight of Sub-Saharan Africa in Morocco's foreign trade is relatively low when compared with the

European Union (56.7%) and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region and North Africa) (15.3%). The freight problems associated with low levels of infrastructure raise the costs of trade as a percentage of export values. Figure 11 incorporates the notion of distance between countries in the valuation of trade costs.

Figure 11. Trade costs as a percentage of export values (average 2009-2015) in African countries



Source : Escap World Bank : International Trade Costs

Other pitfalls are to be deplored, such as the weakness of African banking and financial intermediation or the non-application of commercial protocols. However, Morocco has concluded with its neighbors trade and tariff agreements, agreements based on the most-favored-nation clause or multilateral agreements.

Most of these agreements have not yet entered into force, as have multilateral agreements such as the Trade and Investment Agreement with the Economic and Monetary Union of West Africa (UEMOA) initialed in 2008. The gradual establishment of free trade areas with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Economic and Monetary Community of Central African States (CEMAC) is under way negotiation.

Some deplore that these trade relations between Morocco and sub-Saharan Africa benefit Morocco more. All that is needed is to observe Figure 12: the Kingdom's trade balance with the continent has been in surplus since 2008. The balance actually reached $ 992.3 million in 2015 (ie 1% of GDP) after recording $ 1,091.5 million and $ 981.5 million in 2014 and 2013.

While Morocco's exports to sub-Saharan Africa have been growing steadily since 2009, imports followed a downward trend initially, between 2012 and 2014, to rebound in 2015, recording a growth rate of 70%.

Figure 12. Exports, imports and trade balance of Morocco with sub-Saharan Africa between 1999 and 2015



Source : Bases de données Wits et Comtrade

Figure 13. Morocco's Exports, Imports and Trade Balance with Sub-Saharan Africa



Source: Wits and Comtrade Databases

As shown in Figure 13 below, the index of concentration of Moroccan exports to sub-Saharan Africa is experiencing periods of rise and fall, with three peaks in 2001, 2004 and 2012. Note that three main partners of Morocco exports stand out in 2015: Côte d'Ivoire, Senegal and Ethiopia.

Figure 14. Concentration index and number of products exported by Morocco to sub-Saharan Africa between 1995 and 2014



Source: Unctad

Figure 15. Bilateral export concentration index between Morocco and sub-Saharan Africa



Source: Unctad

Figure 16. Morocco's Exports to Africa by Country and Complementarity Index in 2013 and 2015



Source: UNCTAD and WITS

The Moroccan example teaches us that the Arab countries should carry out extremely fine market studies in order to identify the branches and products to be imported or exported in order to consolidate complementarities and explore other mutually profitable trade matrices. whose comparative advantages are obvious.

Royal visits and high-level diplomacy alongside major Moroccan groups have helped the Kingdom of Morocco to make its way, not without pitfalls but promising, to a sustainable establishment. In 2014, Morocco's direct investment in Africa grew by 52.3% in new projects compared to the previous year.

In 2015, Morocco became a net investor in sub-Saharan Africa: it receives 40% of Moroccan FDI (see figure 17 below). The kingdom ranks fourth behind Kenya, South Africa and Nigeria.

Figure 17. Evolution of FDI flows out of Morocco to sub-Saharan Africa and the rest of the world as a percentage of total outward FDI between 2011 and 2015



Source: Exchange Office, 2016

The main destinations of Moroccan FDI between 2011 and 2015 are Ivory Coast (30%), Mauritius (16%), Mali (12%), Cameroon (9%), Nigeria (8%) Senegal (6%), Gabon (5%), Congo (4%), Togo (3%), Burkina Faso (2%) and Guinea (2%). Morocco has relaxed its regulation of investments of Moroccan companies abroad in the limit of 3 million euros per year for legal persons having at least three years of activity, provided that the company's accounting is certified by an external auditor and the projected investment is directly related to the investor's activity.

In December 2015, the transferable amount for investments abroad was increased to reach a ceiling of € 10 million for Africa and € 5 million for other continents. In addition, a fund of 2 million euros was created to strengthen the presence of Moroccan private operators on the African market (see website of the Office des Changes du Maroc).

Figure 18. Distribution by country of Moroccan FDI to sub-Saharan Africa between 2011 and 2015

Figure 19. Structure of Moroccan FDI to sub-Saharan Africa in 2011, by sector





Source: Exchange Office, 2016

Moroccan FDI in Sub-Saharan Africa is targeted towards high value-added sectors, such as banking, telecommunications and industry, and is led by companies and banks such as Maroc Telecom, Attijariwafa Bank, BMCE, BCP and RAM. According to Figure 19, the banking sector remains the largest recipient of FDI. The share of the telecommunications sector increased from 9% in 2011 to 21% in 2015 (telecoms thus gaining second place) while that of the industry sector fell from 22% to 12% between the two years considered. . FDI to the real estate sector achieved significant growth: its share rose from 2% to 11%, placing it in fourth place.

Other agreements currently underway could change the situation. The megaproject gas pipeline linking Morocco and Nigeria is one and not the least. Following the royal visit to Nigeria, the OCP group reached an agreement with the Dangote group, a powerful African conglomerate owned by Aliko Dangote. The agreement provides for the construction of a fertilizer platform in Nigeria, fueled by Moroccan phosphate and Nigerian gas. This is an investment of 2.5 billion US dollars already committed by both groups. The initial annual capacity is 1 million tonnes by 2018. It could be increased to 2 million tonnes at market demand. In order to secure the supply of phosphate fertilizers for the next three years, the OCP Group has signed a memorandum of understanding with the Nigerian Association of Fertilizer Producers and Distributors (Fepsan).

Another major agreement was signed on May 15, 2017, relating to the Nigeria-Morocco gas pipeline project. This pipeline will have a direct positive impact on more than 300 million people, accelerating electrification projects throughout the West Africa region, thus contributing to the emergence of a regional market electricity.

Seeking further anchorage on African lands, Morocco has formally requested membership of ECOWAS. The kingdom is the largest investor in the UEMOA subregion and the second largest investor in ECOWAS. On the assets of this country, several projects structuring regional integration such as the construction of the Tangier-Dakar road, the participation in the construction of the Rosso bridge on the Senegal River, the pipeline project, the project of the industry of fertilizers ...

In order to achieve this integration with the ECOWAS, Morocco has rights-benefits and duties. First, it must adapt its standards and convergence criteria to those of this community, welcome citizens of the region in the name of the free movement of goods and people, open its market to countries adhering to the ECOWAS and allow them to access European markets and those of the Gulf countries. In return, the kingdom would have access to an economic zone of 15 countries with a GDP of 700 billion US dollars and a population of over 350 million, significant mineral resources and promising agricultural and agribusiness potential. Moroccan companies and banks could benefit, like their counterparts in ECOWAS, from preferential tariffs and favorable regulations on investments.

It is estimated that 37.3% of Moroccan exports to sub-Saharan Africa were directed towards the members of the ECOWAS in 2016. This region is the main destination of Moroccan exports.

Moroccan imports consist of hydrocarbons and manufactured and food products. Morocco has already signed eight bilateral investment agreements with eight member countries.

Third subpart. The European Union: the historic partner

The great challenge of employment can be solved only in the context of the industrialization of the Maghreb countries, the diversification of their economies, the transition from an archaic agriculture to an agro-industry capable of ensuring food self-sufficiency and the satisfaction of local markets. Currently, Maghreb countries are experiencing food price fluctuations that have blazed after the 2008 crisis when capital has shifted to speculation on commodities and commodities taking advantage of cash injected under QE1 (Quantitative easing 1).
Following the global subprime financial crisis, the United States launched QE1 and QE2 transactions in the form of $ 600 billion in government repurchase of government real estate assets. The cash injected by the US monetary authorities was not used to finance the economy but was channeled to the markets for raw materials and agricultural products. Hence the price of the latter, which has negatively impacted the purchasing power of people in developed countries and those in developing countries.

While Tunisia is not far from food self-sufficiency, Morocco suffered drought in 2012 and imported cereals and other commodities. As for Algeria, the deficit in its non-hydrocarbon trade balance is largely due to massive imports of agricultural goods and other food products. Without the oil and gas rent, the country would go through a dramatic crisis and could not feed its population. Algeria, whose food deficit is 80%, is the largest importer of cereals in the world. Maghreb countries import manufactured goods, final goods, and almost all their capital goods.

The lobbying of the "barons of imports", the naivety of the leaders, the self-censorship inflicted by the experts are all factors that have prevented the industrialization and diversification of these economies. Without advocating protectionism, I am proposing a real plan to promote agricultural and industrial activities aimed at import substitution, meeting the needs of the single internal market and re-export within the economic zone or abroad. These developmentist options could have been amplified by all the regional cooperation structures such as Euromed, Barcelona 5 + 5, the Union of Sahel States, the Union for the Mediterranean, the Gulf Cooperation Council ...

The Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) brings together the twenty-eight Member States of the European Union and fifteen Mediterranean partner countries from North Africa, the Middle East and South-East Europe. Its general secretariat is located in Barcelona.
The UPM was founded on July 13, 2008 at the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean. This intergovernmental organization aims to strengthen the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (Euromed) set up in 1995 under the name of the Barcelona Process.
This Union promotes regional economic integration, strengthening new North-South and South-South relations by linking stability, security, human development and sustainable development. The projects promoted by the UPM are: "Business Development", "Higher Education and Research", "Civil and Social Affairs", "Energy and Climate Action", "Transport and Urban Development", "Water and Environment" .

Other examples include the Med4Jobs Job Creation Initiative, a cross-sector flagship project, or the Urban Projects Initiative (UPFI), which includes innovative urban development projects aimed at achieving a high socio-economic impact through strategic infrastructures.
Since 2012, nearly 50 projects have been labeled after 300 expert forums and ministerial meetings attended by 25,000 stakeholders from the region.

This initiative is the advanced format of the Barcelona Process, which follows the Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference, which was held from 27 to 28 November 1995 under the chairmanship of Jacques Chirac. As such, the European Union co defines a work program on topics of common interest with ten Mediterranean Sea states: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey and the Palestinian Authority; Libya and Iraq have observer status.

The results could have been multiplied if the Maghreb states had negotiated in a single block, according to the principle of "unity is strength". On the contrary, the divisions and the every man for himself, even the rivalries between Morocco and Algeria, disconcerted their vis-à-vis organized in economic communities, especially the European Union, main partner and major strike force. Every Maghreb country has tried to do well, not only without taking into account the interests of its neighbors, but also at their expense. The prevailing adage is "I do not win, but there is no question of letting you win". It is a constant that does not honor its protagonists. These will be judged by future generations as having not been the stuff of great statesmen, visionaries and placing the interest of their respective countries before the personal interests and those of their entourages.

However, the North Africans are not the only ones responsible for the failure of North-South integrationist processes of the Mediterranean. For geostrategic reasons and under pressure from the Germans, the EU has channeled funding and major projects to Eastern European countries. The latter have become subcontractors for the German industry, a source of labor, trained and low cost, and a rising consumer market. Southern Mediterranean countries have been mistakenly considered to be social dumping competitors (see Montebourg's report on French relocation centers in Morocco) and issuers of illegal immigration. Spain has, since joining the EEC, been doing everything possible to minimize the arrival of agricultural products in Europe, most of which compete with its own. Fisheries agreements between Morocco and the EU have benefited Spanish trawlers more than Moroccans.

The Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) estimated on 27 February 2018 that the fisheries agreement concluded between the European Union (EU) and Morocco is not applicable to the adjacent waters of the disputed region of Western Sahara because it does not respect the right to self-determination of the "Saharawi people". This decision augurs a new era where any association or institution may bring an action against trade agreements laboriously negotiated by democratically elected bodies; the European Parliament and Council.

Free trade or sectoral agreements have been unfavorable to the Maghreb countries. The case of Moroccan cherry tomatoes banned in Europe for "health reasons" shows the weakness of the position of a single trader country.

Each country believes it is possible to get the most out of its neighbors by dissociating itself from them, but comes to understand that in all negotiations, the EU will give priority to its members. The political conflicts between Morocco and Algeria place these two countries in a vulnerable position, leading them to make concessions to the great powers and to beg their leniency. This is the story of bickering in a school class where the master or the teacher is constantly asked for his refereeing. It is time that the Maghreb leaders grow up and solve their problems between them.

Chapter 1. Algeria-France Economic Relations

Why does Algeria import most of its needs? In the aftermath of independence, the country has created an economic fabric based on heavy industry inspired by the Soviet model and proposals by Gerard Destanne de Bernis on the theme of industrializing industry. The steel complex of El Hadjar, big companies like SNVI, PMA, Eniem, BCR, Saidal, Naftal, Sonatrach, SNTA, ENTP, Giplait, Enie and Cnan participated in this logic. It is not absurd that the State is at the origin of a daring industrial policy, as was the case in France, but provided that public entities have a large autonomy of decision and management criteria meeting the requirements of the market. This was not the case and the State has all regented: sales prices, salary grid, budget allocations, staffing ...

The fact of having restrained the creation of private companies did not favor the development of outsourcing. Supply requirements for spare parts, semi-finished products and intermediate goods appeared. Hence the need to import them: 80% of small and medium quantity imports came from French companies, especially SMEs. Of the 66 countries that our association Amie (Association Montreuilloise for the initiative of the companies) prospected, it is Algeria which was the most promising market. Every year, from 1986 to 2008, I was able to support hundreds of companies in eastern Paris. Even during the black decade, we had marked our presence at the international fair in Algiers, with admittedly fewer companies.

There are many reasons for this: geographical proximity, human affinities, the links created by population flows on both sides of the Mediterranean, not to mention that most Algerian companies and industrial plants used engineering. French. Large contracts, on the other hand, required public intervention and sometimes suffered political hazards.

The top eight French export positions are motor vehicles, pharmaceuticals, petroleum refining products, cereals, machinery for mining and construction, dairy products and cheese, computers and peripheral equipment, motor vehicle accessories. They concentrate about 60% of total French exports to Algeria in value over the period considered.

Algeria is back from a place in the ranking of non-OECD customers in France where it is now ranked fourth behind China, Russia, but also Singapore. However, France remains the largest supplier to Algeria with a market share reduced to 18.74%, whereas until the early 2000s this figure exceeded 25%. This fall is explained by the aggressiveness of China (which saw its market share increase by 3.56 points, to 10.98%) but also by the weakening of the French industrial offer.

In value, French exports to Algeria amount to 10.060 billion US dollars. China is the second largest supplier to Algeria with 6.414 billion US dollars. Italy occupies the third place with a volume equivalent to 3.896 billion US dollars, or 9.69% of global imports. Being Algeria's 4th largest supplier, Spain recorded a volume of 2.627 billion US dollars, which represents 6.53% of total imports. Germany ranks fifth on Algeria's supplier list, with a volume equivalent to US $ 2.345 billion, or 5.83% of total imports. The United States is Algeria's sixth supplier with a volume of 2.148 billion dollars, or 5.34% of Algerian imports.

French investments (excluding hydrocarbons) are the most important. They reached $ 2.5 billion and could become even more important if the projects under negotiation (notably a new Lafarge cement plant and a Sanofi biotechnology center) materialized. The most important nonetheless remains that of the steam-cracking complex in Arzew, near Oran, between Total and the state-owned Sonatrach: an investment of 5 billion dollars. But the project stumbles on the determination of the price of the gas intended for the complex.

French investments, although under-represented in the hydrocarbon sector, are quite diversified and cover agri-food and industry as well as services. French companies in Algeria contribute to economic development, with 35,000 direct jobs and nearly 100,000 indirect jobs. French banks (Societe Generale, BNP and Natixis) settled in Algeria long before the introduction in 2009 of the 51 % -49%. They are doing good business (Societe Generale is Algeria's leading private bank), although they have sometimes complained about the brakes put on the expansion of their branch networks. According to the figures of the embassy France, at the end of 2010, 71% of French investments in North Africa were made in Morocco (9.1 billion euros) against 15% in Algeria (1.9 billion euros), 7% in Libya (884 million euros) and 7% in Tunisia (842 million euros).

Chapter 2. The Renault plant in Algeria: the conditions for its efficiency

When we follow this project from end to end, we realize that the construction of a Renault car factory in Morocco has given rise to a feeling of misunderstanding in Algeria. Why this group which sells for decades on the Algerian market vehicles all ranges confused settles with the neighbor to manufacture 200 000 units there in 2012 and 2013 and to reach 400 000 units by 2014/2015? Especially since renault is an important and historic supplier of the Algerian market

The project is located on 300 hectares with all the facilities. The Logdy family vehicle, the latest from Dacia, the low-cost branch of the Renault group, will be manufactured in this new factory. Intended primarily for emerging markets, it will also be marketed in Europe. This unit, taking advantage of the low cost of labor, is expected to create 6,000 direct and 30,000 indirect jobs in Tangiers (Morocco).

The cost of the project is 1.1 billion euros. The equity capital committed for this project, capital and current accounts, amounted to 240 million euros, divided between Renault Nissan France and the Moroccan Deposit and Management Fund (CDG), respectively at 51% and 49%. The financial contribution of the French car manufacturer is limited to 122.4 million euros against 117.6 for CDG, contributing 11.12% of the 1.1 billion euros, the most important is its contribution in technologies and know-how. Morocco, for its part, provides site facilities, infrastructure and training. It remains to confirm the impact of this factory on the creation of a fabric of SMEs subcontractors.

Renault's project in Algeria plans to produce 25,000 units, mainly for the Algerian market, which, in terms of profitability, is below all standards. Renault plans to catch up by imposing on the Algerian government to ban other manufacturers from setting up in Algeria for a period of three years, which is contrary to the rules of free competition concluded between Algeria and the European Union. In addition, Renault's production will be limited to the Symbol brand, a model derived from the latest Logan.

This is obviously the price to pay a group that is used to dominate with its capital structure while the Algerian investment code imposes the rule of 49% -51%, the Algerian state is the majority. In addition, the jobs announced by the public authorities (8,000 direct and 20,000 indirect jobs) will be subsidized by the Algerian Treasury, because the breakeven point of such an operation for the costs to be covered by the revenues is 300,000. units per year, which will increase depreciation for at least four to five years.

This raises the question of the 42% integration rate announced by the Algerian government: it can only be held over a long period of time if it creates a fabric of industrial SMEs / SMIs delivering inputs to a world-renowned manufacturer. will not fail to impose draconian quality standards on its subcontractors. It's about his credibility and the safety of the vehicles produced under his brand. Volkswagen has had all the equipment and machinery producing the equipment changed by the Chinese companies in Jilin Province for the manufacture of the Audi in partnership with the Chinese manufacturer FAW.

I remain convinced that the only significant market that is of critical size to accommodate large-scale foreign investment will be an economically integrated Maghreb area. A Maghreb economic community would have 85 to 100 million inhabitants with an extension on Africa and Arabic-speaking countries. Maghreb companies could reach the threshold compatible with the criteria of efficiency and profitability. Let us not forget that the failure of the industrializing industry and the weak integration of public companies like SNVI (industrial vehicles), PMA (tractors and agricultural tools), Eniem (household appliances) as well as the iron and steel complex of El Hadjar s' explain by mismanagement but also because they have been configured for a much larger market than the Algerian market.

Chapter 3. European Union-Africa relations to be modified

Relations between Algeria and France have been punctuated by passions, painful memories but also human links woven over the years by Algerians coming to settle in France to work or to start a family. Some of them are binational, most have children and even grandchildren. Algerian entrepreneurs have approached 80% of French SMEs for their supply of intermediate goods, capital goods, semi-finished goods and consumer goods as well as for vehicles and household electrical goods.

These "small contracts" which made France the leading supplier of Algeria with market shares exceeding 28% were facilitated by the geographical proximity, the linguistic facility, the human flows in both directions at the origin of financial flows on the parallel foreign exchange market.

Since 1986, I have witnessed these relationships where the Algerian importer could go and find foreign currency in Parisian cafes and restaurants, and more generally in France, held by binates whose relatives received the equivalent in dinars with a bonus that could reach double the official rate. Imports by tote bags and vehicle purchases have given way to a better organized and more industrialized system.

On the other hand, in a country dominated by the public sector, large contracts are only traded at a high level. The language barrier and financial availability are not a criterion of choice; it is other interests that take precedence, whether particular or geostrategic.

The French presence was strong until 2012. The hundreds of companies exhibiting under French flag on thousands of m2 ceased their exchanges or prolonged them in a confidential form, in the airports or in Paris. The association Amie (of which I was the general manager) and the city of Montreuil were the only foreign exhibitors at the Fair of Algiers in the 1990s.

We have developed the concept of partnership and mutually beneficial cooperation between the companies of our region and their Algerian counterparts. Several SMEs have created joint ventures. Among the companies that we accompanied, I can mention Go Fast became Aigle Azur, Sofresid, Saint-Gobain, Quinette Gallay, CR2J, Hallier Process, Aucouturier ...

I allow myself this historic detour to recall that the future of Algerian-French relations must go in the direction we had imagined: mutually beneficial and sustainable co-productions with transfers of technologies and know-how. I defended the idea that the way out of Europe's crisis would be through new relations with the South of the Mediterranean. Germany has relied on Eastern European countries as a basis for industrial subcontracting and productive investment, at the same time as it has been able to sell its capital goods and consumer products. It's win-win. France should not consider the Maghreb countries as potential competitors but as partners whose level of development is a factor in expanding markets and creating new wealth.

In the late 1980s and in the 1990s, when the deputy and mayor of Montreuil, Jean Pierre Brard, defended at the French National Assembly a gas contract favorable to Algeria or when he intervened to correct the bad rating of Algeria by Coface, he also thought about the companies of his city and the future of trade relations between the two countries.

It is unfortunate that the big French groups took exaggerated precautions during the black decade. In 1985, France held 15% market share on the continent and China 5%. In 2005, the proportions were the same ... but reversed. France's relationship with the African continent should have been part of a historical, geographical, linguistic and cultural continuity. But by being content with the politics of networks and zones of influence, France plays the gendarme on behalf of other states that play their game like China, India, Japan, the United States, even Germany. These countries have launched large-scale projects in Africa, such as Japan, which plans to invest $ 30 billion over three years.

My little history as an international development consultant for companies in eastern Paris is enlightening. When we had agreed with the Algerian authorities to participate in the International Fair of Algiers (FIA), in May 1986, during an exploratory mission led by Jean-Pierre Brard, then deputy and mayor of Montreuil, it was under the sign of mutually beneficial cooperation and partnership. The French Embassy in Algiers and the Foreign Trade Minister of the time, Michel Noir, mocked this speech before returning to the beginning of 1990. Since then, the FIA has always been a partnership.

The first participation of the city of Montreuil to the FIA, under my direction, brought together 20 companies Montreuilloises, exhibiting on a collective stand in the pavilion France. In June 1988, it reached 30 companies; in 1994, 40 companies.

Between 1995 and 1999, Montreuil continued to participate in the fairs of Algiers with a remarkable collective stand. Foreign participation was considerably reduced. The fair in Algiers was declared international, thanks to the participation of our association and some British and French companies (barely a dozen). Under my responsibility, the Montreal Association for Business Initiative (Amie) participated in forums on foreign investment in Algiers in 1997 and 1999, while Algeria was in full civil war. This approach attracted the sympathy of the Algerian authorities and economic operators. From 1999, Amie participated in the FIA in the flag France which had 350 small and medium sized French companies, while large multinationals, fearing for the safety of their staff, did not move.

L'Amie continued to benefit from its positions in favor of partnership and new North-South relations vis-à-vis Coface and public, parastatal or private institutions. The loyalty of our association, as to the continuity of its action in Algeria despite the events of the 1990s, was highly appreciated. From this commitment came mixed Franco-Algerian companies, an emulation to invest and exchange with Algeria and profitable markets for our members. It was win-win. Small and medium-sized companies that had never left France were able to conclude contracts, transfer technology and increase their markets, while contributing to economic development and employment in Algeria.
The condescension and arrogance of certain diplomatic and economic circles have not allowed France to keep its market share.

The Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) signed between the EU and several African states in 2016 tend to lower tariffs and other taxes. They allow up to 83% of their markets to be opened up to European imports. In return, African countries can export to the European market without having to pay certain taxes. Several countries, including Kenya, have rejected

EPAs, exposing themselves to significant taxation of their exportable products as of October 1, 2016, which has negatively impacted their businesses. As a result, the Kenyan authorities succumbed to pressure and accepted these agreements in November 2016. Andrew Mold, Economic Analyst for Eastern Africa at the UN, sharply criticized the EPAs for being a long-term threat for the African economy. He stressed that "African states can not compete with an economy like Germany's. Free trade and competition from European imports is a danger for existing businesses and will prevent the creation of new businesses. " "The EPA strengthens African markets," says German MEP Michael Gahler.

The European Commission has insisted that 20% of African products will remain protected in the long term. The EPA could be added to development aid by creating jobs and intensifying political dialogue with the EU, says the Commission. European countries felt that their markets were open to former colonies without them doing the same on their own markets.

In 2007 the EU initiated the Cotonou Agreement with 79 African countries, leading to the negotiation of free trade agreements between the European and African continents. These initiatives came in response to the World Trade Organization's (WTO) 2000 condemnation of previous agreements deemed illegal.

The EU has signed the "Everything But Arms" agreement with 37 very poorly developed countries, allowing them to benefit from preferential access to the European market without any free trade agreement being signed. These countries can export any product that does not belong to the arms sector to Europe without paying customs duties. As a result, non-accession to the EPA has no economic consequences for them.

Some MEPs like Ska Keller nevertheless believe that the EPA will undermine regional trade and leave partner countries with no opportunity to develop their industry or create jobs and thus reduce the poverty of their citizens. "It is a sword of Damocles weighing on the developing countries: if they do not sign the EPA, their access to the European market is reduced. This agreement is the opposite of development cooperation, "she denounces. The European Union is the largest donor of public funds in the world, but the successive crises of 2008 and 2011 have made some countries hesitate to continue their programs of support to African countries and NGOs that provide valuable support to the people. During my missions in sub-Saharan Africa, I was able to measure the weight of public or private institutions in favor of the most disadvantaged, not to mention their role in the education, training and health of Africans.

According to Jean-Louis Vielajus, President of Coordination Sud, the national coordination of French NGOs of international solidarity, speaking during a debate organized in the Senate on May 15, 2009: "the objective to bring public aid 0.56% of European wealth will not be [...] reached, Italy has cut aid by more than 50% and France is sluggish. It must be recognized that "virtuous states" such as the United Kingdom and Spain have not lowered the amount granted to developing countries.

The decline in European aid is causing more difficulties for poor countries, as emphasized by the president of Coordination Sud: there are "one billion undernourished people" and "one hundred million additional people living on less than a dollar a day ". "The financial crisis does not come from the South but it undergoes it," summarizes Jean-Louis Vielajus. The economic partnership between the European Union and the African, Caribbean and Pacific

(ACP) countries is not 100% win-win. But the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) seems to be content with its agreement with the EU under the EPA.

At the end of September 2014 EPAs were to replace the non-reciprocal trade preferences granted by the EU to West African countries under the Cotonou Agreement of June 2000.
From 1 October 2014, countries that have not finalized negotiations with the EU would no longer benefit from the exemption from customs duties and quotas for their products exported to the European Union. They would switch to the general system of developing countries, which is less advantageous. The ECOWAS has obtained that the degree of market opening to European exports is 75% over a period of twenty years in exchange for unrestricted access to the European market, almost completed, while Brussels claimed 80% in solidarity with some Member States, including France, Ireland, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.
Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana ratified the interim EPAs during the summer of 2016. The two countries will have the same access to the European market as the regional EPA and in the long term envisage a 89% liberalization of the tariff lines by the Côte d'Ivoire. Ivory and 80% by Ghana, spread over a period of fifteen years.
Nigeria benefits under the Generalized Scheme of Preferences (GSP) from a reduction in European tariffs on one third of products and a total exemption of customs duties on one-third of additional products. The 12 countries with LDC status (Least Developed Countries) benefit from the GSP, which grants them access to the European market without any rights or quotas, except for weapons.

If we consider the volume of trade between the EU and the ACP countries in 2014, 38% were with the West Africa region. European imports from West Africa (€ 37 billion in 2014) consist of agricultural products, fisheries and oil (mainly from Nigeria). European exports to these countries (31 billion euros in 2014), of which 37% to Nigeria, consist mainly of capital goods.

For some economists, the free trade zone between partners who are not at equal levels of development leads to unfair competition. Thus, the GDP of the EU members is 31 times higher than that of the ACP countries. These agreements would even tend to weaken the still nascent industries, which are destined to develop. From 1995 to 2015, the market share of African products exported to the EU was 2.7%. It rose to 2.2% in 2015. African products are not competitive in the European market. But the correlation between these agreements and the decline in African exports is not proven.

European agricultural goods (which benefit from subsidies under the Common Agricultural Policy) are more competitive and of better quality than those of ACP countries. John Nzenze estimated on the site Africapostnews on March 16, 2017 that the African States signatories of the ACP agreements had lost $ 2.9 billion of tax revenue in their trade with the EU, which impacts the budgets of the States. In doing so, "in case of free trade, EU exports would increase by 17.6% while African exports would only increase by 5.5 billion euros. The trade balance would deteriorate by 1.8 billion euros.

For some experts, there is reason to fear an increase in rural poverty, a worsening of illegal immigration as well as a destructuring of the industry.
West Africa did not get the additional funds for its economic development, which it estimated at 15 billion euros. The EU has only paid 6.5 billion but no additional funds. LDCs that had full and non-reciprocal access to the European market, apart from weapons, had to agree to open their markets further to European societies. Contrary to what the Commission says, the

loss of customs revenue for African countries has not been offset by the rise in GDP caused by trade liberalization.

In their report, French Customs estimates that French exports to the Maghreb account for 3.1% of total sales, of which 44% to Algeria, 29% to Morocco and 27% to Tunisia. In an article published by Fabien Piliu on December 11, 2014 in the Tribune, the author notes: "Between 1998 and 2005, the European Union (EU) concluded agreements with the Maghreb countries, in order to progressively liberalize trade in the Mediterranean area ". Thus, the EU with 58% of Maghreb exports in 2012 is the first customer and the largest supplier of the Maghreb with 52% of purchases. France remains the largest partner country in the Maghreb, with 13.5 billion euros in exports in 2013, or 15.2% of market share, ahead of Spain (10.6%) and China (10%). 1%). He adds: "However, the EU is losing momentum and loses 14 points of market share between 2003 and 2012, mainly France (- 11 points). In contrast, China is gaining ground among suppliers and now ranks 3rd (5th in 2003) with a 4.4% market share. " All sectors are concerned.

Between 2003 and 2013, French positions declined regardless of the technological level. "This is particularly the case of high technology where nevertheless they resist better thanks to the aeronautical performances", observe the French Customs (Art.cit.). The decline is even more significant for exports of pharmaceutical products: France lost 17 points of market share since 2003, to the benefit of Switzerland and Belgium, while remaining the leading supplier of the Maghreb with a weight of 44% in 2012.
France is losing ground in Africa to China in sectors such as computers, telecommunications, medium technology products such as machinery, household appliances and commercial vehicles. While the two major French car producers consolidate their global positions, their market shares are falling sharply for passenger cars in favor of Germany and Spain. Their positions are also crumbling for sales of engines and commercial vehicles for the benefit of China.

Chemistry remains untouched by this increased competition. However, the trade balance of France with the Maghreb remains in surplus with 2.1 billion euros in 2013, while it is structurally deficit with the emerging countries of the Asian zone. The total French exports is only 3.1%, but given the recurrence of the positive balance of the trade balance, the Hexagon has every interest to defend its economic positions in North Africa, given the weight of its GDP and its population. Strategic errors have been made by the French authorities as well as by the major French groups and institutions promoting foreign trade.

During my travels in West Africa, the presidents of the French chambers of commerce present in the countries of the region described me the process of acquisitions of the French companies by Lebanese or the Aga Khan deploring the lack of flexibility and the the inability of the French to establish relations on an equal footing with their African counterparts. The Lebanese businessmen (many of them were my masters students at the ESG in Abidjan and other schools) considered themselves Africans immersed in the adoption society and adapted to local cultures. It is not the Chinese who have carved out French croupiers, they are the ones who have scuttled themselves, believing themselves on conquered ground in the former colonies. The companies that have managed to keep their market share, there are some, are those that have become acculturated.

Yet, attitudes and mindsets change. At the level of higher education, professional licenses integrate civilizations, cultures, methods of approaching foreign markets. At the economic services level of the embassies, with few exceptions, the petit fours and the cocktails, without end, gave way to the presence in the field and the pragmatism as for the relations with the economic operators and the local institutions . The participants in these sectors are mostly temporary contractors.

In recent years, I have seen the participation of executives and corporate executives in think tanks and conferences organized by research institutes and public and private organizations. I am convinced that the best way to develop its markets in Africa is to establish and produce locally, either to expand its markets, or to sell in neighboring countries or re-export to France or the United States. European Union.

According to the agency Invest in Morocco, the average salary in Morocco is 327 dollars per month, "almost ten times less than the average salary in Spain." Consequence: the bilateral trade balance between France and the Maghreb could go into the red, if this trend continues as exports fall mechanically. According to the website: http://lekiosque.finances.gouv.fr/ as of December 2014, citing the French customs, the subsidiaries of French companies, excluding banks and insurance companies, generated a turnover comparable to the amount of exports, or 13.4 billion. Morocco leads with 7.2 billion euros, followed by Algeria (3.9 billion euros) and Tunisia (2.3 billion euros). "The ratio between the turnover of local subsidiaries and the amount of exports is higher in Morocco (1.6) than in Algeria (0.7) and Tunisia (0.6)," say Customs.

French direct investment in the Maghreb has grown since 2003 twice as fast as all French investments in the world. They have tripled in ten years, peaking at 11.2 billion in 2012. The shereef kingdom totals 8.5 billion, ranking second recipient African country of foreign direct investment (FDI) after South Africa. Morocco has received since this year 8.3% of global investments for Africa. "It is, along with Brazil and China, one of the top three emerging countries where French companies invest the most. Over the last decade, French FDI flows represent on average more than 40% of the total flows of FDI received by Morocco, well beyond the United Arab Emirates (25%), "say French Customs.

French investments in Algeria are far behind those of Kuwait (23% of FDI against 7% for France, or 1.9 billion euros).
In future relations between France and Africa, it will be necessary to use the linguistic vector. In 2050, Africa will have 800 million Francophones (or three quarters of Francophones in the world) out of a population of 2.5 billion. It is estimated that 20% of world trade is made by French-speaking states. Linguistic proximity favors reconciliations in the fields of education, training, engineering, data exchange, technology transfer and know-how. The investment in the digital world must bring out world-class competitiveness clusters, thanks to the emergence of interconnected French-speaking metropolises.

Chapter 4. Relations between Africa and France

In a report entitled Partnership for the Future, recommended by the French Ministry of the Economy and Finance and published in 2013, fifteen proposals were made to promote "a new economic dynamic between Africa and France, which is anchored in a change of perception and attitude of France towards Africa, Africans and Franco-Africans ". To do this, the new partnership should be based on the promotion of mutual economic interests, while ensuring that France takes "the measure of the economic and social emergence of Africa, which will be one of the major hubs of 21st century globalization ".

In his speech on the river dedicated to a new Europe open to the world, delivered at the Sorbonne on September 27, 2017, the French president proposed a new African policy. Emmanuel Macron said he was willing to pay development aid all the resources of the tax on financial transactions he wants to extend to all Europe. He also advocated for a strategic partnership with Africa.

The observation is straightforward: the most robust borders will not be able to stem the migration that lasts. "Only the stabilization and development of the countries of origin will dry up them. What feeds the great contemporary migrations are the inequalities that have settled and the crises that ensue from them ".

The President of the Republic recalled that so far the initiatives of European countries have been scattered and uncoordinated. "But more broadly, our European policy should no longer see Africa as a threatening neighbor, but as the strategic partner with which we face the challenges of tomorrow: youth employment, mobility, the fight against climate change, technological revolutions ".

Mr Macron considers that the French partnership with Africa should be part of a reformed European project and suggests reviewing the technical arrangements that would prevent one country from being penalized in relation to another.

The partnership with Africa must lead to the foundation of a vast project based on cross-investments, on education, health and energy. The French president pushes the point: "If Europe does not seize this chance, others will do it, and if no one does, Europe alone will suffer all the consequences".

I think that France must stop overvaluing "the African risk", focus on shared growth and see Africa as a commodity or consumer market. Among the controversial topics, the monetary relationship between France and the franc zones. Indeed, the CFA franc was created on December 26, 1945, after the Second World War, by General de Gaulle.

In his book "Exit Africa from Monetary Servitude: Who benefits from the CFA franc? Demba Moussa Dembélé castigates this single currency and its failure to facilitate regional integration, arguing that trade between UEMOA member countries does not exceed 15% of their total trade. In Cemac (in Central Africa), these exchanges are less than 10%. In terms of development, of the 14 African countries that use the CFA franc, 10 are classified as "least developed countries" (LDCs) by the United Nations. And their development indicators are among the lowest in the world, according to the United Nations Development Program (UNDP).

Countries are required to deposit half of their foreign exchange reserves with the French Treasury.

During my travels in West Africa (since 1996), I noticed and heard the distress of Africans after the 1994 devaluation that was decided in Paris without consultation with African heads of state. Within ECOWAS, only eight countries use the CFA franc. It would be a question of the latter creating by 2020 a single currency integrating Cape Verde, Guinea, The Gambia, Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone.

It is assumed that no country wants to create its own currency, a source of successive forced devaluations and destabilizing inflationary pressures. Sixteen countries use the CFA franc. BEAC (Bank of Central African States) supervises CEMAC (Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa) for the six member states, namely Cameroon, Congo, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Central African Republic and Chad. The BCEAO (Central Bank of West African States) manages the WAEMU (West African Economic and Monetary Union) which includes Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo. In 2005, the two central banks of the franc zone had more than 3,600 billion CFA francs (about 72 billion euros) with the French Treasury. Some people question: is the CFA franc a brake on the development of African countries that use it? What is embarrassing for the defenders of a single African currency is that it is out of reach at the moment.

I found and analyzed the causes of the weak commitment of banks to SMEs and households. This is the story of the egg and the chicken. Bankers, most of whom are representatives of subsidiaries of major international banks, complain about the opacity of information from loan seekers, false accusations and misrepresentations of corporate accounts. Entrepreneurs complain about the lack of risk taking by the banking system. The solution would be to look for the institution of guarantee schemes for bank loans with the support of the central banks of the CFA franc zone and indirectly the French Treasury.

Many SMEs use self-financing to invest, which limits their development; the leverage effect is non-existent. We know that companies that have reached the critical size and some of which have become multinational firms have operated thanks to the existence of more abundant bank and financial financing. In Africa, bank intermediation dominates the financing of the economy due to the weakness of regional stock exchanges. Pending the establishment of a common regional currency, depending on the economic zones, the CFA franc is the optimal solution.

However, several modes of operation of this banking system should be improved. The fixed exchange rate between the euro and the CFA franc creates distortions for African economies. When the euro is overvalued against the dollar, some exportable products are less competitive and vice versa. A depreciation of the euro against the US dollar increases inflation. But a more detailed study on our part highlights the limited impact of changes in the exchange rate of the euro on the economies of the CFA franc zone, for several reasons.

There is almost no price elasticity of demand for most African exportable commodities, as they consist mainly of raw materials whose prices are set in international markets and billed in dollars and do not depend on external demand. Non-oil products from the franc zone countries are exported to the EU, in euros.

The Governor of the Bank of France, François Villeroy de Galhau, said: "We regularly conduct economic studies on the value of the CFA franc in relation to economic levels, on the value of the CFA franc which is neither undervalued, nor overvalued ", quoted by Reuters on September 30, 2016.

For its part, Lucas Abaga Nchama, the governor of the BEAC, said that "the current difficulties of the Cémac, [its growth will not exceed 2% this year (2017), are budgetary and related to exogenous shock caused by falling oil prices. It is hardly a monetary crisis "(quoted by Jeune Afrique on January 16, 2017).

But do the sixteen countries of the franc zone have the capacity to have a single currency other than the CFA? The fact that the Member States of the monetary zone deposit their reserves with the French Treasury is a form of solidarity between them and a guarantee that a single currency will not be created ex nihilo from astronomical amounts of bank notes.

Articles have caricatured this monetary system by giving fanciful figures, as on the site Silicon Africa in January 2014: there is described a "diabolical" system that France would not want to leave, since it would bring "around 500 billion dollars for his treasure each year, from Africa ". But the author, as he himself acknowledges, does not yet have all the details of the amounts, the valuation and the means of payment of this colonial tax. A little later, in the same article, it is moreover "500 billion dollars each year", but a stock of "500 billion currencies of African countries" (sic) that France would hold. It should be noted that these are 0.75% interest-bearing investment reserves, while central banks in Europe serve negative interest rates.

Several virtues of the CFA franc zone are to highlight:
- exchange rate stability ensures that individuals, businesses, banks and investors do not suffer from erratic exchange rate fluctuations and allow visibility in the medium and long term. Indeed, companies do not use the currency hedging mechanism; investors will not be afraid of a fall in the national currency which would depreciate their financial assets,
- unlimited convertibility within the zone,
- controlled inflation rates,
- the possibility of setting interest rates compatible with the desired investment levels,
- the absence of a parallel foreign exchange market,
- the ban on printing money, a factor of hyperinflation and the collapse of the national currency,
- the convertibility of the CFA franc within the regional monetary zone.

Fourth subpart. The architecture of the Trilateral and its perspectives

The international division of labor, inherited from colonization, has made Africa a supplier of raw materials and an importer of finished products. This integration model was imposed on Africa. In this regard, according to data from the WTO (World Trade Organization) for the year 2015, the share of merchandise trade in the formation of GDP in sub-Saharan Africa is estimated at 41.2%. By comparison, this share represents 21.1% for the United States, 35.8% for China and 29.1% for Japan.
For some African countries, the ratio far exceeds the world average of 44.5%, including 144.9% for Congo, 89.3% for Equatorial Guinea, 84.3% for Mozambique, 66.4% for Côte d'Ivoire and 60.3% for Senegal. The ratios of these countries exceed those of France (44.6%) and the United Kingdom (38%) but are comparable to that of Germany (70.7%).

Liberalization has also resulted in deindustrialization in several countries. According to the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), between 1980 and 2009, with the exception of North Africa, the share of manufacturing value added in GDP formation declined by 16%. , 6% to 12.7% in the rest of the continent (ECA, and AU, 2013).
A study, published in May 2013 by the African Development Bank (AfDB) and a North American NGO, Global Financial Integrity (GFI), indicates that the African continent recorded a net outflow of $ 1.4 trillion between 1980 and 2009 (see AfDB-GFI joint report, "Africa suffers from capital flight", in https://www.afdb.org> Home>
.
The Panel's report led by President Thabo Mbeki points out that annual outflows of illicit flows amount to $ 50 billion (ECA, 2015). According to this study, 95% of these trips are related to the activities of multinational companies and criminal activities, while the remaining 5% are related to corruption.
Illicit financial flows increased at a rate of 32.5% from 2000 to 2009, and cumulative flows during this period corresponded almost to all public "aid" received by Africa during this period (CEA , United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 2015).

The purchase of millions of hectares of land, among the most fertile, by multinational firms or foreign countries, questions as to its repercussions for Africa. The countries that facilitated the sale of their land are Nigeria, Guinea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Sudan, Cameroon, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Madagascar, Mozambique , South Africa, Senegal, etc. It is estimated that during the period 2007-2009 between 32 and 50 million hectares were traded, the most affected countries being the DRC (with 8 million hectares), Ethiopia (with 5.3 million hectares), Sudan and Madagascar (Alternatives Sud, 2013, TNI, 2013).

According to the Oxfam International report published in January 2017:
• since 2015, the richest 1% of the population holds as much wealth as the rest of the planet;
• Only eight men hold as much wealth as the poorest half of the world's population of 3.5 billion people.

Given these huge inequalities, Oxfam observes: "Without change, growing inequality threatens to dislocate our societies. They exacerbate crime and insecurity and ruin the eradication of poverty. Hope diminishes, leaving more room for fear. These remarks are illustrated by the rise of populism and protectionism, whether in the United Kingdom with the vote in favor of Brexit or in the United States with the election of Donald Trump, including the worrying rise of racism and racism. distrust of traditional parties and politics.

In reality globalization has not benefited all social strata and has left the fringes of the uneducated and little or no educated population on the sidelines. This system has stagnated wages and precarious jobs. The gap between the rich and the poor is growing.

ECA and the African Union Commission (AUC) have tried to convince African Heads of State and Government to engage in a new development model based on the industrialization and structural transformation of the continent, with mineral resources and hydrocarbons as a basis for this transformation. But we must integrate all resources: human, financial, natural, land and sea.

In the face of rising protectionism, African countries must increase South-South relations. This should begin with the establishment of the Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA). In this regard, ECA, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa notes that "accelerating Africa's integration, particularly the establishment of an African continental free-trade area, could contribute greatly to support its industrialization. The creation of such a zone would increase both intra-African trade and its industrial content; the adoption of trade facilitation measures, in addition to the establishment of such a zone, would multiply the expected positive effects. The stated ambition for Africa's regional integration should be strengthened, paying particular attention to regional value chains, which today are largely untapped "(UNECA, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 2015).).

Between 1990 and 2008, 66% of the trade expansion of Least Developed Countries (LDCs) was due to Southern countries, which abolished LDC export entry restrictions on their markets. Southern countries have become the main market for LDCs, absorbing more than half of their annual exports, according to Unctad.

The financing component of development projects must be viewed from a different angle. I emphasize the contribution of capital from the Mashreq countries in a logic of profitability and positive return for both recipient African countries and Arab investors.

One of the sources of income in foreign currency, and in some cases the main, exceeding FDI (foreign direct investment) or international public aid, is remittances from the African diaspora. According to ECA, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, remittances have risen from 4.4 percent of GDP in 2013 to 4.5 percent in 2014, representing 4.6 percent of GDP in 2015. Remittances amounted to $ 62.9 billion in 2013, $ 67.1 billion in 2014 and $ 71.8 billion in 2015. According to the CEA (2015), to mobilize these funds more and more the continent must limit the cost of their removal and develop financial instruments to guide them towards development programs.

Figure 20. Migrant transfers to Africa, 200-2014



Source: African Economic Outlook 2014. Global Value Chains and Africa's Industrialization. Report co-published by ADB, OECD and UNDP, p.63

In 2016, Africans living abroad sent $ 33 billion to sub-Saharan Africa, down more than 6 percent from the previous year. This sum is expected to rise again in 2017, according to World Bank forecasts, to settle around 34 billion dollars.

Five countries concentrate 80% of remittances to Africa: Nigeria (with 19 billion dollars), Egypt (16.6 billion), Morocco (7 billion dollars), Algeria and Ghana ($ 2 billion each).

For nineteen countries, remittances are essential because they represent 3% of their GDP. For six countries, remittances contribute more than 10% of their GDP in 2016. This is the case for Liberia (31%), The Gambia (22%), Comoros (20%) and Lesotho (18%).) and Senegal (14%).

Table 43. Fifteen major recipient countries of remittances to Africa

Tableau 2.2. Quinze principaux pays bénéficiaires des transferts des migrants vers l'Afrique

Pays	USD par habitant	% du PIB	Milliards USD courants
Cabo Verde	374.5	8.9%	0.17
Lesotho	369.7	26.3%	0.65
Seychelles	311.4	2.1%	0.03
Égypte	254.7	7.6%	20.00
Tunisie	227.9	4.8%	2.31
Maroc	218.8	6.3%	6.64
Nigeria	132.0	7.2%	21.00
Sénégal	123.5	10.2%	1.56
Liberia	104.4	20.2%	0.40
Gambie	83.8	16.5%	0.15
Togo	62.4	8.7%	0.37
Swaziland	57.8	1.5%	0.06
Algérie	56.1	0.9%	1.98
Djibouti	40.3	2.4%	0.03
São Tomé-et-Principe	36.9	2.1%	0.01

Source : Calculs des auteurs sur la base de données de la Banque mondiale.

Source: African Economic Outlook 2014. Global Value Chains and Africa's Industrialization. Report co-published by ADB, OECD and UNDP, p.60

The Maghreb is the first region to receive these funds, followed by West Africa with just over $ 26 billion.

I propose three incentive mechanisms to encourage the reception of funds from Africans residing abroad:
1. A one-stop-shop that provides information on projects, facilitates formalities and accompanies representations to the authorities. But not only. There is one aspect regularly neglected: that of legal protection. Often, local partners are acquainted with judges and may rob the foreign investor, especially if the latter is often traveling out of the country.
2. Establish a repatriation guarantee and a percentage of the invested capital.
3. In case of dispute, the investor of African origin could appeal to a regional or international jurisdiction.

The funds transferred by Africans based abroad come mainly from European, American and Arab countries. In international financial crises, transfers decline, and during periods of expansion and growth, transfers increase. As long as these Africans have family and sentimental links with their homeland, they will dump some of their savings on the continent and play, in spite of themselves, the financiers of social expenditure instead of the state. If these resources are to grow and exceed the subsistence level and become investors, African governments must step out of their lethargy and embrace the enormous potential of bringing children to the country. left mostly for economic reasons.

The African continent loses more than $ 50 billion annually due to illicit financial flows. This follows from the meeting of the African Governors Group of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (African Caucus) held in Angola on September 4, 2015. No less than $ 854 billion have left the continent. in an "illegal" way between 1970 and 2008.

The ethical principle would be to judge the culprits, those who are responsible for the illicit transfer of currency. But the trials in France of African leaders suspected of misappropriation of public funds and ill-gotten property in their own countries have not yielded convincing results. As the Chinese leader, Deng Hsiao Ping, said, which inspired China's modernization and its evolution towards a productive and highly exporting economy, "it does not matter whether the cat is white or black as long as it catches the mice".

Yes, we must find the means to return at least part of this capital that fled the continent. Among the avenues to be explored, a total or partial amnesty can help the redeployment of its funds towards productive investments.

Tax evaders should enjoy a certain amount of leniency, as long as they invest their capital in agricultural, agri-food or industrial production in their country of origin or in another African country if the former gives the go-ahead.

The issue of taxation is both crucial and complex. Given the weight of the informal sector and the dignitaries of the regime who do not pay their taxes, the tax base is narrow. The dilemma facing governments is: how to deal with public deficits and finance government investments without killing activity?

At the same time, it is urgent to broaden the tax base by integrating real estate assets into a wealth tax by lowering the thresholds, in order to enlist the maximum of rentiers and profiteers of the system.

According to data collected by the 2014 edition of African Economic Outlook, the continent's total tax revenue quadrupled between 2000 and 2014, from $ 137.5 billion to $ 527.3 billion. This is an increase of 12.8% compared to 2011. Tax revenues related to raw materials and natural resources explain this outbreak. In 2012, the top five contributors are: South Africa ($ 98.6 billion), Algeria ($ 79.5 billion), Nigeria ($ 75 billion), Libya ($ 53.7 billion), billions of dollars) and Angola ($ 50.7 billion).

Figure 21. Range of tax levies in Africa, by income group, 1996-2012

Figure 2.10. **Gamme des prélèvements fiscaux en Afrique, par groupe de revenu, 1996-2012**



Source : Données des *Perspectives économiques en Afrique*.

StatLink http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933034676

South Africa and the hydrocarbon and other commodity producing countries have a predominance of direct taxes in government revenues. Other countries with little or no natural resources rely on indirect taxes instead.

After highlighting the forces involved; the Mashreq, Africa and the European Union, as well as interactivities between the three blocks, see how to create mutually profitable synergies and long-term projects. This would allow the Arab investors of the Mashreq, to no longer place their assets on uncertain financial markets; Africans to develop productive sectors and provide jobs for their children and Europeans to prepare a new model of cooperation with a continent they know well.

What the European Union can gain is to position itself as a supplier of technologies and know-how, in order to prepare a new era for its companies as part of a long-term vision. Clearly, Europeans could gain new business opportunities and sustainable co-productions.
If the African, European and Arab private companies and banks will be the actors of this project to prepare investments of the XXI century, the Arab League, the African Union, supported by the regional monetary and economic zones of the black continent, and the Union must build the institutional framework, coordination, impetus, legal guarantor agreements concluded between economic operators.

Political instability in Africa and the problems of corruption and good governance make many foreign and / or African investors hesitate. If there is a binding legal framework obliging all contracting parties to respect in all places and at all times, ad vitam aeternam the spirit and content of contracts concluded. In other words, the change of President of the Republic would not alter the normal course of a contract. Perhaps some multinational firms would be deterred from fomenting coups in order to revert to agreements in progress or to create a new favorable situation for future opportunities or other "Friends". The legal guarantee referred to here can not be equated with a hedge against the financial risks inherent in any entrepreneurial exercise, but imposes legislation and possible recourse before multilateral bodies. During a broadcast on Africa24, great sportsmen of African origin with financial means told us their immense desire to invest in their country of birth or those of their parents, while expressing their lack of confidence in their local partners and in their countries of origin.

The attractiveness of the African market should not be limited to the cost of labor. Foreign investors would be willing to pay decent wages that are compatible with a level of productivity that will be achieved only through education, vocational training, apprenticeship and technology mastery.
Two important projects are needed to create a business-friendly climate: firstly, good governance at all levels of the state, administrations and local authorities; second, an independent, more just justice that does not favor nationals at the expense of foreigners who bring in capital.

Electricité du Mali, a subsidiary of EDF, told me in 2010 of a series of tradesmen's lawsuits declaring alternately fires, the alleged origin of which would have been electrical cut-offs. My interlocutor was moved by the complicity between the judges, the plaintiffs and even the defense lawyers. Electricity of Mali was obliged to bring lawyers from France.
I had the privilege of officiating on Africa24 as an editorialist between 2011 and 2016. I was able to develop my ideas of institutional, social and economic reforms.

My main idea was to call for a new model of processing primary, mining and agricultural products instead of exporting them in their raw state. In fact, value is created mainly during the transformation process and not during the extraction and primary exploitation phase. As shown in this diagram published in the daily Le Parisien on October 3, 2017, the balance of power is always against the upstream producer.

Figure 22. "What a product yields to different actors"



The theme of the value chain includes industrial processes as well as agribusiness and agribusiness.

Chapter 1. Industrialization of Africa

European colonialism has imposed a development model based on the plundering of raw materials and the export of goods and services. As a result, independent African states have become markets for finished products and for the export of raw subsoil resources, processed abroad and resold to the continent at high prices. The African elite has monopolized the benefits of this unequal and easy-gaining trade, leaving productive activities behind. The demographic evolution, the emigration of young people and brains, the aspiration of the populations to a better life impose futuristic choices preparing the XXIe century.

First of all :

- try a little to transform basic products into semi-finished or finished goods,

- develop agribusiness and develop an integrated value chain. According to a report by the World Bank, Africa's agri-food industry will be worth $ 1 trillion in 2030. The continent can become the world's largest exporter of food products thanks to its unique strengths: fertile soils (but more than 60% of arable land is not cultivated), abundant labor, mild climate all year round. It is paradoxical that every year African countries import more than 73% of the wheat they consume (they spend more than $ 11 billion on imported cereals, especially for rice) and more than 330,000 tons of chicken. Agri-food giants like Nigeria and Angola are starting to focus on agribusiness as a way to diversify their economies as oil prices plummet.

- to advance in regional economic integration,

- develop win-win partnerships with private African and foreign groups,

- create African champions in industry and services to overcome the narrowness of markets,

- fit into a balanced international productive process.

Only then will poverty be eradicated and jobs massively created. This is the interest of Africa and the world.

The weight of Africa as a whole in world manufacturing production is only 1.1%. This striking figure is one of the lessons of the report Promoting Industrial Development in Africa in the New World Context that has just been published by two United Nations organizations: UNCTAD (for development) and UNIDO (for industry), published by " l'Usine Nouvelle " on July 12, 2011.

Industry has so far contributed only modestly to Africa's growth. Africa therefore still accounts for only a very small percentage of world manufacturing value added (MVA) and world manufacturing exports: 1.1% and 1.3%, respectively, in 2008.

From 1980 to 2013, the industry's weight in the continent's economy grew from 12% to 11%, keeping it at the lowest level of all developing regions. The lack of industrial capacity concerns manufactured products with high added value, such as those with low added value.

Africa saw its global manufacturing value-added added value (GVA) in African GDP rise from 12.8% in 2000 to 10.5% in 2008. Norbert Lebalé, an economist at the Africa Division of Unctad, presented a report in July 2011 (see L'Usine Nouvelle on July 12, 2011): "For 20 years, many Asian countries have managed to rely on industry, particularly high-intensity activities. labor force, to establish their economic development.

Despite its greater proximity to the European market, this model did not work for Africa. Norbert Lebalé recommends greater regional integration: "It is no longer conceivable that each country, even populated by a few million inhabitants, can think of developing, by itself, a whole set of industrial sectors. Industrial strategies must be thought of as a whole.

Africa's economic fabric is unequally distributed. It is dominated by Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Mauritius and South Africa. Africa's weight in world manufacturing output has stagnated at 1% since 2000, while the share of emerging Asian countries has risen from 13% to 25% (with China taking the lion's share). Half of Africa's exports of manufactured goods come directly from natural resources, while the figure is 13% for Asian or Latin American countries.

The United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the African Development Bank (AfDB) and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) published the 2017 edition of the report in May 2017, which suggests: "More governments will have to integrate entrepreneurship into their industrialization strategies. "
According to the AfDB, "In 2016, Africa's economic growth fell to 2.2% from 3.4% in 2015, due to lower commodity prices, weak global recovery, and challenging conditions. adverse weather, which impacted agricultural production in some regions. However, it should rebound to 3.4% in 2017 and 4.3% in 2018, which supposes that with the revival of commodity prices, the global economy will be strengthened and macroeconomic reforms implemented at national level ".
The report reveals that 18 African countries achieved intermediate to high levels of human development in 2015.

FDI (Foreign Direct Investment) was $ 56.5 billion in 2016 and is expected to reach $ 57 billion in 2017. This investment has diversified, encompassing the construction sector, financial services, industry, transport, electricity and information and communication technologies.
Abebe Shimeles, Acting Director of the AfDB's Macroeconomic Policy, Forecasting and Research Department, says: "Despite the economic turbulence of the past two years that seems to have undermined Africa's rise, we are quite convinced that the continent remains resilient, with economies that are no longer dependent on resources and whose growth prospects are broader. With vibrant private sectors, an entrepreneurial spirit and vast resources, Africa has the potential to grow even faster and in a more inclusive way. " He said that progress remains uneven "while African governments must implement more ambitious and better policies for job creation" in:

https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/African_Economic_Outlook_2018_-_FR.pdf.

The report adds, "It is essential to turn the challenge of population growth into an opportunity for the success of Africa's new industrial revolution." It is noted that twenty-six African countries have an industrialization strategy in place. But most of these strategies are the work of large industrial companies at the expense of entrepreneurs from start-ups and small and medium-sized enterprises working in sectors with high growth potential and job creation. Companies with less than 20 employees with less than five years of existence provide the largest quota of formal sector jobs in Africa. In addition, the emergence of digital technologies creates bridges between the industrial sector and the service sector. Industrialization strategies must have a positive effect on sectors enjoying a comparative advantage. These include agribusiness and renewable energy.

Mario Pezzini, Director of the OECD Development Center and Special Adviser to the OECD Secretary-General for Development, said that "African economies can not miss the goal of transforming their production. Entrepreneurs must be the main actors of Africa's transition to the fourth industrial revolution "in" Economic Outlook for Africa ", 2017 edition:" Unlocking the potential of African entrepreneurs, a prerequisite to accelerate the industrial transformation of the continent " https://www.afdb.org/fr/news-and-events/unlock-the-potential-of-african-entrepreneurs-to-accelerate-africas-industrial-transformation-says-the-african-economic-outlook- 2017-17009 /

Table 44. Manufacturing value added as a percentage of world total for Africa and Asia

	2000	2014
Africa	1	2
Asia	11	39

Source: Unctad

Table 45. Leading African exporters of manufactured goods in 2015 (in thousands of US dollars)

<table>
<tr><th></th><th>Exports of manufactured goods</th><th>Percentage share</th><th></th></tr>
<tr><td>Africa</td><td>89 109 964</td><td>100 %</td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td>South Africa</td><td>31 588 200</td><td>35 %</td><td rowspan="6">80 %</td></tr>
<tr><td>Morocco</td><td>14 788 703</td><td>17 %</td></tr>
<tr><td>Tunisia</td><td>11 225 534</td><td>13 %</td></tr>
<tr><td>Egypt</td><td>9 858 386</td><td>11 %</td></tr>
<tr><td>Kenya</td><td>2 039 210</td><td>2 %</td></tr>
<tr><td>Ivory Coast</td><td>1 847 116</td><td>2 %</td></tr>
</table>

Source: Unctad

According to the African Economic Outlook (op.cit.), The African continent has untapped entrepreneurial potential. In 18 African countries where we have statistics, 11% of the working-age population has created their own businesses to exploit business opportunities. This level is higher than in the developing countries of Latin America (8%) and Asia (5%). However, few of these companies invest in high-growth sectors, employ more workers, or introduce innovations into the markets. To turn their dynamism into an engine of industrialization, African governments will need to strengthen the skills of workers and the effectiveness of trade poles - such as industrial parks and special economic zones - and increase their access to finance, with more credit. accessible and more innovative instruments for small and young businesses, the report added.
Edward Chisanga carried out a comparative study between Asia and Africa in an article published in February 2017 by ICTSD (International for Trade and Undertainable Development) entitled "The industry in Africa: what lessons to draw from the Asian experience ? "

He notes that in 2000, Asia's manufacturing value added represented 11% of the world total, while that of Africa only 1%. The share of Asia even went up to 39% in 2014, while that of Africa reached only 2%, the same year (table 44 below). This explains the marginalization of the continent in international trade in manufactured goods and the persistence of poverty and underemployment. Symmetrically, Asia's share of world exports of manufactured goods will reach 50% in the next ten or twenty years.

The share of manufactured exports in world exports increased from 24% in 2000 to almost 40% in 2014, while very few African countries export manufactured goods abroad. In 2015, only 15 countries accounted for almost 91% of Africa's $ 90 billion in manufactured exports, which means that nearly 40 countries shared the remaining 9%. The fact that only six countries (South Africa, Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Kenya and Côte d'Ivoire) account for 80% of these total exports is problematic (Table 43).

The share of manufactured exports in total African exports increased from 26% in 1995 to 23% in 2015, while over the same period, this share rose from 74% to 77% in Asia (Figure 14).
The dependence of the mining sectors, including the hydrocarbons of the international markets can be seen through export revenues which went from 60 billion US dollars in 2014 to 34 billion in 2015 for Angola, from 12 to 6 billion for Guinea equatorial, from 100 to 51 for Nigeria, from 50 to 38 for South Africa and from 8 to 6 for Zambia.

Figure 23. Share of manufactured goods in total exports (in percentage terms) in Africa and Asia



Source: Unctad

The share of manufactures in national exports, for the vast majority of African economies, remains too low. Progress between 1995 and 2015 is low for Africa and wider for Asia.

While Asia's trade surplus in the manufacturing sector exceeded US $ 1 trillion in 2015, Africa had a deficit of US $ 266 billion (Table 46). In 2015, Asian exports of manufactured goods amounted to $ 4.6 trillion and imports accounted for $ 3.6 trillion. These figures contrast with Africa's exports, which barely exceeded $ 89 billion, or 25% of its imports (which reached $ 354 billion).

Table 46. Trade balance of manufactures in Asia and Africa (in thousands of dollars)

		1995	2015
Asie	Exportations	798 606 462	4 640 781 122
	Importations	856 876 847	3 603 686 569
	Balance commerciale	**- 58 270 385**	**1 037 094 553**
Afrique	Exportations	28 383 598	89 109 964
	Importations	82 385 071	354 673 649
	Balance commerciale	**- 54 001 472**	**-265 563 685**

Source: Edward Chisanga, Economist, Unctad

Africa benefits from climatic and geological advantages that give it a wealth of variety of agricultural products, without preventing it from importing a wide range of agricultural and food products that could be produced locally. It is essential to rethink the agri-food development model by considering using all the levers that create a sector that is geared towards the domestic, regional and international markets.
It is :
- create the marketing infrastructure for agricultural products both by road and rail, and by sea. Sub-Saharan countries suffer enormous losses after harvest, which can reach, in the case of perishable agricultural products such as fruits and vegetables, an average of 35 -50% of production and between 15 and 25% for cereals;
- introduce distribution modes that are both decentralized, harmonized, coordinated and supported by the public authorities. Farmers need guarantees as to the routing of their produce and their disposal;
- to negotiate at the regional level complementarities in terms of comparative advantages and according to the needs of consumers, avoiding the use of their foreign exchange reserves in food imports;
- foster regionally critical agri-food companies to improve productivity and boost production on a large scale;
- ensure that the value chain that transports food and processed agricultural products to consumers is controlled from upstream to downstream in order to achieve optimal cost / price equilibrium levels;
- develop training and apprenticeship in the agronomic and agro-industrial field and promote financing for the creation of agro-food farms. In doing so, young people will have career prospects and a job, and this would generate the creation of an industrial fabric, accompanying the industrialization of the agricultural world;
- by making work in rural areas attractive, it would be possible to fix the peasant populations in their villages;

- develop a post-harvest loss reduction strategy to support the agro-industrial development strategy.
Some countries like Morocco launched a tax amnesty operation in 2014 to regularize the situation of Moroccan residents illegally holding property and assets abroad. No less than 19,000 individuals and companies responded favorably to this solicitation and disbursed nearly 2.5 billion euros, made up of one-third of cash and two-thirds of real estate and financial assets.
China's role in Africa is highly haunting among African experts, politicians, and people interested in Africa. Some argue about the benefits of the so-called Chinese commitment to the continent's economic development. Others, including me, believe that the Chinese authorities are investing in Africa only to extract its raw materials and to make it a receptacle for its own consumer goods.

China has increased its trade with Africa by a factor of 12 and has made commercial transactions and investments with Sub-Saharan Africa accounting for 10% of its GDP. China has risen to the forefront as Africa's trading partner for $ 200 billion annually.

The figure below shows the rise of the European Union in Africa's trade, while China, the United States, the BRICs and South Korea follow more compact curves. , with a slight advantage to the Chinese.
Figure 24. Africa's trade with selected partners, 2000-2012

Figure 3.2. **Échanges commerciaux de l'Afrique avec certains partenaires, 2000-2012**



Source : Base COMTRADE des Nations Unies (2012).
StatLink http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933034733

The European Union ranks first as Africa's main trading partner with trade in the region of $ 240 billion, or 38.2% of the continent's total trade, compared to $ 160 billion for Asia (25.3%) and $ 74 billion for North America (11.7%).

Beijing has invested more than 75 billion since 2007, of which only 1.1 billion is dedicated to development aid, and for the most part in concessional loans allowing its companies to invest heavily in Africa.

Nevertheless, sub-Saharan Africa accounts for only 4% of its exports. Re-export trade should be considered from coastal countries in southern and eastern Africa and between coastal countries in West Africa and the Sahel countries. Re-exports re-evaluate China's share of imports from countries that are actually trans-shipment activities (eg, Benin and Togo). Chinese investors, often under state control, use Chinese labor and condition their loans to use Chinese companies.

Chinese companies are interested in Angolan and Nigerian oil, copper from the DRC and Zambia, and Namibian uranium. They have sanctuarized their access to cobalt, essential for the production of electric car batteries, by controlling at a high price (several billion dollars) the mines of the world's largest producer: the Democratic Republic of Congo.

While the Chinese display a foolproof serenity in their economic intervention, European and especially French leaders do not fail to mention the issues that annoy: the problems of visas and illegal immigration, human rights, legal action against African leaders over ill-gotten property and embezzlement. In addition, Europeans have instruments to control the illegal transfer of funds and money laundering detection techniques. This displeases some decision makers who pay in bribes. In contrast, the Chinese offer material advantages to their interlocutors, officials and business leaders.

This ranges from scholarships to the children of decision-makers, trips to China, all expenses borne or payments of "commissions" on hidden accounts ... Contracts are often overvalued, to give rise to retro commissions. In his book, China's Second Continent, Howard French (2014), which has counted one million Chinese entrepreneurs who have gone on the assault of the continent, has this formula: "Africa has been a workshop of new ideas that have now become great strategic assets ".

According to the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, based in Washington, Sino-African trade was estimated at $ 10 billion to climb to $ 220 billion in 2014, with a slight decline in recent years following the fall in prices of oil. China contributes one-sixth of total lending to African countries, appealing to some African experts and policymakers, especially when it comes to financing infrastructure.

"The relationship between donors and recipients has changed dramatically with the arrival of China," said Dambisa Moyo, a Zambian economist and author of the book Dead Aid, published in 2009 and questioning Africa's links with China. Europe and the United States based on aid. "African countries need trade and investment. No matter where it comes from - China, India, Turkey, Russia, Brazil - it's always good news to have new partners, "she adds.

For Jeffrey Sachs (2017), director of the Earth Institute at Columbia University, China's enthusiasm for Africa is "the most important source of development for the continent of our generation."

Figure 25. "These emblematic projects of the French-speaking zone"



Source: Financial Times and Jeune Afrique, 20

The Middle Kingdom has become widely accepted in major construction contracts (roads, bridges, airports, housing estates, dams) and mobilizes nearly 2,000 public construction and public works companies, as well as private investors in Hong Kong. and Macao.

Another asset of China is its skilled diaspora: it occupies niches, spreads in the socio-economic landscape and is a relay in countries where it settles to the point of learning the local language and sometimes marry with nationals (this is the case in Algeria). In Morocco, taking advantage of free trade agreements unfavorable to the Moroccan side, Chinese companies bought at a high price the heart of the wholesale trade (Derb Omar district in Casablanca) to oust Moroccan products and import Chinese consumer goods (toys, textiles, shoes, small household equipment). There are nearly one million Chinese in Africa, 400,000 in South Africa, 250,000 in Angola, 150,000 in Nigeria, and several thousand in Madagascar and Mauritius.

Since 2016, China has invested in free zones, the most recent of which is planned in Tangier (Morocco) and has a budget of 930 million euros. Its objective, according to the official presentation, is "the construction of an economic center capable of generating 100,000 jobs, of which a minimum of 90,000 jobs will benefit the inhabitants of the Tangier region".

The Chinese operate six special economic zones in Africa: two in Zambia (Chambishi and Lusaka), two in Nigeria (Lekki and Ogun), one in Mauritius (Jin Fei) and another in eastern Ethiopia. The chosen industrial sectors are textiles, household appliances, electronics, telephony, ceramics, ironwork, metallurgy, building materials ... These activities, if they have not had a ripple effect on the economic fabric of the host countries, make it possible to penetrate African markets in a more sustainable way and to get closer to places of consumption.

Indian investments do not respond to the will of a state as is the case with the Chinese, but to a logic of market and profit, even if it must help the recipient countries to develop. These investments are made in all sectors: raw materials, the automotive industry, agriculture, infrastructure, telephony, the pharmaceutical industry, as well as skincare and beauty products. The Tata group has been investing since 1977 in eleven countries. Indians can go even further in the pharmaceutical sector, as does the generic drug giant Cipla in antiretroviral drugs. The cost of drugs to prevent and / or treat chronic diseases in Africa is so prohibitive that co-productions seem essential.

The United Nations published in June 2011 a report on the industrialization of Africa (http://unctad.org/en/Docs/aldcafrica2011_en.pdf). It emphasizes the need to move to a new stage of development by industrializing. The continent is not starting from scratch. It can use its natural resources and skills already acquired in the mechanical industry and chemistry to advance in technologies through win-win relationships with Europe. The old continent would trade with a booming market and Africa would benefit from the technologies of developed countries whose industrialists would try to produce manufactured goods close to their markets.

Norbert Lebalé, Economist at UNCTAD's Africa Division, said this by presenting this report on July 11, 2011: "For 20 years, many Asian countries have been able to rely on the industry, including intensive activities. labor force, to support their economic development. Despite its greater proximity to the European market, this model did not work for Africa. The reasons for this situation are multiple. They range from the lack of "price competitiveness" to the small size of many domestic markets, the weight of the informal sector and small businesses, weak public support, bureaucracy and corruption or political instability.

According to Norbert Lebalé, "it is no longer conceivable that each country, even populated by a few million inhabitants, could think of developing a whole series of industrial sectors. The industrial strategies must be thought of as a whole "quoted by the Usine Nouvelle on July 20, 2011.

From this point of view, it is impossible to start industrialization processes outside regional integration by setting in motion the harmonization of trade policies, the establishment of common regulations and shared infrastructure projects, the pooling of energy policies and the pooling of industrial and agronomic research.

After independence, some African countries have made the bet to implement import-substitution activities, such as automobile assembly workshops using imported subassemblies without the least transfer of technology. It was the same in electronics (with Thomson in Morocco). Algeria was engaged in what was called "industrializing industry" by creating industrial giants, but with a functioning state, bureaucratic, obsolete and irrational.
The deindustrialization of Africa can be explained by:
- the bad negotiation by African countries of globalization. Most of them have signed the WTO agreements and free trade agreements without being prepared to face a well-structured competition, better armed and heavily supported by states with powerful instruments of economic intervention. efficient;
- the liberalization that has given more power to the market at the expense of the States, consecrating the domination of the powerful multinationals;
- Structural adjustment programs imposed by the IMF, which has dictated privatization, devaluation and state withdrawal from developing countries, while development has been based on public action ;
- exogenous shocks, be they economic or financial crises or fluctuations in the price of raw materials on international markets;
- intra-African wars, caused by economic or political powers and conflicts between neighbors;
- bad governance, corruption and tribal and personal rivalries;
- postindependence fragmentation: African countries are not critical enough to support industries that require economies of scale, which poses the problem of indispensable regional integration;
- the failure of the education system, the weakness of the vocational training and apprenticeship system, the lack of efforts to improve the quality of goods produced have prevented the path of import substitution and the revival of exports;
- the installation of a rent economy based on the unequal redistribution of the resources of the subsoil and oligopolies dominated by the importers who have crushed the processes of wealth production in the bud.

The digital and technological revolution is not sparing Africa. It is good for improving the knowledge economy and the purchasing power of the middle class. The Afric Wealth Report, published in June 2017 by New World Wealth, lists 160,000 millionaires on the continent. This number has increased by 145% between 2000 and 2014. I am not a supporter of the idea of runoff that money from the rich is spreading through society, but in this African society where solidarity dominates, it is to be hoped that enriching Africans will invest in their own countries rather than outside the continent.

New technologies and digital are among the popular sectors and opportunities for foreign investors.

Africa is ranked as the second fastest growing market for mobile phones after Asia. Privatization movements date back to the 1990s when hundreds of Orange billboards could be seen on the road in Mali and neighboring countries. It is surprising today to see young people with smartphones at 145 euros, while the average monthly income does not exceed 150 euros.

Buyers are, in addition to the middle class, Africans who receive financial support from family members working abroad. "New generation" devices and smartphones such as the iPhone, Blackberry and Samsung, often expensive for the modest African, have left a place for smartphones at low prices, Asian manufacturing.

It is not impossible that Chinese manufacturers practice discriminatory monopoly and create a climate of sympathy in a growing market, as did the Japanese in Vietnam in the late 1980s.
As for the Internet market, the African market could generate billions of dollars. This is why tech giants like Google and Facebook are scrambling to offer Internet access to millions of Africans. Google's Project Loon and Facebook's Free Basics are innovative initiatives to connect Africa. It is to be regretted the absence of European groups assisting innovative African entrepreneurs trying to conquer the Internet access market.

The case of BRCK, originally from Kenya, who created a rugged Internet modem instrument that adapts to tricky environments; like limited Internet connections or power cuts. The modem can juggle Ethernet, WiFi, 3G and 4G, and comes with eight hours of charge for the battery. BRCK has already sold thousands of units in 54 countries, including India. Recently, the company raised $ 3 million in funding from investors to extend the reach of this amazing device.
The digital economy of Africa is booming and we can say that the digital revolution is under way. Many services now have applications, such as hotels, recreation, furniture and even industrial parts.

Among the areas to be modernized, the banking and financial sector deserves particular attention, especially when we know that cash transactions represent $ 100 billion a year. There are solutions that are moving ahead with mobile money transfer and payment services. The money transfer market is also promising. But the most important project is the implementation of new technologies in companies, especially SMEs. Africa must negotiate the digital revolution!
In Europe, 25% of investments are related to new information and communication technologies (NICT). France invests more than Italy (which is late) and other neighboring countries. On average, SMEs with between 6 and 200 employees are equipped with a dozen computers. Germany is doing better.

The biggest investor in the NICTs and most often equipped with computers is the service sector (including computer services companies). Unsurprisingly, public works and transport are the least well equipped in computers because of low levels of education and computer literacy.
France caught up a bit in 2003. Internet is present in a very large majority of companies. The most common type of connection in Europe is average throughput, especially in Germany and Italy (with ISDN, Integrated Services Digital Network). Internet is less and less perceived by SMEs, as a means of communication and advertising and more as a tool for management and improvement of operating conditions.

In the Internet, e-mail is the most popular, followed by information searches and customer / supplier relationships. Banking relations are developing strongly. Professional sites are expanding. More than 70% of SMEs have websites in Germany, Italy, France and Spain. The number of companies that are not equipped is declining. In Germany, SMEs are using their sites intensively to improve their services, their businesses and their reputation. After a period of resistance, France is gradually becoming involved in electronic commerce.
It is in large cities that ICTs and computer equipment are the most widespread.
Whether in companies, banks, local authorities, primary schools or universities, the use of new technologies must be the rule not only to communicate, but also to develop daily activities and to come up. It is also about developing the most advanced uses through sites for professional use, Intranet, internal and external relations.

The problem in Africa is generational. If young people are having fun on the Internet to navigate, create discussion groups and professional or private communications, some leaders in the public or private sectors are restive to behavioral changes within their institutions. They continue to give their notes and handwritten letters to their assistants or to delegate the research and management of mails and social networks to them.
The creation of new sites is slow and the rate of computer equipment too low, especially in SMEs.
The main purpose of business sites is to make them known to their customers and / or the general public. Then come the customer / supplier relationships. However, e-commerce is very little developed. Africa should have an ICT plan to accelerate the deployment of new technologies in SMEs (including data and applications shared between customers and suppliers) and to develop cooperation between the various industrial sectors and support methodological actors.
African companies, lagging behind NICT investments in relation to economies around the world, do not allow their economies to achieve sustainable economic growth. Thus, ICTs represent 48% of business investment in the United States compared to 35% in France and Europe, and only 5% in Africa. This low level of investment impacts the performance of companies. ICTs can effectively restructure the company and modernize its operation.

The development of ICTs in SMEs would be optimal if it were carried out by sectors with common characteristics and the same needs, with awareness-raising actions and training for executives, managers and employees (who would thus benefit from synergies), and accompaniment and follow-up in terms of new ways of organizing work. The aim is to develop a highly integrated approach to the industrial and service sectors, which requires a common strategy to achieve a harmonization of modes of exchange. The combined software and hardware approach allows for a new organization and other management styles that need to be strengthened and federated.

According to a study by Ernst & Young and Novametrie entitled "At the heart of SME information systems", new technologies are attracting more and more of these companies. "Managers (SMEs), who have become more pragmatic, are increasingly familiar with integrated software and distributed infrastructures." The operational challenge is for them priority. The organization and the internal processes are the first affected by the technological wave. Contrary to what one might think, the (relative) small size of SMEs does not diminish their chances of success in integrating new technologies. The different services (technical, marketing, customers ...) are closer to each other. Information can flow faster and better.

Moreover, it is not surprising that the first areas chosen to apply these new technologies concern the internal functioning of the company. According to the study cited above, the three most widely used technologies are Intranet, EDI (Electronic Data Interchange) and ERP (Integrated Management Software Packages), which are often used to feed databases. .

A report must be made on the use of new technologies by companies from one year to the next. They are notoriously lacking experience and hindsight to appreciate the true value of the economic benefits, whether positive or negative. That's why the statements of intent are numerous, but the practice follows less.
One of the most important information of the study is that, for almost 60% of the SMEs questioned, the evolution of the information system towards new technologies is described as natural. This figure roughly corresponds to the percentage of companies dedicating an annual budget to this sector.

The delay of African SMEs in the use of ICTs is an important and now well-known cause of stunting in Africa. For several years, France has had a lower average growth rate than the most dynamic developed economies, particularly the United States. The analysis of the growth gap between France and the United States has been the subject of much work by economists. These identify three main causes. The first two will not be treated in this note: it is, on the one hand, the differences in demographic growth and, on the other hand, the greater mobilization of labor in the United States, a country in which the number of people in employment is higher and the hours of work are higher. The third concerns us directly: it deals with the growth of labor productivity. Since 2006, productivity growth has deteriorated in Africa and the gap has widened with the Asian countries, which have managed to increase it. This mainly concerns the services sector, as the manufacturing sector has not experienced comparable weakening. NICTs have been established thanks to the generalization of microcomputers connected to the Internet. Beyond this basic equipment, more advanced equipment is spreading, in particular integrated management software packages, Intranet and Extranet networks or personalized Internet sites..

This equipment must be used to reduce production costs, improve the efficiency of the production chain and speed up the flow of information.
Large companies are engaged in new technologies as a necessary means for their development and competitiveness. African small and medium-sized enterprises are lagging behind. They must be digitized. Thus, they will improve their business processes, especially if they use integrated management software packages and create merchant Internet sites for part of online transactions, using a network.

The African economy is fundamentally dual, with traditional sectors lagging behind due to habits and low levels of education and training. In the export-oriented and externally oriented sectors (industry, agribusiness), progress is clearer. The differences are characterized by the differentiated use of technologies and the positioning between protected sectors and sectors exposed to international competition. In order to reduce this gap, it is urgent to reorganize the productive process (intranet network, integrated management software package).
A better rate of equipment allows the search for information, the communication with partners, the exchange of information as well as the commercial operations. This can be seen in the service sector, wholesale and commercial intermediaries, telecommunications and computer, engineering and operational (data processing, legal , management control ...). African SMEs need to evolve towards innovation in order to help reorganize services in order to take into account information and technological developments. This should result in the assimilation of management, organization and distribution methods.
African SMEs need to be increasingly efficient and innovative to cope with the demands and changes of national, regional and international markets. However, unlike large companies, they do not have the strategic tools or the skills to deal with all the problems they face. Their structural situation stems from the need to develop new products or services, to market and launch their offers, to network, to question their economic environment and to identify opportunities or changes in the market. Their sustainability depends on their ability to innovate and use all new technologies, to work in a network and in partnership to share risks and pool knowledge. The future of the economic and social fabric of Africa, its stabilization as well as the creation of new jobs depend on the dynamism of these essential actors that are SMEs in the development of the local economy. Whatever the meritorious efforts of African companies, without the infrastructure of public or private Internet operators, they will not be able to modernize.

In an in-depth study published by the journal Technologies on April 22, 2015 and bearing the evocative title "Internet: the fracture of infrastructures", Claire Hemery evokes the million kilometers of optical fiber cables that crosses the ocean floor to connect the continents between them. These infrastructures are geographically unequal.
In 2011, the world had more than two million Internet users, or 30% of the world's population. But Africa has only 6% of these Internet users, while the African population accounts for 15% of the world's population. This is indicated by the following graphs.

Figure 26. Distribution of the world population by continent in 2014



Figure 27. Distribution of Internet users by continent in 2014



Figure 28. Internet penetration rate by continent



Source : Internetworldstats.com (octobre 2011)

The Internet penetration rate is 11.4% in Africa, 23.8% in Asia, 58.3% in Europe and 78.3% in North America.

The site of TeleGeography, a US telecommunications research and consulting company, is best able to provide us with submarine cable mapping. It reveals the saturation of infrastructures in the North and their failure in the South. The Internet, which is commonly thought of as a space without territory, the absolute virtual, does depend on physical infrastructure. Africa is the continent most penalized by these inequalities of equipment.

Figure 29. Interactive map of submarine cables



Source : TeleGeography

Optical fiber technology connected the United States, the United Kingdom and France until 2002. More than one million kilometers of such cables have since been installed at the bottom of the water. Optical fiber offers a much higher information rate than coaxial copper cables, which support a large bandwidth, on which the speed of the connection depends. It is also less sensitive to electromagnetic disturbances. It is therefore essential to support the rise of the Internet.

Figure 30. Map of submarine cables serving Africa



Source : https://manypossibilities.net/african-undersea-cables/

According to Claire Hemery, "the African continent is the main remaining shipyard for underwater cables, whose biggest investors are telecommunications operators, aware of new business opportunities. Orange, Vivendi, Vodafone and Barthi are competing in this market where only a few African operators such as South African MTN, Nigerian Globacom and Egypt's Orascom continue to hold their ground. The problem is that the areas covered by these infrastructures are those that respond to the implementation strategy of operators-operators of Internet access at the expense of the real needs of the populations.

Laurent Checola also notes in Le Monde of October 10, 2011 that "the Lion cable, which passes through Madagascar, Mauritius and Reunion, only serves areas where the Orange operator is present." He also explains that "with a low traffic between the countries of the continent, Africa is also struggling to impose itself in the agreements of peering (pairing) with major international access providers. Because in the Internet economy, free traffic sharing is only between networks of equal size.

Chapter 2. Agri-Food Transformation: One of the Pillars of Development in Africa

On the African continent, 70% of the population still lives on family farming, hence the need to create organizations to pool the means of exploitation and marketing, both in the domestic market and in export.
Agriculture has been left behind in all mineral-producing countries. The other countries have specialized in a single production (cocoa, coffee, cotton), in any case on productions intended abroad. Morocco and Tunisia have tried to combine market gardening and cereals, in order to meet the needs of their populations, but also to develop export-oriented agricultural activities (citrus fruits, tomatoes, olives ...).

But in all cases, the peasantry was despised and abandoned to his own fate. Villages and hamlets lack basic equipment (water supply, electricity, school and sanitary facilities, etc.). If the old people accepted this isolation situation year after year, young people, who now have access to the international media, are looking for a quality of life and places of leisure and entertainment that they will find in the big cities. The result of this situation is a rural exodus to metropolises catalyzing all the miseries and frustrations, which generates a bad lifestyle, problems of delinquency and crippling crime. The rural world is a provider of vague immigration to European countries, which is not without problems of adaptation and integration.

Since Adam Smith, David Ricardo and Karl Marx, we have learned that the earth is a source of value accumulation and wealth creation. Value added is created in the agricultural sector, but with a rise in productivity. In order to compensate for the fragmentation of land and the low productive intensity, it is necessary to create development poles and to promote the aggregation of resources and resources while respecting the specificity of the farms. This must involve training, the rationalization of agro-food structures and the pooling of resources, giving priority to the structure of the Economic Interest Group.

The GIE allows small farmers to pool their resources to improve their performance. A contract by sector and / or geographical area must be set up with the help of consular services (chambers of agriculture) or state. In return, farms that agree to join together could benefit from targeted subsidies, a tax system, funded training, preferential access to seeds, equipment, export services, logistics, veterinary follow-up , technical and health assistance, advice on innovation and inventions. Many farmers face water scarcity and depend on rainfall. Only public intervention can develop irrigation and deliver drinking water. Sometimes digging a well may be enough to water people and livestock, but if there is no human and sometimes financial support, the task is often arduous.

An unknown but nevertheless noble and generous dimension is the decentralized cooperation between French and African territorial authorities. I participated in several twinnings, including that between the city of Stains (Seine-Saint-Denis) and Mengueme (Cameroon). The most emblematic is that between the city of Montreuil (Seine-Saint-Denis) and the Circle of Yelimané (Mali).
This cooperation, inaugurated in 1985, focused on hydraulics, agriculture, livestock farming, the environment, support for market gardening, support for decentralization, education and literacy, training, education and training. hygiene, etc.

Innovation is the desire to extend this Franco-Malian relationship to Vietnamese expertise. It is the genesis in 2004 of the Support Program for Sustainable Development of Yélimané (PADDY), in a framework that exceeds that of decentralized cooperation to seek South-South cooperation (Mali-Vietnam). Driven largely by Montreuil, the program benefited from a technical and financial commitment from the Malian, French and Vietnamese states, communities and the local population, Malian nationals in France and international institutional partners. The first phase of the PADDY (2005-2010) included an agricultural component and an institutional strengthening component, corroborating the decentralization process in Mali.

To help the Malian communities to implement the skills transferred in the framework of decentralization, the Inter-Collectivités Meraguemou Syndicate, which brings together the communes and the Council of Cercle (equivalent of a French department), was created in 2008. This joint service supports communities in their project management and funding research.

In a second phase (2010-2016), the Inter-Collectivités Meraguemou Syndicate became the main interlocutor of the decentralized cooperation between Montreuil and the Yélimané Circle.

Thanks to its roots, the decentralized cooperation between Montreuil and the circle of Yélimané has withstood the troubled period that Mali has experienced since 2010 (insecurity and restriction of travel for Europeans, occupation of the north of the country and coup d'etat in 2012).

Located north-east of the Kayes region, the Yélimané circle has a population with a strong rural dominance (90%) of 180 000 inhabitants spread over an area of 5 676 km². The climate is Sahelian and climatic, geographical (enclavement) and socio-economic handicaps are numerous. A part of the population is in migration in the neighboring countries of Mali but also in France (in Montreuil in particular). The contribution of migrants is considerable for the development of the circle and the survival of families.

The circle is composed of 12 municipalities including 94 villages. These communes are the result of the Malian decentralization process that began in the 1990s. The first communal elections were held in 1999.

The axes of cooperation

1. Institutional support, through the Inter-Collectivities Meraguemou Union:
- formations of the elected
- support to strengthen the capacities of municipalities in their project management
- support for basic local public services such as education and health
- Rehabilitation, equipment and animation of the House of Friendship, resource center for actors of cooperation with Montreuil and headquarters of the Union Inter-Communities Meraguemou, conducted as part of a school-site.

2. The female promotion:
- support for the Yélimané women's network
- construction of the House of Women of Yélimané, in association with associations Montreuilloises (House of women, Associations of Malian women of Montreuil).

3. Promoting the conditions for sustainable economic and agricultural development:

- support for business creation: setting up of a binational support system for project leaders in Montreuil (migrants) and Yélimané, conducted in partnership between the City, the Inter-Collectivités Meraguemou Union, the NGO montreuilloise SIAD and the ADCYF
- fight against desertification: support for programs implemented with migrants and communes of the circle (soil restoration and reforestation project in six communes of the Circle)
- Networking of actors, support for migrant initiatives, development of exchange activities between territories.

These actions fall within the framework of the three-year program defined between the partners and co-financed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development.

Financial partners
- Department of Foreign Affairs and International Development (Maedi)
- French Embassy in Mali
- Île-de-France Region (partner of Kayes Region)
- Delegation of the European Union to Mali
- Agency for Rural Development of the Senegal River Valley (ADRS)

Technical partners
- Association for the Development of Yélimané in France
(ADCYF) - International Development Support Service (SIAD) - Montreuil Women's House - Association of Malian Women of Montreuil - Agency for Sustainable Development of Yélimané (ADDY) - Local Committee of Twinning of Yélimané

Montreuil 101 000 inhabitants), third city of the Île-de-France, on the border of Paris, has a long experience of welcoming migrants. Among the 19% of foreigners currently, there are about 6,000 Malians. The majority is from the Yelimane Circle which is located in a pre-Sahelian region. Approximately 137,000 people live in the 90 villages in an area of 6,098 km2. It is the lack of water and resources that has led Malians to immigrate. A modest salary earned in Paris makes live very extended families, in the Malian sense of the term.
Responding to a request from the Malian associations in Montreuil, the municipality has engaged since the end of 1985 in a twinning-cooperation with the Circle of Yelimané. The aim is to support Circle initiatives that promote sustainable development and enable villagers to live in their own country.

Actors and cooperation structures
The cooperation is based both on associations and on Malian and French institutions. In the context of decentralized cooperation, it has the support of the Municipality of Montreuil, the State Secretariat for Cooperation and the European Union.
The associative partners in Montreuil are the Association for the Development of the Circle of Yélimané in France (ADCYF) which gathers almost all the Malian associations coming from the Circle of Yélimané, and the Office Montreuillois of the International Relations (OMRI), association law 1901, who is in charge of carrying out the policy of the City of Montreuil in the international field.

These two organizations meet in Montreuil in a follow-up committee whose task is to support the development and implementation of the three-year development plan for the Yelimané Circle. It meets at least once a quarter.

In Yélimané, another Monitoring Committee also meets at least once a quarter. It is composed of the members of the Local Development Committee which will eventually be replaced by the representatives of the Mayors of the twelve new communes. It has the same powers as the Montreuil Monitoring Committee.

In addition, in Yélimané, a fully Malian operational team of nine is responsible for implementing the development program. It relies on a network of technical operators outside the team on the basis of contractual commitments.
Finally, twice a year, in Yélimané, there is a Steering Committee which is responsible for monitoring the activity of the program team, the definition of the annual projected programs and their financial resources, the analysis and control half-yearly results obtained and possible reorientations of the program in progress.
This steering committee brings together OMRI and ADCYF representatives from Montreuil, representatives of the Yelimané Circle Local Development Committee, the Local Twinning Committee, women's and youth associations, and representatives of the Association. for the economic and social development of Yélimané in Bamako (ADESY) as well as operators in an advisory capacity. So all the decisions are taken in a tripartite way: Montreuil-migrants-villagers.
Note that it is rarely necessary to send French specialists to Mali, as they are most often found locally.

Actions taken
1. Agricultural hydraulics. There is real potential for increasing the production of traditional crops by means of micro-dams, filter dams, ponds, small protection structures for growing areas, development of market gardening perimeters as well as the realization of more important works as the example of the dam of Diocoulané which allowed the cultivation of 350 ha.

2. Drinking water. Its access remains a permanent concern of the villagers. Several water supplies have been made or are in progress in the villages. The program focuses on improving the management of existing and future water points.

3. The supply of cereals. The program trains grain store managers to ensure the supply of villagers in a highly remote area at fair and affordable prices.

4. Education and literacy. The program aims to consolidate the four existing village libraries, possibly to create others, to train young volunteers in literacy and to help set up literacy centers.

5. Small productive projects. Loans, granted individually or collectively, will enable villagers to carry out small projects, sources of additional income.

Financing
They come from the city of Montreuil, on par with the State Secretariat for Cooperation, the European Union, migrants and aim to enhance the work of villagers Other partners, such as the Great Lakes of Seine or the Council Regional Council of Ile-de-France intervene on concrete projects.

Difficulties

They come first from the climate itself, from the advance of the desert, partly linked to global warming and poor management.
They come then from the difficulty, in terms of proposals of actions, to grant the desires expressed by the villagers with the solutions proposed by the migrants. Hence the interest sometimes of mediators, former migrants themselves, returned to the country and involved in both cultures.
Finally, the difficulties stem from the temptation to model Western models on a reality very different from that of Africa. It can be said that cooperation is a real support for sustainable development in the Yélimané Circle and at the same time in Montreuil, through the awareness it brings, especially during exchanges between young people. The goal of rolling back the desert, is threatened in the medium term by the warming of the climate that we provoke by the economic development of the most industrialized countries.
This experience shows that it is possible to increase local agricultural production both to meet the needs of the population and to provide jobs for young people who prefer to work in the country rather than risk their lives in an adventure like illegal immigration.

Another goal is also attainable; import substitution, especially as food prices fluctuate uncheckably.

Figure 31. Import prices of basic food products



Source: African Economic Outlook 2014. Global Value Chains and Africa's Industrialization. Report co-published by ADB, OECD and UNDP, p.37

Why not set up an advance system on seed costs and pre-harvest preparation? We know that there is a gap between the first plowing to return the land and the harvest. The idea of insurance on the hazards of nature such as natural disasters and climate change is also needed. Another benefit of the consolidation model is the ability to negotiate large quantities of supplies, given the regularity of purchases and their large quantities. To many, agri-food producers can have a common commercial action, which can take many forms depending on the country, the sector, the local habits and customs. Mutual aid and solidarity can take many different forms. This ranges from the pooling of funds to the loan of equipment and seeds, to the raising of livestock in common, through advice and sharing of innovations and information.

The prices of agricultural products are subject to the exogenous fluctuations that African farmers undergo.

Figure 32. Export prices of agricultural products



Source: African Economic Outlook 2014. Global Value Chains and Africa's Industrialization. Report co-published by AfDB, OECD and UNDP, p.36

Governments could fund facilitators and coaching to help farmers and ranchers make the best choices to make their activities productive.

All these instruments and means should lead to better mechanization of African agriculture. Josef Kienzle, agricultural engineer at the Plant Production and Protection Division of FAO (United Nations Agriculture Organization), told Euractive website on July 20, 2016: "The EU must get involved in the agricultural mechanization of Africa ". Some services for farmers were largely covered by World Bank loans. When this support stopped, the mechanization devices collapsed. It is unfortunate that farmers have preferred to return to manual tools. The use of tractors has become quite rare and only for large crops or private companies. In my Trilateral scheme, the Mashreq countries should finance this effort to industrialize African agriculture with European technology in return for participation in the profits and products of agricultural activities. Contrary to a dominant idea that mechanization would destroy jobs in the agricultural sector, it is the opposite: young people migrate to cities and Europe because the work of the land is too painful when there are technologies alternatives. The modernization of agribusiness would make this sector attractive and allow the redeployment of labor to other tasks. If they receive funding, the young people who were previously trained would become real entrepreneurs, developing their businesses, improving their own income but also those of their relatives. Traditional agriculture, which accounts for 70% of African agriculture, has an economic weight that will decline if action is not taken. The debate is: how to reconcile a model of sustainable, sustainable and productive development without eliminating hundreds of thousands of jobs?

FAO supported the procurement of tractors for African farmers and signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the European Committee of Farm Machinery Manufacturers' Associations (CEMA). It deplores the fact that this material is diverted and corruption is rampant.

The Chinese have sold agricultural equipment that can not be said to be reliable. On the contrary. A senior Tanzanian official asked them not to "send them equipment that breaks down after only a few hours of use." A Chinese tractor is selling 8,200 euros but will probably not work more than two or three years.

On 7 June 2016, the European Parliament adopted a report condemning intensive agriculture in Africa. According to the rapporteur, Maria Heubuch (Greens), "we have already made the mistake of intensive agriculture in Europe, we should not reproduce it in Africa, because this model destroys family farming and reduces biodiversity".

One solution would be to adapt the African model taking into account its specificities. Why not provide small operators with smaller machines and adapted equipment and teach them how to use them on smaller, easily usable plots, whose maintenance does not require calling an engineer from the European supplier with all the related costs and the more or less long delays?

In 2012, G7 countries and ten African countries launched the New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition (Nasan), to lift 50 million people out of poverty by boosting investment in the agricultural sector in these ten African countries. (including Benin, Nigeria and Côte d'Ivoire) by 2022. The establishment of mechanisms facilitating access to land, the use of certified seeds (hybrids, GMOs) as well as tax facilities in favor Private investments in the agricultural sector are the counterparts to these investments.

Aisha Dowell, in charge of agriculture at Global Justice Now, believes that "smallholders produce ... with much more sustainable and climate-friendly technologies than large agricultural companies. [...] Nasan is doing the exact opposite, facilitating the control of large agricultural enterprises over food systems in various African countries. The elected representatives of the European Parliament accuse the Nasan of supporting GMOs as part of the public-private partnership for the distribution, adoption and consumption of fortified organic agricultural varieties. The June 2016 report points to the risk of land grabbing by large groups at the expense of smallholders because "in Africa, land law is the exception, since the ownership of agricultural land operates according to the principles of the right of use and customary law ". The rapporteur stresses that "the partnership must therefore respect the different forms of ownership so as not to endanger small farms". An approach that the European Parliament's report calls for based on FAO's guidelines.

Another warning from the European Parliament, and not the least, concerns the privatization of seeds that would come under the control of the commercial seed sector. However, according to the report, nearly 90% of African farmers trade in their seeds (purchase, sale, exchange, etc.). Regarding GMOs, which many European countries reject use, Jean-Cyril Dagorn of Oxfam France, quoted by Euractiv on June 8, 2016: "France [...] must act to block any expansion of the Nasan and implement a transparent and inclusive assessment of the impact of the initiative in the ten African countries concerned ".

The development of agriculture and agribusiness with a mechanization in doses adapted to the African context, the industrialization of the continent impose to solve the following problems:

- education and vocational training;

- infrastructure: the rail network, roads, the Internet and especially electricity;

- health, in its two components: prevention and medical follow-up with compulsory vaccination and a health booklet that accompanies African children from birth to their end of life.

Investments in infrastructure and upgrading the skills of African workers would encourage businesses to move to Africa. Most African children can not continue their education and fall directly into poverty and emigration. The European Union and the Arab countries with large surpluses of foreign exchange reserves should co-finance these expenditures, not for aid purposes but for productive and mutually beneficial cooperation. An example should support us in this scheme: the soaring price of butter. It has increased 172% in 20 months, reaching 6,800 euros per ton in October 2017.

Heavy investments in African agriculture and livestock would ensure the eradication of poverty in Africa and a sharing of crops and animal and dairy products for the Gulf countries, whose needs of the population are increasing.

In an interview with WirtschaftsWoche and taken over by the Euractive website on July 3, 2016, Jeffrey Sachs, then adviser to the UN secretary-general, estimated that it would take around 45 billion euros a year for the sectors of the economy. education and health. Africa would require an additional € 195 billion a year for infrastructure projects. The specialist in the fight against poverty suggests that in the world, there are huge sums that sleep in banks. Investors simply do not know what to do with it. If the public sector shows them the way, they will follow. This is what I also think of Arab funds that are placed in US Treasuries and financial markets with the risk of suffering, severely, a stock market crash and / or bond.

J. Sachs points to a crucial point, namely investing in roads and power plants, saying the rest will follow. Infrastructure generates other business and makes investments in agriculture and industry profitable. The Chinese prefer mines and raw materials and employ their workforce as a priority. In this sense, the Chinese are more willing to invest in the long term, without worrying about the issue of human rights.

Germany has chosen another method to penetrate the African agricultural sector by funding green innovation centers. The investment is modest: 80 million euros for German companies and research institutes. Small producers will learn effective cultivation techniques, use of modern machinery and targeted pesticides. Critics of the project accuse him of seeking to open new markets for German exports. I am tempted to say that it is good war. If it's win-win, why not?

Researchers at the ZEF, a research center at the University of Bonn, offer improved management techniques and new technologies, such as solar drying of fruit and vegetables or studying livestock movements and eating habits. Another proposal is the training of farmers-breeders in the use of modern machinery. Detlef Virchow explains: "Of course, green

innovation centers are not just for farmers with plots of less than two hectares. In fact, it's about learning to fish for a man. "
The mechanization of agriculture and the emergence of a real agri-food industry must not stop at the stage of production. We must look for the transformation of agricultural products into final consumer goods (for example: fruits reduced to jam) or destined to be transformed into semi-finished products (cocoa transformed into cocoa butter). The transformation process also concerns mines, oil and gas.

Chapter 3. Africa's Inclusion in Global Value Chains

Global value chains offer African countries the potential for structural transformation. This is the statement of the 2014 edition of African Economic Outlook. This PEA is the result of joint work by the African Development Bank (AfDB), the OECD Development Center and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). This report, entitled "Global Value Chains and Africa's Industrialization," highlights how Africa's engagement in the global economy can foster industrialization. In his introductory speech to the report, Pascal Lamy, former director general of the World Trade Organization (WTO), suggested that African countries have the capacity to burn several steps to integrate directly into a value chain, without even wait until all other links in the chain are in place. By participating in a value chain, countries and companies can acquire new capabilities that allow upgrading. Pascal Lamy warned African countries against non-tariff barriers that can no longer be resolved by preferential trade agreements.

For her part, Angela Lusigi, Policy Advisor, UNDP's Strategy and Advisory Unit, said in the report quoted earlier that: "For value chains to effectively integrate the poor and marginalized - often women - Targeted public policies and inclusive business models should facilitate access to productive assets, such as land and finance, and improve the productivity and resilience of small producers.
The report emphasizes that more effective participation in regional and global value chains contributes to economic diversification, the return on domestic resources and the value of infrastructure investments while engaging in high value-added activities.

The mobilization of funding for co-development projects under our Trilateral framework imposes a regulatory framework bringing together international institutions such as the European Union, the African Union, the Arab League, the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Maghreb Economic Community, the economic community of North Africa, as well as all the regional economic zones. The World Bank (which in 2016 committed $ 13.3 billion in funding to sub-Saharan Africa), the African Development Bank (which has a commitment of $ 11 billion), the IMF and OECD would become associate members.
Under the 11th EDF (European Development Fund), for the period 2014-2020, out of a total envelope of approximately 30 billion euros, 25 billion should be deployed in Africa. The EDFs are mainly concentrated in Africa (the funds of the 10th EDF had thus been implemented 90% on the African continent).

Several objectives must be assigned to this tour de table: better control the risk, allow companies to lead long-term strategies in an Africa that suffers from the image of unstable continent politically and economically. It is the guarantee to develop sustainable projects, creators of wealth and jobs. The key to success is reassuring investors about the solvency of customers. These international bodies must verify that the clauses of the projects they finance are respected.

But communication is not enough anymore. International institutions regularly report on the evolution of African countries' deb

Figure 33. Debt Sustainability Analysis

Tableau 1.3. **Analyse de la viabilité de la dette : apprécier le risque de surendettement**

Risque faible	Risque modéré	Risque élevé
Bénin (janvier 2013)	Burkina Faso (juin 2013)	Burundi (septembre 2013)
Cameroun (juin 2013)	RCA (juin 2012)	Comores (décembre 2013)
Cabo Verde (janvier 2012)	Côte d'Ivoire (décembre 2013)	Tchad (mai 2013)
Congo (août 2013)	Ghana (mai 2013)	RDC (avril 2013)
Éthiopie (octobre 2013)	Gambie (mai 2013)	Djibouti (mars 2013)
Kenya (avril 2013)	Guinée (juillet 2013)	São Tomé-et-Principe (juillet 2012)
Liberia (décembre 2013)	Guinée-Bissau (juin 2013)	Soudan (novembre 2013)
Nigeria (mai 2013)	Lesotho (septembre 2013)	Zimbabwe (septembre 2012)
Rwanda (décembre 2013)	Malawi (juillet 2012)	
Sénégal (juin 2013)	Mali (février 2013)	
Tanzanie (juin 2012)	Mauritanie (juin 2012)	
Ouganda (décembre 2013)	Mozambique (juin 2013)	
Zambie (mai 2012)	Niger (avril 2013)	
	Sierra Leone (septembre 2012)	
	Togo (juillet 2011)	

Note : Entre parenthèses, la date de l'analyse la plus récente.
Source : Analyse de la viabilité de la dette des pays à faible revenu, Banque mondiale/FMI.

Source: African Economic Outlook 2014. Global Value Chains and Africa's Industrialization. Report co-published by ADB, OECD and UNDP, p.40

Coordination spaces already exist but are non-binding. One example is the OECD's dialogue forum with the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). Some African countries are also part of the OECD Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Tax Information.

Public support and funding should go to the private sector, with safeguards, so that the funds contribute to value creation and jobs. Private companies have little debt and often rely on self-financing. No company has developed without resorting to bank financing and / or financial markets. Leverage should benefit start-ups, very small enterprises (TPEs), small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and mid-cap companies (ETI) and the encouragement of venture capital.

In order to facilitate the creation, expansion and growth of businesses, the creation of a one-stop shop is ideally suited to guide access to the various financing, insurance and technical assistance tools for the management and development of businesses. prospecting new markets.
In this sense, institutional relays should be used under the aegis of technical representatives of the Arab League, the GCC, the African Economic Zones and the European Union. These institutions could form sectoral sub-groups to inform on business projects and opportunities, financing, guarantees and administrative and legal formalities. International support organizations, whether commercial services in the countries concerned, international chambers of commerce or employers' organizations, have their place in the Trilateral, bringing together the three blocks.

A joint study conducted by AfDB (African Development Bank), OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) and UNDP (United Nations Development Program) under the umbrella of African Economic Outlook 2014 compiled data. on African economies and proposals on how to build global value chains and Africa's industrialization.
At first glance, the authors of the publication note that the involvement of Africa is limited to low value activities and recommends to take part in activities with higher value added given the strengths of the African continent. Achieving this goal requires opening up to trade, targeting regional and emerging markets, modernizing infrastructure, promoting local businesses and investing in education.

I tirelessly defended on Africa 24 as an editorialist the absolute necessity for the African countries to change their exploitation model of their wealth, by developing as much as possible the process of transformation of the mining and agricultural raw materials.

The multinationals that come to Africa for their supplies should engage in socially responsible processes, integrating agricultural and mining producers into the process of production, recovery and distribution. Of course, this could not be done solely by virtue of the particular character of African products as well as their intrinsic quality.

The microclimate and the terroir are assets for exotic products, original or rare, with unique characteristics. According to the Financial Times (2014), Heineken International produces more than 11,000 tons of rice in the Kisangani region of the Democratic Republic of the Congo for the production of a beer with an unusual taste.

It is through technology and innovation that African countries will be able to become part of the international division of labor and the process of globalized production and distribution. In doing so, small, medium and large farmers would be dragged into this virtuous groundwork guaranteeing new markets and expansion of those already acquired. If, according to UNCTAD, 80% of world trade is done by multinational firms, they have been committed for decades to outsourcing certain activities, through the use of outsourcing or service providers.

The relocation of production is not necessarily synonymous with deindustrialization of the homeland of origin but a redistribution of tasks that could improve the global competitiveness of the manufactured product. When I was responsible for the economic development of several localities in eastern Paris, I followed the Hollywood Chewing Gum factory in Montreuil which, since the 1990s, has shed its print activity printing and transportation, to focus on productive bases. Thus, the subsidiary of the American group could rely on subcontracting to printers and transport companies that operate at a tight pace. According to EVA, a joint data compilation at the OECD and the WTO, the added value created, directly or indirectly, by the services, as a variable inserted in the process of valuing the total value added of manufactured goods, is 30% (figure below) .

Figure 34. Share of services in the value added of manufactures trade, all countries, 2009



Source: African Economic Outlook 2014. Global Value Chains and Africa's Industrialization. Report co-published by ADB, OECD and UNDP, p.137

Industrial and agricultural production generates around them a myriad of service activities such as transport, logistics, storage, computing, accounting and communication.

In the automotive, food and chemical sectors, the largest share of value added is made up of distribution and repairs, followed by business services and, third, transportation and warehousing.

African countries should seize the niche of intermediate goods as a driver of trade growth since the 1990s. According to Cattaneo and Miroudot (2013), imports of intermediate goods promote access to the most efficient factors of production. so that companies produce cheaper.

But food scandals as well as reports and publications on the negative impact of certain foods, beverages and processed products on health have imposed a change in legislation and have imposed the need for greater traceability. Public health and safety standards (phytosanitary) compete with the initiatives of private producers and distributors for opportunistic reasons, surfing on this ecological wave or to meet the demands of consumers.

Figure 35. Trade unbundling



Source: African Economic Outlook 2014. Global Value Chains and Africa's Industrialization. Report co-published by ADB, OECD and UNDP, p.138

Input accounted for about 65% (or $ 11 billion) of imports in 2012 compared to 57%, or $ 2.8 billion, in 1995. Due to the deindustrialization of European and American countries, and as a result of the rise in the industrial sector in emerging countries, the share of OECD countries in world imports of intermediate goods fell from 75% to 60%, as the ratio rises in the rest of the world. The share of manufacturing value added in OECD countries accounts for only 60% of the world as against 80%.

The share of value added in trade is low in Africa and is growing slowly from 1.4% to 2.2% between 1995 and 2011, while that of Europe is 50.9% in 2011, against 57.5% in 1995, and that of East Asia increased (16.2% in 2011 against 14.4% in 1995). This ratio also dropped in North America from 13.1% in 1995 to 11.8% in 2011.

Unlike countries that have industrialized by mastering the entire production process, African countries can be part of the chain of production and distribution. But Africa can aspire to an increasingly integrated continent-wide model of industrialization and a South-South division of labor.
It is important to avoid being content with assembly activities alone and to favor opportunities that promote job creation and high added value, increased integration in international trade ...

In the value chain, large companies try to take advantage of the best quality and price inputs in each country. Africa needs to move upmarket and / or optimal specialization.

Figure 36. The upscaling wave in the global value chain



Source: African Economic Outlook 2014. Global Value Chains and Africa's Industrialization. Report co-published by ADB, OECD and UNDP, p.142

However, several pitfalls are to be avoided:
- not to specialize in phases of the low value-added production process,
- Exposure to international crises by being absolutely and exclusively connected to pro-cyclical activities,
- unbridled exploitation of natural resources with a risk of exhaustion,
- a strong dependence on the strategies of multinational firms.

Large companies have invested in Africa in low value-added and technology-limited sectors such as clothing instead of high-tech industries, such as electronics, new technologies, automotive, medical ...

Cattaneo and Miroudot (2013) suggest that each country should choose the activities that are most competitive, able to integrate it advantageously into the international division of labor. It is still necessary that it has a sufficient supply of the products in question. Assembly operations should benefit from the logistics and ease of entry and exit of components and processed products. In doing so, the appropriate environment for this integration into value chains needs to be created without harming other sectors. Tax incentives to encourage one sector could be at the expense of other sectors and other utilities, health and education.

The industrialization of Africa also involves the emergence of private entrepreneurship and entrepreneurship. Oil and gas producing countries have not encouraged the creation of activities outside the private sectors. The other countries have experienced a rentier elite and a comprador bourgeoisie depending on former colonizing powers and / or new industrial countries like China and India. Basic and higher education can help develop productive enterprises. African countries need to create 10 to 12 million new jobs every year to absorb new young people entering the labor market.

The training must embrace both the managerial and financial, technical and professional sectors.
The authors of the AfDB, OECD and UNDP report, published in 2014 and already cited, have calculated the degree of integration of world regions into global value chains, and rank Africa third in this international division of labor.

Figure 37. Integration of world regions into global value chains, 2011



Source: African Economic Outlook 2014. Global Value Chains and Africa's Industrialization. Report co-published by ADB, OECD and UNDP, p.150

But African integration into global production and distribution is more downstream rather than upstream, although recent developments show a reversal of this situation.
Europe and Asia are the main suppliers of intermediate goods incorporated in African exports, accounting for 40% and 30% respectively. Europe is also the main destination for intermediate products from Africa. Upstream integration between African countries must progress. It accounts for only 25% in East Africa and 15% in Southern Africa and Central Africa, and less than 10% in North Africa.
Africa's involvement in the international division of labor is mainly through the manufacturing sector in front of services. The lagging agriculture should be better off with the progress of agricultural processing. African agricultural production (fruits, vegetables, cotton, tea, etc.) accounts for 88% of the inputs in the manufacturing processes of global international products as well as sales and marketing activities. The processing of agricultural products represents only 39%.
In order for African agricultural products to be easily exported to the European area and the Mashreq, it is necessary to set up exchange of experience and information commissions in order to make recommendations concerning:
- improved standards, food safety and animal and plant health as well as phytosanitary issues,
- the guarantee that these measures do not create unjustified obstacles to trade, but instead facilitate trade.
This should result in veterinary agreements, which apply to animals and products of animal origin.
Subsidies for agricultural products as well as for industrial products and services must be highly transparent in order to limit distortions to pure and perfect competition in commercial relations between the three blocks.
Permanent consultation between them must make it possible to measure the negative effects on trade between them, to find a solution if a subsidy has adverse effects on other partners and to avoid subsidizing agricultural exports to other countries. the other party's market.
Africa's services exports were about $ 102 billion. They consist of computer and information services, financial services, business services, distribution and tourism.
The tourist assets of Africa are multiple, that they are the climate, the diversity of the sites, the reliefs and landscapes, the virginity and the purity of certain countries, are not valued at their right level. Wars and political and social instability, security problems, divert Western tourists from the destination Africa.

Chapter 4. small and medium enterprises in the International Division of Labor

It remains to settle the question of the smallness of the companies and their difficulty to weigh in this international division of labor. The associative formula and the groupings of companies can constitute the adequate answer. They make it possible to leverage the bargaining power of their members and to improve the pooling of know-how and innovations by sector and by sector, as well as technological transfer.
So far, the participation of African companies in the international division of labor has been initiated by multinational firms operating in Africa. We must reverse the trend by visiting and prospecting all over the world. This is what the Chinese have done by not only receiving foreign trade and foreign experts but encouraging Chinese companies to explore promising markets.

Given the human and financial resources to be put in place, their sharing under the auspices of the regional economic communities should be facilitated. Several networks should be set in motion: African banks established in Europe and America, as sources of information on business opportunities and financial support, African chambers of commerce and commercial services of African embassies in Africa. industrialized countries that must restructure in order to serve African companies seeking to internationalize, as do French embassies around the world, for example.

African SMEs that are not able to prospect outside the continent could count on the portage to the international major internationalized African groups. The principle is well established in Europe: the multinational firm provides its offices and networks to help small businesses to enter this foreign market at lower cost and low risk. This support in terms of knowledge, infrastructure and resources is valuable. The international SME remains in control of its commercial strategy in the target market. Such a portage takes several forms:
- sharing of information as well as advice on the target market to help carry out market research,
- connecting with local customers and operators, addressing them directly to influential decision-makers and clients potentially interested in its offer by presenting themselves as a partner recommended by the major group,
- assist legally and commercially the SME carried in the drafting of its contracts and on customs issues, taxes, regulations ...
- temporary loan of offices, business premises or accommodation of staff or trainees,
- collective portering for a group of SMEs.

Porting could be between large companies and SMEs in the same economic zone or block. It could be organized regionally, continentally or between the three blocks under the umbrella of the mixed chambers of commerce.

An international trade awareness plan could be put in place in each region, municipality or agglomeration. This action financed by the public authorities must be conducted under the aegis of the chambers of commerce or employers' organizations, why not by European or World Bank type financing.
African SMEs need to be more and more efficient and innovative to cope with the demands and changes of the market. However, unlike large companies, they do not have the strategic tools or the skills to deal with all the problems they face.

Their structural situation stems from the need to develop new products or services, to market and launch their offers, to network, to question their international environment in order to identify the opportunities and mutations of their market.

Their durability depends on their ability to detect and occupy new markets, to work in a network and in partnership to share risks and pool knowledge.
The future of the economic and social fabric of the African continent, its stabilization as well as the creation of new jobs depend on the dynamism of these essential actors that are the SMEs in the development of the local economy.

I organized collective actions in several African countries that I called the SAAR program: "Awareness, Action and Network Support". This project, specially adapted to SMEs, aims to provide quickly operational solutions to SME issues. The idea of adopting "awareness through action" (association of "awareness" and support in collective actions) is proposed, in order to meet the requirement to avoid the leaders of SMEs and to their teams too big a "break" in their daily activities.
The link between "action awareness" and "networking support", a methodology that allows the company to use meetings and group training not only as a learning opportunity, but also as a privileged opportunity to detect new market opportunities makes SAAR a new and original action program. The goal is triple for SMEs:
- to give them access to expert advice for international development,
- teach them the most effective and innovative methodologies in organization and skills development through a transfer of operational know-how,
- teach them how to network to maximize their knowledge and to efficiently and quickly exploit business opportunities.
The aim is to make SME managers and their teams autonomous and capable of exploiting, in an efficient and operational way, the knowledge and know-how learned during collective actions.
This awareness plan can concern both SMEs (independent companies with less than 250 employees) and large companies with no international experience. It integrates leaders and executives, experienced or with low training.

The methods and objectives of these collective actions are aimed at:
- collectively mobilize and optimize the performance of companies around technical experts and a theme related to international development, information and the network,
- by action, with the help of technical assistance and pedagogy specially adapted to the concrete problems of SMEs, for results that are immediately operational and exploitable,
- promote and boost the network spirit by encouraging meetings and exchanges between companies and experts,
- disseminate good practices and collective experiences,
- train in best practices and help develop a real ability to network for the development of international partnership offers,
- develop synergies and the sharing of information on business opportunities and new markets for the improvement of commercial actions, allowing a reaction in times faster and faster, in the face of changes in the environment and markets.

The purpose of SAAR collective action is to enable SMEs to access expert advice to solve their immediate problems, while improving staff skills by transferring know-how and skills.

This action program is intended to jointly address the specific needs of each company and pool knowledge and network solutions through collective awareness, support actions and individual technical assistance, are subject to the responsibilities and to their respective teams.

This program helps to identify and reinforce development actions, foster international alliance strategies and intensify (private / public) support networks for marketing and export. Experience shows that the use of a dynamic international development policy has been a growth factor for SMEs that have followed the instructions of the advisers.

How to monitor the prospection? Negative prospecting and positive prospecting should be distinguished. It is a question of highlighting the differences between what the company knew of the market (market study) and the reality of the "field". The analysis of these differences leads either to a confirmation of the planned choices (positive prospection), or to a revision of the policy to be implemented on the prospected market (negative prospecting).

Negative prospecting
The reasons for a negative survey can be numerous. Some of them alone justify the abandonment of the market as the absence of the couple product / market or a product in phase of decline. These situations usually occur when no serious market study has been conducted prior to the mission. In other cases, an analysis of the reasons is needed in order to decide whether to abandon the market knowingly. It revolves around the following questions:

1 / The product does not correspond to the expectations of the market?
Are the desired adaptations feasible?
Can the market accept the appearance of a new product?

2 / Why would the price be too high?
Can the export cost price for this market be lowered?
Is the variable cost sale feasible?
Are the margins compressible?

3 / The choice of implementation mode is not appropriate?
Can the partner profile be changed and stay in line with our market strategy?
Are targets editable?
Is another mode of distribution possible?

If the answers to these questions are negative, the market should be temporarily abandoned.

Positive prospecting
The survey confirms the choices made in terms of commercial policy. It is now necessary to implement operations carried out internationally. Prospect tracking is done in two stages.

Upon return from the business trip, a letter of intent with full documentation of the company and its products and additional information is sent to all prospects. At the same time, well-known information is collected from its banker, chambers of commerce and industry, employers' organizations and the commercial services of the embassies.
Do not hesitate to ask your financial partner for information on the reliability of your prospects. Indeed, its foreign correspondents make it possible to better understand the credit risk. This information must however be crossed with another source.

After formatting the mission or trade show report and after receiving the reputation information, a response to the prospect's request is made. This is different depending on whether it is user / requestor of quotation (drawing up of a sales contract, etc.) or future partner / importer, commissioned representative, licensee, master franchisee, co-owner, etc.

In the latter case, the company prepares a contract to unite it with its future partner while inquiring about its commercial and financial notoriety.
It is better to invite your future foreign partner to France to sign the collaboration contract. Indeed, this approach has two advantages:
- "at home" bargaining offers a psychological advantage to the exporter (places are known)
- the visit of the company allows the partner to better know the personnel with whom he will be in contact as well as the methods and techniques used in the management of orders and shipments.

Finally, the sales department must update:
- the prospecting file which contains a statement of the prospects,
- the customer file which mentions the state of the relations with these,
- the competition file.

Marketing appeared in the United States at the end of the 1950s, in France at the end of the 1960s. Before its appearance, companies focused solely on the production function, which is explained by the fact that the demand was superior to the offer. When the trend reversed, French companies had to refine their techniques to attract the consumer, to create new needs.
French exports are hampered by the size and quality of SMEs.

The product is one of the four variables of the marketing plan, it is defined as the response of the company to the needs of the consumer.
The trademark or service mark is a graphic sign capable of distinguishing the goods or services of a natural or legal person.
Packaging is often overlooked but is an important component in the product recovery process. The container ensures the integrity of the contents, from the output of the packaging line to the final destructor.
The product range consists of all varieties of products manufactured and sold by a company. This range offered by the company has two dimensions:
- the width: measured by the number of product lines proposed, ie the number of groups of products;
- the depth, that is to say the diversity of products offered.

To choose a positioning strategy, the company must refer to its target and the competition. The company needs to know the perception that consumers have of the products offered on the market in relation to their real expectations.

The life cycle is characterized by four phases of development which are:
- the launch phase: introduction of the product on a market,
- the growth phase: sales rise sharply and the product is known on the market,
- the phase of maturity: the level of sales remains high but begins to stagnate,
- the phase of decline: sales are down, profitability becomes negative.
I helped the Taratte company based in Montreuil sous-bois, which manufactures automatic lathes to sell its rudimentary machines in the Maghreb, because in Europe the numerical

control machine has supplanted this equipment. The advantage of this type of equipment is that it does not need maintenance or sophisticated maintenance. Of course I have also installed high-tech machines in Africa when the customer has the human resources and the ability to manage them.

Price policy

The pricing policy is a very particular component of the marketing mix. Unlike other variables, price plays an important role. Indeed, it can be a vector of positive benefits and significant value for the customer.

A company's pricing policy is to set the prices at which it sells its various products to its different customers. This same price must be accepted by customers as well as by the company, following a study conducted by the company: the study of the psychological price.

Producers' freedom to set prices can sometimes be limited by legislative or regulatory provisions

The importance of prices in a marketing-mix.

the presence of exacerbated competition encourages distributors to offer advantageous prices to their customers, while at the same time putting pressure on their suppliers. This same pressure allows the different actors to enjoy optimum profitability.

The approaches used in pricing

Pricing from costs.

Pricing from the competition.

The price setting from the request.

The synthetic approach taking into account all relevant factors.

The modulation of the price

Price modulation is allowed provided that the price advantages granted to certain customers are justified by economic, social or serious reasons and are not unduly discriminatory.

The marketing mix

Marketing-mix refers to the English terminology of the 4 axes or "PS":

Le *mix-marketing*

In english	**In french**
Product	Produits
Price	Prix
Place	Distribution
Promotion	Communication

The marketing mix is defined as the set of tools that the company has to achieve its objectives in the target market.

The distribution policy

The mission of a company does not end in its warehouse of finished products, it must also take care of the flow of its fabrications from its factories to the consumers or users.

Distribution can be defined as all the operations necessary to ensure the transfer of finished products of a company from the stage of production to the stage of consumption. But it is sometimes defined as "bringing to the right place, in sufficient quantity with the right choice, at the right time and with the services necessary for their sale, consumption and even maintenance".

Distribution channels
The distribution path is the path followed by a product or service to move from the production stage to the consumption stage.

Electronic commerce
E-commerce is generally defined as all transactions made on the web, on-line orders online with electronic payment or not.

Currency risk hedging instruments
Foreign exchange risk hedging consists of reducing or canceling the foreign currency position of the company, using internal methods or transferring the risk to external organizations (banks and international trade insurers).

Management and internal coverage methods
There are four methods of currency risk:
- compensation: it consists in assigning the settlement of a claim in settlement of a debt denominated in the same monetary unit,
- the mesh: it is based on the use of compensation techniques,
-lidning: it consists in reducing the exchange risk by delaying or accelerating payments and repatriations,
- contractual exchange clauses: their purpose is to eliminate the currency risk or to limit it.

External methods based on the use of banks
There are three:
- borrowings and loans in foreign currencies: these techniques make it possible to have a share in the cash of the company and in the hedging of the exchange risk;
- Futures: this technique allows you to know in advance the price at which the banker will buy the currency from the exporter at maturity and sell the currency to the importer at the time of maturity;
- the foreign exchange option: it allows its holder to hedge its foreign exchange risk while preserving the possibility of making a foreign exchange gain in the event of a favorable change in the exchange rate of the currency.

Export credit insurance

Client risk and political risk are two of the major risks for the exporter. These risks can be hedged by means of banking techniques or the assignment of receivables.

 Typology of risks
The nature of the risks to which an exporter is exposed when dealing with a foreign buyer changes during the different phases of the operation. There are several types of risks such as political risk, commercial risk, manufacturing risk, credit risk, economic risk or currency risk.

 Private buyer and public buyer
The private buyer is the debtor who can be sued in a common law jurisdiction and against which a procedure for bankruptcy can be initiated.
The public purchaser is a debtor who escapes the recourse of common law because of its legal status.

 The different types of fonts
Three types of policies are issued by international development insurance: individual policies, global policies and subscription policies.

 Compensation conditions
In the event of a claim, international trade insurers only indemnify the insured if he has complied with the terms and conditions of the sales contract, and therefore the losses are not the result of his own fault. or negligence, which excludes the coverage of commercial or technical disputes.

The different types of international commercial insurance guaranty
Their field of action has gradually widened. To its original mission as an export credit insurer was added that of mobilizing new exporters.

 The procedures related to the prospection of markets
The principle of these procedures is to provide the exporter with risk coverage and financing:
- prospecting insurance: it guarantees the exporter against the financial losses resulting from the prospection of new foreign markets;
- fair insurance: the principle of fair insurance is to guarantee the insured against any losses that his participation in a commercial event abroad could entail;
- simplified prospecting insurance: the principle of this guarantee is to encourage companies to prospect new foreign markets by limiting the financial risk in case of failure.
The purpose of international business insurance is to provide effective financial support to SMEs in their first approach to markets deemed difficult.
- insurance offers: this guarantee concerns the hedging of the financial risk linked to the establishment of a tender offer in the context of international auctions or over-the-counter transactions.

 Credit insurance
Different types of credit insurance policies are issued by International Trade Insurance. There are short-term guarantees and medium and long-term guarantees.

Short-term guarantees: these guarantees concern the current trade in consumer goods with a credit life of not more than 180 days, and light or light-duty equipment that has a credit life of less than three years. years.
Medium- and long-term guarantees: Medium- and long-term guarantees are individual, that is, they apply to strictly individualized transactions.

Other guarantees:
International trade insurers also issue different guarantees adapted to the following risks:
 Economic risk guarantee: this guarantee was introduced so that French exporters would not be particularly disadvantaged with regard to foreign competitors in the event of a rapid rise in domestic prices.

 Foreign exchange risk guarantees: the international trade insurers offer the exporter three types of guarantees: the foreign exchange guarantee on repatriation, the foreign exchange guarantee on the basis of the forward exchange rate on the date of submission of the offer and the foreign exchange guarantee on currency transfers.
 Guarantees on deposits: the issue of bonds to guarantee the buyer of the seriousness of the offer, the good performance of the contract or financial commitments is very common in export transactions.
 Guaranteed export-oriented investments: this guarantee is intended for companies wishing to make new investments abroad, which will have the effect of significantly increasing French exports

Coverage of export risks by private insurance
The place of private insurance is still modest, but exporters tend to use it more and more frequently to cover some of their export risks. There are three basic categories of coverage:
-Market frustration insurance: These policies, originally designed for exporters participating in offshore projects, may be extended to cover clearing or service markets, leases and certain other transactions financial.
-Export Credit Insurance: This guarantee applies to commercial and political risks as well as non-transfer of currencies.
- Confiscation-export-nationalization (CEN) insurance: the purpose of CEN is to protect the insurer against the consequences of arbitrary decisions of a government.

African companies should master their relations with banks and financial organizations, in order to consolidate their efforts to internationalize. The aim is to establish a strategic and operational relationship with international financial organizations and to have a long-term vision of growth opportunities: increased investment potential, better cash flow, more secure payments, reducing the number of days / credits, increasing cash flow, reducing financial costs and increasing net margin.

The strategic financial plan consists of the operational participation of managers in all phases of development based on the identification of needs in the short and medium term. The translation of this strategic plan into an action plan involves the integration of the basic rules of negotiation with the organizations.
The creation of a recovery file requires the preparation of a file gathering all the available documents to achieve the expected result. The strategic choices of a method of recovery can be amicable, by judicial way or transfer of receivables, etc.

Financial security of SMEs
African SMEs too often lack financial and human resources and skills to ensure their sustainability in the current international context, as well as skills "sharp" in areas that are not at the heart of their job. Administrative and financial organization and risk management are generally not developed in SMEs, unless the manager himself has this competence.
The collective action "Financial Security" aims to:
- to make managers aware of the risks incurred in their international relations,
- help them to assess the risks and to treat them,
- to provide them with simple tools to identify, evaluate and prevent these risks,
- to ensure that they take control themselves through the techniques taught and feedback.

This program must enable SMEs to access, despite their size, technical solutions generally reserved for structured companies. It consists of helping companies (SMEs / VSEs) to evaluate, control and manage the risks that can compromise the achievement of business objectives and the implementation of company strategies. It relies on flow diagnoses, and in particular financial flows, which enable companies to secure their growth and international development.

Several phases of actions succeed one another:
- awareness of the actors and in particular of the head of the company,
- objective risk analysis in the form of a pre-diagnosis highlighting the strengths and weaknesses by proposing an action plan,
- establishment of an action plan,
- sensitization,
- Implementation of management tools: performance monitoring, operating cycle offset "BFR", cash flow plan, internal process / organization, ...
- search for financing, ...
- carrying out a diagnosis highlighting progress and residual risks,
- support actions for companies to monitor the action plan.

These services do not constitute an audit of the procedures nor a revision of the accounts, but a security of the administrative and financial organization of the structure.

The approach

An intervention that takes place in close coordination with the management / management of the company in the development and implementation of tools for measuring an internationalization strategy:
- operational risk management,
- global devices for monitoring and measuring performance,
- analysis of other factors.

Transparency and risk analysis

One of the major objectives of the analysis is very often to help to decompartmentalise the functions within a company and to reach a better visibility at the same time overall for the structure but also in its transversal functions.

Toolkit for Risk Management in SMEs mainly focused on financial risks.

Implementation of a financial risk assessment "toolkit" that provides practical means and clear information for risk assessment, development of a proactive risk management approach in SMEs, and the implementation of corrective actions.

The components of risk assessment and risk management should be grouped into short sequences that can be covered by a reasonable amount of work without the need for too much technical expertise.

In this way, the investment required to initiate the process is very limited and the results are visible very quickly.

In cases where a particular technical nature is required (atypical sector of activity, major problems not covered by the generalist tool), the risks are analyzed in more detail by specialists after agreement of the head of the structure, so that no important aspect is neglected.

Operational risks in a foreign market may result:
- internal dysfunctions and / or external events related to the general environment (financial, legal, tax, cultural, etc.)

-Operational Risk Management: reduced operating costs and stabilized cash flow; improvement of the quality of products or services; shorten the order-client cycle time; reduce supply chain risk exposure; Mitigate investment risk by confirming the business case and method of supplying capital equipment.
- the management of assets and liabilities, cash flow and liquidity, customer credit risk.

What expected impact on the SME group targeted by the project?

After having objectively analyzed the strengths and weaknesses and made an assessment of the real risks, the orientation of the action plan is then drawn.
It remains to define the relevant and priority actions, to implement and guide them, proposing to the company, if necessary, to be accompanied by a professional and to draw up a balance sheet of the action.

Understand the logistics

Logistics is a great guarantee of competitiveness for the company. It is still necessary to know his trades, his advantages and the instructions for outsourcing.
What is "logistics"?
The exact definition of the term "logistics" is "control of a flow". An explanation a little short, so much the logistics is a vast field of activities, completing the transport. One and the same company can not control every link in the supply chain. That's why the company has to learn how to cut down the organization of work, stick to its core business and outsource the functions it does not control. "
We distinguish between "pure" logistics and logistics in the broad sense. In the flow direction, "pure" logistics includes four business lines: receipt and storage in quantity and quality, order picking, shipping of goods and inventory management. Logistics in the broad sense include other trades than pure logistics as logistics expertise, which consists in reducing the number of vehicles, warehouses and stock. One clarification, however: It is rare for companies to specialize solely in pure logistics. Transport companies, in their new form, have some links in the chain.

How are the logistics professions organized?
Each of the pure logistics trades requires specific skills, adapted technological or computer equipment. For each profession, there are several levels of skills and several mastering tools. For example, inventory management is a very complex function that requires a division of skills. The engineer must be able to master the computer tools of management such as software packages. These manage the available locations inside the warehouse. For storage, the operator must be able to be responsive at the level of material handling and respect the location orders formulated by the software package. In order to receive the goods, quality controllers must carry out strict controls in compliance with certain standards. For the preparation of the goods, the handling agents must master the palletization.
The regulatory framework for the maritime transport market should be established between the three blocks. It concerns measures ensuring that commercial vessels have equal and equitable access to ports and port services. It clarifies the regulatory texts so that the commitments made are clear.

What advantages to outsource?
For convenience, there will be four:
- concentration on his original business (investment priority and transfer of fixed costs in variable costs),
- reduction of logistical costs and reinforcement of the quality of the service by the effect of mutualisation of the flows and control of the procedures (gain of surfaces and resources, responsibility of the known and unknown demarcation, sharing of the information systems ...),
- reduction in tool stocks and transport costs (supply chain supply force, berthing, use of existing agencies),
-externalization of social risks.

Outsourcing? Manual
Identifying the links in the supply chain or "slicing" the organization of work, and outsourcing, is not easy. The expertise of a consulting firm is required. "Before outsourcing logistics, you first have to compare the cost of logistics internally and externally.

The international development of companies could only succeed in Africa by strengthening international trade and the approach of foreign markets both in public higher education (bachelor's and master's degree) and in higher education schools. public or private trade. Whatever the nature of the institution providing these trainings, it is essential to call on external stakeholders with solid experience in import, export and international partnership.
Pure commercial futures should not be the only recipients of international prospecting and negotiation techniques. Technicians too should be able to take into account the international dimension in order to convince foreign partners about the products and advantages of Made in Africa. Sometimes it would be essential to adapt the exportable products to the requirements of foreign customers.

It is preferable to develop double diplomas in the African country in partnership with leading European schools, as I had the opportunity to practice as a project manager commissioned by the Paris Graduate School of Management in Mali, in Côte d'Ivoire, Senegal and Algeria. The advantage is to avoid sending students abroad who, once they graduate, do not return to the country.

Once the conditions for the internationalization of Africa are brought together from the point of view of formation and networks, the industrialization of the continent should follow the example of Asia, starting with inserting itself in the international division of labor before going into range.
I have witnessed industrial change in Vietnam and Cambodia since 1992. These two countries emerged from several devastating wars. They developed their agriculture and operated a sort of primitive accumulation of labor. Then they specialized in manufactured intermediate goods destined for Japan and neighboring countries. Aided by their integration in ASEAN, Vietnam and Cambodia manufacture manufactured final goods and processed agricultural and fish products, exported all over the world.

I witnessed the technical and technological progress of China's automobile industries in northeast China. Not wanting to prospect in Beijing and Shanghai, already invaded by the emissaries of the big international companies, I led the companies of my association Amie, in Changchun, capital of the province of Jilin in March 1994. Since then, I have been able to observe the technological changes of FAW Group Corporation, formerly First Automobile

Works, the third-largest Chinese car manufacturer, which produced 3 million 80,000 vehicles in 2014.
Based in Changchun, a city twinned with Montreuil in the Paris region, thanks to me, FAW decided to cooperate with the Volkswagen Group in 1990. Therefore, the modernization dynamic not only of the third Chinese car producer but also of its subcontractors premises is launched. A real industrial revolution has taken hold of Jilin Province.

During my visits to the factories of automotive suppliers, I was able to observe the old state of the old machine tools and their replacement by new means of production. A training plan accompanied technical and technological innovations.
FAW pursued its quest for more autonomy by manufacturing its own vehicles while diversifying its partnerships with Toyota and Mazda in 2003. China can impose on foreign manufacturers technology transfer as a prerequisite for entering the market. the Chinese market.

African countries are small in terms of their respective markets and, as such, would be unable to demand such concessions from their foreign partners. However, as unity is strength, African states grouped together in an African economic community as an aggregation of the regional economic zones will act in the direction of an in-depth transformation of the African Union.

Chapter 5. Organizational articulation within the Trilateral

This brings us to discuss the organizational articulation between the three components of the Trilateral. If the European Union is well structured to take collective action towards a country or group of countries, it lacks the doctrine of a new trilateral relationship and a vision of Africa apart from the clichés of the past. France, a former colonial power, has not created the conditions for new partnerships that go beyond the exploitation of raw materials and the sale of products that have become obsolete and / or uncompetitive over time. The arrogance of some French expatriate entrepreneurs has not helped to establish long-term French-African projects. Beyond climatic, cultural, historical and geographical differences, the German approach with its neighbors is inspiring.

Indeed, when I was attending the Leipzig fair in the early 1980s, I witnessed the activism of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in this great event as well to develop business with its sister the German Democratic Republic (GDR), officially the sixth largest industrial power in the world, only to establish economic relations with the entire communist bloc. The FRG had an advanced and prosperous market economy with many highly internationalized companies of all sizes positioning themselves in high value-added niches and specializing more in the quality and sophistication of its engineers and skilled workers, thanks to a bold policy of learning and valuing manual work. German small and medium-sized businesses as well as large groups must constantly adapt, restructure and face stiff competition in the global market. German industrialists will rely on their own contacts with their counterparts from eastern European countries to the most remote Soviet republics. But the link between East and West were the leaders of East German companies.

Indeed, during the 1980s, the German Democratic Republic (GDR) struggled to modernize its planned economy during four decades of communism. The administered economy decides on the allocation of resources, the production program, the techniques employed and the distribution channels, both nationally and internationally.

With reunification in 1990, Germany relied on the economic networks accumulated over decades to move towards co-productions with its eastern neighbors. Taking into account the specialization-division of labor within Comecon, the German contractors have subcontracted a particular manufacture to the country that masters the technology and has the know-how anchored for ages. Thus, the Czechoslovaks had positioned themselves in the heavy industry whether they were wagons, the railway industry or heavy goods vehicles ... When we tried to work with Czech companies in 1995, we had the certainty that this country was indeed "the little German garden". The Poles were fond of light and heavy industries with their blast furnaces and iron and steel industry. The Baltic countries were suppliers of electronic components, while Romanians were known for their wood, furniture and textile industries, not to mention the food industry.

In Germany, the "screwdriver factories" developed like the trucks, most of which were manufactured in eastern Europe and assembled in this country.

German investments cumulated with those of its eastern neighbors are four times higher than those of France. In addition to its investments in these countries, Germany has established industrial and service companies and has absorbed many companies. The German language has become the second foreign language after Russian.

Germany has closed Goethe Institutes in Latin America to open in Central and Eastern Europe (about 60 institutes in Europe). The Germans favored the resettlement of economic activities wherever there was a German presence before 1945. Forty years of intense competition allowed them to accumulate a high degree of know-how.

Despite the backwardness of the Eastern European countries, the German leaders have weighed all their weight in order to expand the European Union to its countries. Even Romania and Bulgaria, two countries plagued by corruption, have benefited from an anachronistic and staggering EU integration.

But these countries have contributed and contribute to making the German economy, both in the agricultural, agribusiness and industrial sectors more competitive and with a successful industrial specialization.
France should be spearheading the action of European economic development in Africa. It is not a question of duplicating the German model with the former Comecon, but to draw inspiration from an example of win-win partnerships that have allowed the re-industrialization of Germany and the modernization of Central and Eastern Europe. Eastern.
In order to reindustrialise the African continent, the European Union should help its former colonies to transform their agriculture, their industry and their services by becoming producers and not just consumers. This will involve real co-production and co-design projects thanks to the transfer of technology, know-how and training.
As mentioned above, the financial means implemented by the European Union for Africa are limited, hence my central thesis to enter into agreements with the Arab countries, not for financial support, nor to play the role of bankers-financiers of projects, but as actor and co-author of this work that I describe as Trilateral of the 21st century.
North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa would become a vast field where the partners of the Mashreq and Europe would work in good agreement with Africans, treated as equals, to sow, spread, cultivate and maintain the land, factories and services.
Finance being the sinews of the war, it would be useful to allow financial institutions and investors from countries with surplus foreign exchange reserves to invest in production and distribution processes in countries offering business opportunities. In any case, each bloc should have equal and fair access to the markets of the other blocks. However, this should be done according to the conditions of optimal profitability and respecting the prudential and regulatory standards in place in the three blocks. In addition, financial institutions can only offer cross-border services in a defined number of sectors, such as the banking and insurance sectors.
The institutions of the three blocks should establish a Financial Services Supervisory Committee to oversee and regulate this sector and to protect the security and integrity of their respective financial systems by excluding pensions and social security from their fields. which remain the responsibility of the nation-state.

The Trilateral is a three-level rocket:

1 / The first level is composed of the three supranational institutions: the Arab Economic Community, the African Union and the European Union.
The Arab Economic Community is defined as the grouping of the Maghreb Economic Community, the North African Economic Union, the Gulf Cooperation Council and other non-affiliated or developing countries of an economic zone.
The African Union has political, geostrategic, economic and social prerogatives, but it can create an economic commission within it that will bring together the different regional economic communities.
The three entities will not be the planning bodies for future cooperation linking the three Trilateral blocs, nor the organization of the productive activities of this new integration into the world economy through the big gate. They will have the following objectives:

- create optimal conditions that will facilitate trade in goods and services, direct investment by businesses, the construction of public and private public facilities, the rehabilitation of road, maritime and rail infrastructure, without forgetting the digital and renewable energies;
- define measures to promote investment opportunities between the three blocs and to protect investors and ensure their equitable treatment by supranational institutions;

- remove some of the obstacles to foreign direct investment, such as limitations on the percentage of ownership of the capital of the company in the host country or subsidiary. In this register, we can recommend the possibility to investors of a block of transfer to their capital to another block and vice versa. However, there is a need to protect the capital of developing countries, especially since it is often ill-gotten funds. But we have examples of productive South-North investments, with positive spin-offs in terms of production and jobs. This is the case of the acquisition of Brandt France by Issad Rebrab and the emergence of a manufacture of household electrical products in Algeria.
- to direct European and Arab funding towards mixed projects, in line with the objectives assigned to the Trilateral, namely economic projects of common interests;
- harmonize tax legislation in favor of productive investments;
- enter into agreements between the Trilateral blocks to protect foreign investors from the regime and government changes;
- create mechanisms to provide all-round guarantees in a block and the designation of arbitration and courts in case of dispute;
- to create mixed commissions at the level of the Trilateral of:
* check the respect of the agreements between the three blocks,
* point out the progress of joint projects,
* to plan for the future in order to propose to the laws of the economic unions modifications and adaptations,
* unlock difficult files by providing answers to obstacles that may be technical and financial,
* harmonize technical, safety, health and hygiene standards and remove barriers to inter-bloc trade and investment;
- harmonize tariffs and taxes on intermediate and manufactured goods;
- commit to proscribing practices as dominant markets, anti-competitive mergers;
- enforced competition laws and preventative companies from violating this legislation, through coordination between the respective competition authorities;
- guarantee intellectual property and trademarks, and protect innovators and inventors from any spoliation of their creations. Building on existing international intellectual property law, the three blocks should develop coherent regulations and standards among themselves. They should define protective measures against infringements of intellectual property rights. Trademark registration procedures should be introduced to:
- promote the opening of frontiers to goods co-produced by the three blocks and finally reduce taxes and tariffs on them;
- promoting research and development in all sectors by setting up working groups bringing together leading personalities, usually from at least three regional areas. The studies and conclusions should be taken into account by the public and private operators.
- stimulate synergies / universities / research centers and companies between the three blocks, and financially support these exchanges. The results of the work in the three areas, in order to materialize the ideas that emerge.

2 / The second level. Each block must coordinate and organize within it, in order to deploy all its efforts in the direction of the success of its partition in the Trilateral.
First, the European Union, especially its southern members, should change its neighborhood policy and its relations with the South and the East, considering its destiny as intimately linked to the other two blocs. Its reindustrialization will go hand in hand with the industrialization of Africa and the Mashreq. Through trade agreements and free trade investments, African and Arab industries could sell their products on the European market. In return, the technology, capital goods and know-how of the Old Continent could find takers among their strategic partners. Europe, by the solidity of its institutions and its democratic anchoring, would be qualified to occupy the position of guarantor of the respect of the agreements passed between the three blocks in the long term whatever may be the changes of government and regime. Indeed, the heavy and long-term public and private investments of Arab sovereign funds and European funds should be secured.

Investments in infrastructure, railways, energy, mining and land could become profitable after only several decades. All studies have shown that Africa's delay in its integration into the international division of labor and its share in the GDP and trade of our planet can be explained by the state of road, energy, digital and sanitary infrastructure. and educational. In the framework of the Trilateral, the three blocks are associated in long-term projects, as well as those productive in the short / medium term that generate effects induced on the productive activities but in the long term.

Secondly, the Arabic-speaking countries are made up of surplus oil states in terms of their foreign exchange reserves and North African countries, a link between the Mashreq and the rest of Africa. This whole block is positioned as an investor through its sovereign funds in value-producing systems such as land, factories, renewable energies and digital in Africa but also in the continuity of the production chain upstream or downstream in all Arabic-speaking countries.

At the time this book is being written, the Maghreb countries, especially Morocco and Algeria, are in open conflict, breaking down what is left of the Arab Maghreb Union. The Gulf Cooperation Council is in deep sleep, because of the boycott imposed on Qatar by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Bahrain and Yemen in the name of the fight against terrorism: they criticize the Qatari state its alliances with Iran and Turkey and call for the outright closure of the al-Jazeera TV channel.
It is incomprehensible to note the myopia of the leaders of the countries in conflict whereas worldwide, except the United States under the presidency of Donald Trump, the regional economic integration is strongly sought. The Saudi Wahhabi monarchy and its allies will not be able to defeat their Shia enemy by force of arms. Military supremacy is the prerogative of the major nuclear powers that have the right of veto in the UN Security Council. Regional gendarmes are only supplementers of an international policy decided elsewhere. When the American president decides to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, he first considers his Zionist electorate, evangelist and conservative, and challenges his Arab allies. This stance brings water to the mill of extremists and Iran who refuse any compromise with Israel.

The Gulf states are introducing VAT, reducing some subsidies to basic necessities, implementing austerity policies and facing massive military spending, while their oil revenues have dwindled since 2014. Saudi Arabia draws on currency reserves $ 50 billion per month. This amounted to $ 487 billion, while the central bank would have printed money for more than $ 57 billion. At this rate and with regard to the needs of the population, major projects like Neom and the 2030 Plan would be compromised.

Pragmatism would require all Gulf countries to leave their political conflicts aside and reinforce each other economically. The fratricidal struggles within the GCC are indeed carrying a massive self-destruction. The weight of the countries of the region in the world will not be symmetrical to their nuisance capacity but to the strength of their economies and their human and economic development and their ability to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century through innovation, creativity and accomplishment of productive projects in the medium / long term, without mismanagement or immoderation. The proposals contained in this book are intended to help prepare for the post-oil era and to envisage new intercontinental co-operation positioning the economies that adhere to it in a scheme of production and creation of wealth in good agreement with their neighbors and African and European partners in this great adventure, for the good of their peoples, for peace and stability.
Iran and Saudi Arabia are spending on arming and supporting armed groups in neighboring countries, and even beyond the Middle and Far East, hundreds of billions of dollars, which would be enough to prepare for the future future generations.

In December 2017, Iranian power was confronted with protests across the country related to economic and social issues, denouncing Iran's corruption and commitments in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen and Iran. 'other countries. Officially, the inflation rate has been reduced to 10% but the unemployment rate remains high (12%). The lifting of some economic sanctions, following the Iran nuclear deal in 2015, did not result in an influx of foreign investment. An economically cooperative and less bellicose geostrategic policy in the region would have been more beneficial to the people of Iran.
Iran's military budget exceeds $ 10 billion in 2017 and continues to see the prospects for economic recovery move away.

Norway, a small country of 5.3 million people, reserves a portion of its oil revenues to future generations. The Government Pension Fund, formerly known as the Government Petroleum Fund, has $ 957 billion. This country does not seek to quarrel with its neighbors, nor to extend its cultural, religious or political influence. Successive governments are only concerned to make their fellow citizens and their children and grandchildren happy. In addition, having visited the facilities of the Norwegian group Kværner and its subcontractors and equipment manufacturers, I can attest to the high level of diversification and modernization of the Norwegian industrial fabric.

Third, the African Union needs to bring the regional economic zones together around the goals of the Trilateral. African regional economic zones are not economically integrated by production but only by trade and, for the two CFA franc zones, by the currency. Being extroverted, these economies are projecting towards the North, without thinking of developing South-South relations to expand their markets and reach the critical threshold to make local production profitable and its distribution on a larger scale than that of a national space. too narrow.

But the perimeter of the African regional economic communities must be broadened by their regrouping into a kind of federation of the latter under the aegis of the African Union more focused on economic and monetary issues. This involves free trade agreements, tax, customs, economic, infrastructure and energy, investment protection and intellectual property.

Harmonization of business law and foreign investment codes should be closer to the Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law (Ohada) in Africa, as 17 countries have signed the treaty. instituting October 17, 1993 and revising it on October 17, 2008 in Quebec City (Canada), after lengthy discussions between African and non-African experts. This is certainly a basis for future agreements and not an end in itself.

Ohada had to be the answer to legal and judicial insecurity as a major cause of investor mistrust, not to mention the misery of the courts and the lack of transparency of judgments rendered. In this regard, an effort to train judicial personnel, particularly in the areas of trade and business, would be more than useful. Judicial delays and problems of ethics are a factor of uncertainty in court decisions. Ohada needed to streamline the corporate legal environment to boost investment. Abuses have been committed against local or relocated companies where there is opportunity to wrongly subtract from unfair judgments funds allocated among lawyers, police, prosecutors and judges. Ohada, extended to all countries of the continent wishing to join this Trilateral XXI century project, should create a protective arsenal of companies, defining as clearly as possible their rights and duties as well as those of their environment, to know customers, suppliers, users and administrations.

Adapting, modernizing, harmonizing and simplifying common law in uniform acts are essential ingredients for securing the legal settlement of business disputes and promoting alternative dispute resolution methods.

All the signatory Member States of the reformed Ohada Treaty should place the supranationality of any legislation above the internal provisions.

Ohada includes:

- general commercial law concerning:

* the status of the trader, the status of the entrepreneur, individual entrepreneur;

* the Trade and Personal Property Credit Register (RCCM), which notably receives the registrations of natural and legal traders, declarations of enterprising activity and registration of security interests;

* the lease for professional use;

* the business, consisting of all the means that allow the trader to attract and retain customers;

* the broker (broker, broker or sales agent);

* commercial sale: contract of sale of goods between traders.

- the law of commercial companies and the economic interest grouping: this is the statement of general provisions, common to all forms of commercial companies: rules of constitution and operation, liability of directors, legal links between companies, transformation, merger, division, partial contributions of assets, dissolution, liquidation, nullity of society and social acts, various formalities and advertising rules.

- the law of cooperative societies:

* applies to all cooperatives, subject to specific national or regional rules, applicable to cooperative companies carrying on a banking or financial activity;

* provides for two types of cooperative at the choice of entrepreneurs: the simplified cooperative society and the cooperative society with a board of directors;

* clearly distinguishes the rules common to both as well as the rules specific to each type of cooperative.

- the law of collective insolvency proceedings:

* organizes procedures for the prevention and treatment of companies' difficulties by decision and under judicial control (conciliation and preventive settlement before

cessation of payments, bankruptcy and liquidation of assets after cessation of payments);
* defines the regulation applicable to the judicial agents and defines the patrimonial, professional and penal sanctions applicable to the debtor and to the leaders of the failing company (personal bankruptcy and bankruptcy).
- the accounting law:
* establishes the accounting standards, the chart of accounts, the rules of bookkeeping, presentation of financial statements and financial information;
* refers to the personal accounts of entities, natural and legal persons, consolidated accounts and combined accounts; it includes, in addition, criminal provisions.
- the right to transport goods by road;
- the law of arbitration and the law of mediation:
* sets out the principles of the law of arbitration, regulates the different phases of the procedure;
* sets the conditions for the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards;
* organizes the remedies available against the sentences: action for annulment, appeal for review and third opposition.
- the law of security interests:
* organizes security interests, understood as an assignment for the benefit of a creditor of property or assets to guarantee the performance of an obligation or a set of obligations.
- the law of simplified recovery procedures and the enforcement procedures:
* sets the basic data of the forced execution,
* regulates the various methods of constraint: conservatory seizures (tangible personal property, receivables, partner's rights and securities), and enforceable seizures (seizure, seizure, assignment of remunerations, seizure) Real estate).

3 / The third level: the role of private operators, NGOs, banks and insurance companies, chambers of commerce and industry, employers' associations of the three blocks.

Most African and Arab countries (even those with a liberal orientation) have experienced models of development with a prominent role for the state. Either their economies are mono producers of mines and hydrocarbons and therefore rentier and redistributive with huge inequalities, or they are under the thumb of some families and personalities in power and around him.

In developing countries, political dominance provides economic power, unlike industrial democracies where large fortunes and groups that capture national wealth influence the course of elections. They control the media and directly or indirectly fund political parties.

It is time for a new class of entrepreneurs to embrace the modernization of agriculture, agri-food and industry through the use of business services and information and digital technologies.

The Trilateral project should mobilize public and private operators around investment opportunities. The latter would be supported by all professional organizations and consular chambers, whose mission is to serve businesses.

The Chambers of Commerce and Industry of the three bloc countries as well as all employers' organizations and economic-diplomatic services should create a database of priority sectors in their respective countries as well as partnership calls.

Prospecting missions organized by one of these organizations and conducted in another Trilateral member country should be facilitated and supported by their counterparts in the host country.

During thirty years of consulting to the companies of Eastern Paris I noticed the shyness of their leaders to export their know-how and their products. But by "hunting in packs" as we did in our Association of Montreal for the initiative of companies (Amie) in 66 countries, vocations were detected and promoted, and SMEs and TPE found the way to internationally.

Symposia should be organized on sectoral or branch themes, or following public or private requests. They could concern sectors or production and distribution processes with the objective of coordinating the specialization of each country, its contribution upstream or downstream.
We hear about the blockchain, or chain of blocks, but in my remarks, I do not want to go to the creation of cryptomania. What is interesting is to be able to use the mechanism of this technology of storage and transmission of information without control organ, to circulate business opportunities and exchanges of goods and not currencies. This database, the information of which is sent by the users, must be checked and grouped at regular time intervals.

This blockchain can go further than a distributed database to also embrace the e-commerce function, affecting imports and exports as well as investment projects, protected from falsification or modification by storage nodes. This blockchain should be like a secure registry encompassing all transactions done throughout the process.

The blockchain raises legal issues that need to be discussed between Trilateral bodies These include: intellectual property law, contract law and chain governance, sanctions against false projects, false offers or requests for products, and more generally sanctions against counterfeiters and crooks.
This blockchain regulated by the public (the Trilateral Commission) but used by the private sector must operate with an established framework whose rules would govern the operation as transparent as possible and the most sincere so that its credibility is ensured. This public blockchain must define rules with a code defined by the Trilateral and managed by protocol technology and the software that composes it.

Studies on a product, a sector, an innovation, a sector, a technology could associate human and financial resources of the three blocks of the Trilateral. Example: an agro-food project, under specific climatic conditions, should bring together specialists to improve or invent new methods of seeding, cultivation and maintenance-backup.

Laboratories integrated with universities or receiving public or private funding should cooperate on projects of common interest. In this regard, the university-business rapprochement is to be promoted in all Trilateral member countries, in order to combine research and practice, university inventions and industrialization of the latter.
This poses the problem of training and training of trainers through a cascade effect. This method has already been successfully tested in the framework of the partnerships concluded between European and North African universities and their African counterparts. At the same time, a kind of intra-Trilateral Erasmus should be encouraged to encourage learning of other countries' cultures and production methods. Once in charge, these young Europeans, Africans and Arabic speakers would have capitalized on the knowledge of markets, technological levels and consumption habits of other countries in the Trilateral.

The circulation of experts and researchers from the South to the North should be facilitated by the granting of multi-year long-stay visas. Obviously, we are not in a world without competition but the three blocks are dominated by specializations and there is a strong chance of complementarities between them.

In our Trilateral project, there is no question of dictating or planning production and distribution processes to SMEs / SMIs and multinational firms. Institutional intervention is required to create a legal, political, financial and social environment, as well as the conditions for valuing investments, not to mention the infrastructure markup and the availability of trained and well-qualified human resources. It is the private entrepreneurs who will spearhead this new dynamic. However, major projects must benefit from state sponsorship through the deployment of economic diplomacy.

In the spirit of strengthening this cooperation between the three blocks, one can imagine giving preference - at equal price / quality ratio - to the companies forming part of the three blocks in international tenders. Agreements should specify the areas in which companies in a block can provide goods and services to other blocks, both to the national government and to regions or local authorities.
It is recommended that companies ensure compliance with the rules concerning the value of the goods, services or market concerned, the type of procuring entities and the authorized goods and services.

States must agree not to intervene in the conduct of private sector competition mechanisms, and not to take measures that may disrupt them. State-owned enterprises, monopolies and special-prerogatives should not place barriers of entry to goods and services from partner countries. In other words, competition between public and private enterprises should not be negatively impacted.

A compendium of Community aid to investors and co-development projects must contain all the information necessary to benefit from it. In order to facilitate outsourcing and co-productions, the three blocks should mobilize tax incentives and subsidized loans and all the facilities in the direction of raising overall value creation levels within the Trilateral.
Taxation should be the lever that would favor productive activities and penalize parasitic economic actions. In the same vein, customs duties on imports of certain products that can destroy jobs in countries belonging to the three blocks must be increased, except for intermediate goods and other capital goods.
Financial resources for financing the aforementioned projects can come from sovereign wealth funds, private investment funds, but also from new tax-free tax for the consumer-taxpayer, such as the so-called Chirac tax on airline tickets. It can be set between € 2 for economy class and € 40 for business class. These sums will have to be adjusted according to the income levels of the contributing countries.
Algeria, importing up to $ 60 billion, mostly vehicles and consumer goods, has used up 70 percent of its foreign exchange reserves and has not encouraged national production, is in a crisis that will get worse, because nothing has been done to reindustrialise the country.

Morocco, through naivety and / or duplicity of some leaders, has signed free trade agreements with countries like China and Turkey, better prepared and better structured, sacrificing its textile, leather and product processing industries. food. Border informal trade introduces expired products without sanitary control or quality. It was the cause of the bankruptcy of the Thomson factory producing black and white and color TVs.

The Trilateral should be an area of wealth creation and vigilance against countries practicing social and economic dumping like China. Its members should reaffirm their respect for the rights and commitments of the rules of the World Trade Organization, while reaffirming their opposition to the negative effects of unfair commercial practices on their domestic production.

To this end, investigations into possible cases of unfair commercial practices should be carried out and measures taken to put an end to such practices. In the same vein, cooperation in the exchange of information and consultation should prevent such practices. Transparency must affect customs procedures, making customs requirements public in the sense of greater efficiency and simplicity. In terms of tariff classification, decisions must be known in advance, anticipated and reliable.

The Trilateral should not be content to favor only trade and partnership agreements but embrace the social, political and environmental spheres. The value of work must be promoted as an unchanging principle to achieve progress through improved standards and without a race to the bottom. African workers will contribute to the goals of industrialization of the continent through more education, training, education and skills. Equality between men and women is a sine qua non of social and economic progress. Democracy is a factor of fulfillment for all. These objectives should be the subject of consultations and decisions at the level of Trilateral institutions, involving the business community, civil society organizations and citizens.

Trilateral members should recognize the interdependence of economic growth, social development and environmental protection. Economic growth should support social and environmental objectives. Both supranational Trilateral institutions and member countries and civil societies should form working groups and forums to outline a new approach to sustainable development.

I proposed to focus on regional economic integration through production and not just trade in goods and services. In the three blocks, the development of new clean, non-polluting industries and renewable energies could give rise to multinational companies combining public and private funds.

The Arabic and African peoples need more scientific and technological education to carry out rational and pragmatic tasks in their daily and professional lives far from superstition and supernatural beliefs. These principles are not binding but should give rise to mutual assistance and the financing of actions in this direction.

Conclusion

The Mashreq countries, Africa and Europe should build a new model of mutually beneficial cooperation over the long term, to ensure their economic growth and mutual enrichment.
On January 30, 2018, in Marrakech, the Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Christine Lagarde, declared the urgency for the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region to face the challenges of unemployment, especially young graduates. , pointing out that nearly 25 million young people will enter the labor market in this region of the world, hence the need to achieve sustainable and inclusive growth.
The region's main challenge is to respond to the aspirations of young people, to instil in them a faith in the future and to give opportunities to people, she insisted, calling for improving the business climate and promoting the private sector in the region.

According to UN studies, the African population will double by 2050 to reach 2.5 billion people (our planet will then have 9.7 billion human beings), constituting a time bomb. The fertility rate in Africa dropped to 4.7 children per woman in 2017, compared to 5.5 twenty years ago. It remains high compared to the rest of the world. Birthing efforts must be made through an awareness campaign, but this will not be enough to prevent this exponential demographics.
The risks are many: an uncontrolled emigration with all that follows as disillusionment, abuse, homelessness of newcomers. Poverty is the unintentional ally of jihadist terrorism. Civil wars and geostrategic tensions cost Africans excessively.

In the MENA region, nearly 25 million young people will enter the labor market in the next five years. Youth unemployment (35%) is the biggest scourge that threatens social peace throughout the region. The exclusion of women from the economic sphere is another factor of socio-economic imbalance.
At the Forum for Employment held in Marrakech in late January 2018, Christine Lagarde, Executive Director of the IMF, noted: "Popular discontent is bubbling" in the Middle East and Maghreb region.

This cooperation scheme could serve several purposes:
- to reindustrialise Africa and thus contribute to massive job creation, in order to fix populations and transform the consumer continent from consumer goods to producer of manufactured goods and final goods;
- give a new lease of life to European economies in the process of deindustrialisation and massive unemployment, with the exception of a few northern countries, and create new activities. Robotization and the automation of productive processes threaten millions of jobs. Whatever the stimulus and stimulus of consumption, the national productive apparatuses are incapable of meeting the needs of the populations. This results in imbalances in trade balances and payments. Europe should broaden its outlets by finding another model of integration into the world economy by structuring an association-sharing of production and distribution functions with Africa and the Mashreq.
- to provide the Mashreq countries with a promising African market, triangular cooperation with Europe as co-production funders, and their inclusion in this value chain.

The Gulf Cooperation Council countries have been struggling with falling oil prices since 2014 and are desperately trying to diversify their economies. Given the narrowness of their respective markets and the rentier behaviors of the ruling classes, the Trilateral perspective would offer them a vast market, co-development and the implementation of a new era of economic development.

These Arab countries will not be content to be the safe of this configuration, but act as a co-producer in this mooring where each party will contribute to the creation of value among other partners. In return, they will have their share of this mechanism by hosting finishing plants or processing according to their human, natural and spatial resources. The matrix of this combination of means and potential revolves around European technology and know-how, financing from the Arab countries with savings surpluses, particularly those of the Gulf, and vast African markets.

Before looking at how to build this economic cooperation between the three blocs, it was necessary to identify, in the first part, the forces present within each stakeholder of the Trilateral (Africa, Mashreq and the European Union).), to then evaluate the possible linkages of interests and potentials between them in a second part, to finally build the bases of the mechanism of entanglement of the processes of co-production, co-distribution and co-financing. This numerical control machine must be well oiled with tools arranged to facilitate the machining and thereby the rendering of its activity continuously. The programming of its activities must meet the criteria of co-design and co-development both horizontally (between supranational institutions) and vertically (companies, financial institutions, support organizations for economic operators, NGOs as well as civil societies). The speed of rotation of this machine will depend on the way in which its three centerpieces will be organized.

The European Union is the most integrated structure, with the most advanced organizations in terms of coordinating economic, social and financial policies.

Africa has several economic and monetary zones and an African Union, an imperfect place for interstate relations. This continent has not advanced sufficiently in regional integration processes. Trade between African countries hardly exceeds 13% of the total trade of the entire continent.

The Arab world is in a state of unprecedented disintegration, and fratricidal conflicts are stifling any hint of economic development. The Arab Maghreb Union has been moribund since the closure of the Algerian-Moroccan border in 1994, while the Gulf Cooperation Council is completely at a standstill.

In the first part, the unification of the Arab economic space is conceived in several stages that follow one another and become entangled.

Firstly, the Maghreb Economic Community, which was the subject of my last book (C. Sari, 2014), must negotiate with Egypt an economic community of North Africa. The Mashreq (Arab world beyond Sinai), should regain its serenity and build new relations between neighbors in the perspective of preparing the post-oil and the future of future generations. Regional economic integration seems the best way to achieve this.

The most prosperous period experienced by the Arab-Muslim world at the socio-economic, cultural, civilizational and scientific levels was during periods characterized by the free movement of goods and people from Tangier to Baghdad. In the introductory chapter, the context of freedom of thought and creativity that allowed thinkers and leaders to prioritize progress and trade was highlighted. Entrepreneurship has been surprisingly dominant, although at times and in some places nepotism and increased taxation of market activity has brought empires and cities down.

The dynastic crises grew as the rulers settled in the comfort of power and opulence, thereby increasing the spending of princes and those in power, at the expense of the producers and traders who watched helplessly to their spoliation by the tax.

It is Ibn Khaldoun, the true founder of Arabic-speaking sociology, who makes the most objective analysis of the process of seizing power through the esprit de corps (asabiyya) followed by a prosperous period and ending with the decline.
What made the economic and social force of the Arab-Muslim world is a great openness to other civilizations, tolerance vis-à-vis other religions by non-discrimination against citizens who had adopted another religion than Islam, with the support of the political authorities.

The Maghreb was a single entity shared by several feudal lords. Each territory had its own budget and its own taxation, in symbiosis with the other cities and regions belonging to a single Maghreb area.
The tax evasion and the refusal of the wealthy Maghreb to pay the tax was explained by the fact that the tax was considered unfair and spoliator and was used to finance the lifestyle of dignitaries.

The land is the main source of wealth creation and accumulation, it concentrates the desires of those in power who impose on it a complex tax system where several methods of calculation coexist according to the property regime.

The functions of money are explained by Ibn Khaldoun, who attributes to precious metals an intangible value which can not be an object of traffic, since they are the basis to which all that is gain, acquisition or treasure is reduced.
Ibn Khaldoun's vision of international trade and trade between North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa is staggering. He highlighted Afro-Arab relations embracing all aspects: economic, cultural, human, geostrategic, political and religious.

It is very instructive to note how Ibn Khaldoun favors large export, much more lucrative than local trade. Two destinations are popular; sub-Saharan Africa and the Mashreq by selling goods to the rich and the poor. "That's why traders who are used to traveling to the land of blacks are more comfortable and richer than others," he wrote. Traders take risks on dangerous roads and desert lands where water is often lacking. Only reckless traders undertake such trips. Domestic trade is less profitable because of the fierce competition, given the large number of traders and the abundance of goods.
The commercial interconnections between the Arab space and Europe were via the Black Sea, the Caspian Sea, and Russia, where treasures of Arab currencies were found.

This belief that the revival of a unified and prosperous Arab economic space will take place in stages has led to an examination of Maghreb economic integration processes in the Mashreq (first part). With Egypt, the Maghreb Economic Community could favor the birth of a North African Economic Community (first subpart).
In the pursuit of my work on the Maghreb economic community (C. Sari, 2014) and in order to broaden the economic zone even more optimally, research has turned towards the conditions of construction of an Economic Community of North Africa. To do so, it has been exposed and analyzed the main indicators of the region by highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of the six North African states.
North African economies need to create synergies and complementarities and seek economies of scale, to reduce dependence on dominant economies, and to increase their bargaining

power in international relations . The gain in terms of additional GDP is between 4% and 6%, thanks to regional and international dynamics and a reduction of geopolitical tensions and thus a reduction in the race for disarmament between the two countries. Algeria and Morocco, not forgetting Libya.
Regional integration should be accompanied by a tighter business climate to build economic relations without any nepotism or rentier positions, and introduce more competition. The fight against corruption is a stimulating factor for the economy, thus contributing to the orientation of territorial and national budgets towards more efficiency and more transparency. Stability and social peace depend on it.

As for trade and investment between North African countries that are weak, they could be revived by the introduction of a common currency, the dirial. It would not look like a single currency like the euro, it would be closer to the ECU which preceded the euro, but whose use was slowed by the Germans who feared an unfortunate competition against the Deutschemark.
Economic convergence within the CEAN (North African Economic Community) must go hand in hand with the approximation of investment codes and the harmonization of customs and trade rules. The construction of a regional area of free trade and the mobility of capital and people is needed from the outset.

In the same logic, a radioscopy of the Mashreq states sheds light on their economic models based on hydrocarbon exports. The fall in oil prices has prompted Saudi Arabia to embark on pharaonic projects like Neom and the 2030 Vision, while the other Gulf Cooperation Council countries are questioning how to diversify their economies. The Trilateral 21st Century Project could allow the Gulf countries to embark on a long-term cooperation approach with the Africa bloc and the European Union by agreeing on a common strategy far from the strategy of choking of Qatar by its Gulf neighbors and Egypt.

The Arab Economic Union should stimulate the development of trade in goods, services and capital, as well as the circulation of human resources. The Arab world is the only region in the world that knows no regional construction. The inter-Arab trade is insignificant.
The establishment of a common currency at the level of the Arabic-speaking area should make the compensatory payment systems more fluid and remove the financial constraint on the economies of the region.

Thanks to this common currency, Arab economic and financial operators could export, import, invest in the ECA (Maghreb Economic Community) without using foreign currency. Tourists from any country in the Arab Community should use this currency and move freely within it.
An Arab monetary institute will supervise the mechanisms of compensation of monetary and financial flows by operating a consolidation of the accounts by the aggregation of needs and surpluses of currencies between the Arab countries.

The second part dealt with this triangular relationship Africa / Mashreq / European Union but starting with an inventory of the potentialities of Africa, its strengths and weaknesses, its regional economic zones (first subpart). Indeed, the presentation of African economies focused on their own characteristics as well as the dominant sectors and their respective weights in industry, agriculture and services. The weight of public debts, domestic and external is the key to understand the margins of maneuver of these countries. This is what drives changes in gross domestic products, trade balances and balance of payments

The big challenge facing the African continent is its rampant demography. The growth rate of the African population is twice that of the world average, exceeding an average of 2.42% in 2015. In the absence of a job-creating economic policy, unemployment is at a scandalously high level. high, especially among young people, resulting in social problems and immigration out of control.
The evolution of the GDP of the African countries does not make it possible to absorb the 18 million entrants every year in the labor market. Yet Africa's wealth could meet people's needs for access to clean water, electricity, primary health care, alleviate poverty and reduce maternal mortality, which continues to rise deliveries etc.

The opacity around the mining sector, certainly profitable, is explained by the diversion of part of its income to the benefit of the ruling class. The greed arouses envy and conflicts of interest often leading to chronic instability and civil wars. Africa has reserves equivalent to 120 billion barrels of oil and 600 million hectares of uncultivated arable land, half of the world total.

The future of Africa will be more promising by transforming all or part of raw materials and agricultural products into finished or semi-finished products, through the development of import-substitution industrial activities and efficient services. At present, African countries are the outlet for consumer goods, particularly from Asia, hence the need for a considerable effort of industrialization. In order to achieve this, efforts to reform governance, improve the education system and general, technical and technological training are essential.
There can be no economic and social development without a deep restructuring of road, rail, air and sea transport infrastructure and systems, as well as good logistics.

Another key success factor of this new economic model is the renewal of intra-African trade through regional integration processes, going beyond existing regional economic zones.
The CEMAC (Economic and Monetary Community of Central African States) suffers from a rise in civil society protests against new announced austerity measures. This risks adding to the economic and financial crisis a political crisis and, paradoxically, compromising regional integration.
SADC has set itself the goal of moving towards economic integration that brings development.
Article 5 of the SADC Treaty (1992) links economic growth with poverty alleviation, improving the standard of living and quality of life of people in southern Africa and supporting socially disadvantaged people.
The Arab Maghreb Union is down. Since 1994, Algeria has closed its borders with Morocco in response to Morocco's decision to introduce a visa against Algerian travelers. The customs union has not made any progress.
ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) is the economic zone that is best able to achieve further economic integration in order to "maintain and enhance economic stability, strengthen relations between Member States and to contribute to the progress and development of the African continent ", on the ECOWAS website.
The project to create a Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA) was signed in January 2012, during the 18th ordinary session of the African Union Conference and was scheduled to start in 2017. This project aimed to consolidate the 54 States in a free trade area including Comesa, EAC, SADC on the one hand and ECCAS, ECOWAS, UMA and the Community of Sahelo-Saharan States on the other hand.

After taking stock of the strengths and weaknesses of the two blocks that together with Europe constitute the three pillars of the Trilateral, it was highlighted in the second sub-section and analyzed the economic relations between Africa and the countries. Arabic speakers.
There were two levels of Afro-Arab relationship. The first is of an institutional and organizational nature, concretized by the African Union-Arab League summits, the first of which was held in Cairo in 1977. The result was the creation of several cooperation organizations.
It should be noted that several bilateral and multilateral Arab financial institutions support the development of African countries through technical and financial assistance, such as the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa. Arab companies and banks have bilateral agreements with their African counterparts as part of productive investment programs and not just financing and donations. Projects could be carried out under the auspices of regional Arab and African economic communities.

Arab-African trade reached $ 35 billion in 2015, while Arab countries' trade with the European Union amounted to $ 289.2 billion. The revival of these South-South relations must be carried out at embassies, chambers of commerce and industry, employers' associations and local authorities.

The strengthening of Arab-African links will involve cooperation in the military, security and migration, training and education, the reception of African students in Arab universities, the multiplication of twinning between municipalities, regions, universities, grandes écoles ... The creation of a climate of sympathy also involves the construction of hospitals and health centers in the poorest countries.
Initiatives should be encouraged, such as organizing an Arab-African Trade Show every year in every economic community.

The establishment of a preferential trade zone between Africa and the Arab world should no longer remain a theoretical debate but enter into an operational process.
Support for economic, financial and technical cooperation between African and Arab countries must include the combination of common financial structures and the impetus for a strong participation of Arab capital in development projects.
Arab countries can participate in the diversification of sub-Saharan economies and mutually beneficial co-productions; as in the agri-food, manufacturing, technological and digital fields, not forgetting renewable energies.

The Trilateral can not be complete without a new structuring of North-South relations, more precisely between the European Union and Africa, two historical partners with complex links. The former colonizing powers did everything to perpetuate neo-colonial links, going as far as physically eliminating patriotic African leaders, seeking to reshape economic systems in the direction of the development of productive activities and meeting the expectations of the people. Some leaders claiming socialist and progressive ideology have disappointed the aspirations of their peoples. Patrice Lumumba in Zaire and Thomas Sankara in Burkina Faso, Samora Machel in Mozambique, Agostinho Neto in Angola and Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe not only mismanaged their countries but also exercised power nepotically and dictatorially, allowing their families and their entourage to behave far from the rules of transparency and rectitude.

The Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) signed between the EU and several African states in 2016 tend to lower tariffs and other taxes. They allow up to 83% of their markets to be open to European imports.
While most African leaders were pro-Western, neo-Marxists, as was the case in Dahomey (now Benin) of former President Kerekou, Ahmed Sekou Toure in Guinea, Julius Nyerere in Tanzania, Kenneth

Kaunda in Zambia and Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana, as well as the pro-independence leader Amílcar Cabral in Guinea-Bissau. All these leaders have failed the economic transition and the well-being of their peoples.

The boundaries of African states (except for Nigeria and Egypt) have not led to the emergence of large-scale countries facilitating the creation of industrial, agricultural and agri-food units that can operate in an area with market opportunities, allowing to achieve economies of scale. Hence my tireless advocacy for economic integration founding industrialization of the continent. Africa must cease to be only the supplier of raw materials and agricultural products with the complicity of the comprador bourgeoisie that allows the plunder of natural resources and transfer their ill-gotten funds to the richest countries of the North.

The responsibility is shared and the solution is a common work. The analytical objective of this book is to invest new avenues focused on the search for win-win partnerships: to make Africa a new Eldorado in the positive sense of the term for the benefit of African populations and for the benefit of European companies with jobs created from both shores of the Mediterranean to Cape South Africa.
The EU is the largest importer and exporter of agricultural products, industrial goods and services.

Some EU agreements with African countries have led to the creation of free trade zones between the two continents. This initiative, dating from 2007, called the Cotonou Agreement, involving 79 countries, with a population of 700 million, followed the World Trade Organization's (WTO) 2000 condemnation of past agreements. judging them illegal. Signatory African countries can export their products (except arms) to Europe without paying customs duties.
The main criticism of this Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) is that it prevents the industrialization of African countries and thereby the creation of jobs and the eradication of poverty. Some MEPs denounce the blackmail done to countries that do not wish to sign the agreement by closing the European market. In addition, the successive crises of 2008 and 2011 led to the decline of public aid to African countries and NGOs that are present in African cities and countryside. It is certain that African states are negotiating all the free trade agreements in a weak position, as their disunity is glaring and their economic bases are no match for the most industrialized countries. These agreements should have been made in conjunction with a large program of productive direct investments favoring the emergence of local industries in symbiosis with European industries that might not have experienced such deindustrialisation.

France lost its dominant position in French-speaking Africa to China in sectors such as manufactured goods, finished and semi-finished consumer goods, computers, telecommunications, technology products and machinery. appliances and commercial vehicles.

The Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), which brings together the 28 Member States of the European Union and 15 Mediterranean partner countries from North Africa, the Middle East and South-East Europe, wants to promote integration economic development, strengthening new North-South and South-South relations. The projects promoted by the UPM are: "Business Development", "Higher Education and Research", "Civil and Social Affairs", "Energy and Climate Action", "Transport and Urban Development", "Water and Environment" .

The results could have been better if the North African states were formed into an economic community, negotiated in a single bloc, according to the principle of "unity by force", and proposed joint projects.

Among the strong and time-bound relations between France and certain African countries, the monetary agreement within the framework of the CFA franc zone. Many unfounded accusations impute to the former colonial power the spoliation of foreign exchange reserves of the countries that are members. For my part, I think that, despite all its imperfections such as the rigidity of exchange rates between the euro and the CFA franc on the one hand, and the CFA franc and other currencies on the other, the CFA franc zones favor intra-African trade and reduce the use of hard currency, eliminating de facto currency risk and endless devaluations.

Exchange rate stability provides individuals, businesses, banks and investors with protection against erratic fluctuations in currency movements. The absence of parallel currency markets and the ban on printing money are factors that stabilize inflation levels.

Once the foundations of the triangular relationship were thrown out, namely the synthesis of the assets and pitfalls of each block and the binary links between the blocks, the fourth sub-part highlighted the architecture of the Trilateral and its perspectives. This is the highlight of our demonstration.

The three blocks are invited to combine their cooperation in a three-tier system.

In the first cabin are housed the three supranational institutions: the Arab Economic Community, the African Union and the European Union. Each of them is determined by the assembly of state or supranational entities.

The Arab Economic Community represents the grouping of the Maghreb Economic Community, the North African Economic Union and the Gulf Cooperation Council. Other countries could be part of it individually.

The African Union is called upon to federate the various existing or future regional communities and to broaden its economic and social prerogatives by strengthening its economic pole.

The European Union is the most operational bloc to achieve the objectives of the Trilateral. Far from being a planning body for the activities of public and private companies and the actions of financial institutions, this body is called upon to create the optimal conditions for trade in goods and services, direct investment by companies and the production of equipment. Public and private collectives, the rehabilitation of road, maritime and rail infrastructures, without forgetting the digital and renewable energies. It is also responsible for protecting investors and ensuring smooth co-production, co-distribution and co-financing of intra-Trilateral projects.

The Trilateral Council, which must involve the participation of Heads of State and Government, should remove barriers to foreign direct investment, except in strategic sectors such as nuclear power, energy, sensitive technologies and military logistics. Capital movements between blocks could not serve as a screen for disguised tax evasion and / or facilitate ill-gotten transfers of funds.

One could imagine a prioritization of European and Arab funding for mixed projects of common interest and an agreement on fiscal incentives to this end.

Many foreign investors (including many members of the African diaspora) are reluctant to invest in Africa, fearing a regime change, ambush or blackmail by their partners, with the complicity of the police and justice and mafia behaviors. In order to reassure them and notwithstanding the transparency and good faith of the foreign investor, the Trilateral Commission should provide all moral, legal and political guarantees to foreign investments.

International arbitration must be privileged and organized impartially, by encouraging contractors to use it in most cases.
In order to make the circulation of inputs and equipment in the inter-bloc production chain fluid and efficient, it would be necessary to harmonize technical, safety, health and hygiene standards and to remove obstacles to inter-bloc trading and investment.

Goods co-produced between two or three blocks should be exempt from taxes and tariffs. It will be necessary to stimulate synergies between universities, research centers and companies between the three blocks and to financially support these exchanges. This will have to be done in symbiosis with the basic education sector and vocational training.
The project of industrialization of Africa and industrial redeployment of the Mashreq and the European Union could not start if there is a shortage of skilled labor.

The second floor of this rocket called the Trilateral is made up of three apartments, each of which is occupied by a block that must organize its members: states, institutions, communities of states and states not affiliated to a community. Each block must be organized politically, legally, economically and institutionally in order to conclude agreements and to follow up with the other blocs. Thus, the European Union must revise its texts and treaties and change its neighborhood policy for a renewal of relations with the southern Mediterranean, the Atlantic and the Mashreq, considering its destiny as intimately linked to these two other blocs.

In Mashreq, the only existing umbrella structure is the Gulf Cooperation Council. It is composed of oil monarchies, but its activities have been frozen since the boycott of Qatar by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Yemen and Egypt in the name of the fight against terrorism. This coalition accuses the Qatari state of duplicity with the Persian enemy, Iran, and mobilizes colossal means to reduce its influence. Contrary to popular belief, the opposition is not between Shiites and Sunnis but between pseudo regional powers. Iran's shah Pahlavi was he not the ally of the neighboring Arab monarchies in the same American camp? In reality, the power of the satellite states is at the economic level and the political weight of the Union with other states.

It would be wiser to leave political conflicts alone to reinforce one another economically. This is the best way to prepare for the post-oil era by embarking on the path of new intercontinental cooperation for the good of the people, peace and stability.
The Middle East region is experiencing destructive strains of their ability to get out of underdevelopment. The Arabic-speaking countries of North Africa could serve as a link between the three blocs with regard to the geostrategic, linguistic and historical fact.
The African Union needs to bring the regional economic zones together around the goals of the Trilateral. The African regional economic communities, by joining together into a federation under the leadership of the Union, will have to move towards more economic and monetary convergences and relations of co-productions and mutual subcontracting.
The generalization of Ohada by integrating the demands of non-Ohada states should respond to legal and judicial instability and suspicions of an unreliable judiciary.

The third floor of the rocket consists of private operators, NGOs, banks and insurance companies, chambers of commerce and industry, employers associations of the three blocks.

It's time for a new class of entrepreneurs to embrace modernization of agriculture, agri-food and industry through business, information and digital services .
The success of the Trilateral project would depend on the high degree of mobilization of public and private operators around investment opportunities in the framework of standard PPP (Public-Private Partnership) agreements.

State-owned enterprises in the South and Mashreq countries should move towards greater entrepreneurship, initiative and innovation and no longer rely on the crutches of the state and the great families that reign over their respective countries. This imposes non-rentier savings and more directed towards the efficiency of the combination of the factors of production, far from the oligopolistic behaviors and rentiers.

The Chambers of Commerce and Industry, the employers' organizations and the economic-diplomatic services of the three blocks should pool their databases on business opportunities, promising sectors and the routes and vicissitudes of investments to be executed or carried out. perspective. These business support organizations are invited to organize thematic, sectoral or branch symposia.
The Trilateral must not be content to favor only trade and business partnership agreements, but encompass social, political and environmental aspects. The value of work must be revalued in order to facilitate its rise in qualifications and skills. Gender equality is the foundation of socio-economic progress. Democracy is a factor of development and the emergence of talents and start-ups.

The triangular relations between the three blocs, Africa / Mashreq / European Union, must take a form of integration through production and an optimal combination of productive, human and material factors. This is intended to promote co-production, co-design and co-distribution within the borders of the three blocks and / or export to third countries. This strategy can take several forms: the joint venture, the multinational holding company or agreements between independent companies. The entanglement of productive apparatus may be based on a division of labor among Trilateral member countries or a specialization, based on comparative advantages.

As we are not in a logic of imperative planning, nor voluntarist public policies, but support and advice; The sectors to be prioritized are, of course, agro-food processing and raw materials. This requires import substitution activities to meet the needs of the African people and to loosen the external constraint that imposes dependence on international prices and a high cost in foreign exchange. States should promote the formation, rationalization of agro-food structures and the pooling of resources, by giving priority to the structure of the Economic Interest Grouping (EIG), which allows small farmers to gain in performance and to escape the shortcomings of small-scale farming. means and markets.
This vision is not just about Africa, but could address the short-, medium-, and long-term needs of the dry-land Mashreq countries, whose food and agri-food needs are staggering.

Africa's involvement in the international division of labor would only be achieved by enriching mineral and natural resources by transforming them into finished, semi-finished and manufacturing products for African, Arab and European markets.
African regional integrations would favor the emergence of industries benefiting from economies of scale, since they operate in a wider area and break with the narrowness of national markets. The example of the automotive industry is most convincing: the installation

of factories and their subcontractors would be profitable only when the market is buoyant, counting millions of units at the end of the production lines.

Renewable energies are at hand in countries with 200 days of sunshine, if not more per year. Other energies are also to be explored (wind, biomass, civil nuclear energy) that are necessary for the proper functioning of economic activities and the comfort of the inhabitants. Why not imagine a resizing of the Desertec project, involving European countries and Africa as part of an integrated Euro-African energy market?

In order to meet the needs of people and businesses in outlying villages and towns, it is possible to intensify the installation of small individual wind turbines connected to the grid and large scale wind farms. New technologies and the digital revolution are not destructive of jobs but a factor of innovation and productivity gains.
Services to agriculture, industry, businesses and households are areas of collaboration between the three blocks. Banks and insurance and European engineering are present in Africa but it is possible in return that European companies outsource their call centers, accounting and IT services according to the win-win rules that make them competitive internationally and locally.
Africa offers a poorly developed tourist potential in terms of climates, diversity of sites and reliefs and landscapes, the virginity and the purity of certain countries.
Wars and political and social instability, security problems divert Western tourists from the destination Africa.

In terms of fisheries policy, coordination is needed to track cross-border traffickers but also to usefully exploit the wealth of the two seas that bathe the continent, the Mediterranean and the Atlantic Ocean. In the face of the heavy means used by the Russian, American and Japanese fleets, fisheries agreements between Europe and Africa should protect the fishermen and the maritime wealth of Africa.
Several sectors such as pharmacy, chemistry and more generally industry need time to develop new products (it takes fifteen years on average to release a new drug). It is through the combined efforts of laboratories and public and private research centers that the Maghreb will be able to compete with emerging countries.

Uncontrolled urbanization in Africa should encourage African local and national authorities to call on European expertise in the development of Local Urbanism Plans (PLU) and urban planning techniques, taking into account the specificities of Africa.

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